Publications

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. Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance. In NIPS, 2018.

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. Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. 2018.

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. Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities. 2018.

. Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples. In FOCS, 2017.

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. Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms. In EC, 2017.

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. Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Duality. In STOC, invited to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior for STOC/FOCS/SODA, 2017.

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. A Duality Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. In SIGECOM Newsletter, 2016.

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. A Duality Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. In STOC, invited to the Special Issue of SIAM Journal on Computing for STOC and the 2017 Highlights of Algorithms, 2016.

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. Zero-sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax. In Mathematics of Operations Research, 2016.

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. On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. In SODA, 2016.

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. Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources. In COLT, 2015.

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. Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. In Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2015.

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. Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching. In WINE, 2014.

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. Simultaneous Bayesian Auctions and Computational Complexity. In EC, 2014.

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. Designing Markets for Daily Deals. In WINE, 2013.

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. Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design. In FOCS, invited to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior for STOC/FOCS/SODA, 2013.

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. Mechanism Design: a New Algorithmic Framework. Ph.D. Thesis, MIT, EECS Department. Honorable Mention of the George M. Sprowls Award (for best MIT doctoral theses in CS) and the SIGEcom Doctoral Dissertation Award runner-up, 2013.

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. Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions. In SODA, 2013.

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. Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. In SODA, invited to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior for STOC/FOCS/SODA, 2013.

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. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. In FOCS, 2012.

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. Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation?. In GandALF, invited to the Special Issue of Theoretical Computer Science for GandALF, 2012.

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. An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. In STOC, invited to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior for STOC/FOCS/SODA, 2012.

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. A Tight Lower bound for Streett Complementation. In FSTTCS, 2011.

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. Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing. In FOCS, invited to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior for STOC/FOCS/SODA, 2011.

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. On Optimal Multidimensional Mechanism Design. In SIGECOM Newsletter, 2011.

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. On Minmax Theorems for Multiplayer Games. In SODA, 2011.

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. An Improved Lower Bound for the Complementation of Rabin Automata. In LICS, 2009.

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. API Hyperlinking via Structual Overlap. In ESEC/FSE, 2009.

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