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Foreword

After over two decades of publication, Historical Discourses has become a veritable institution at McGill University. It showcases the best history essays written by McGill students, provides students with an experience in publishing and helps support our vibrant, intellectual student community. Yet, it almost met its premature demise when it failed to publish in 2006. Through his heroic efforts, last year’s editor-in-chief, Stefan Szpajda, resuscitated the Historical Discourses and printed both the 2006 and 2007 volumes. This year marks another successful year for the journal. Out of a pool of almost a hundred and twenty submissions we have chosen twelve essays that best illustrate the academic talent and intellectual diversity of our fellow history students. I hope you enjoy reading their fascinating papers.

Publishing our modest collection of essays was a Herculean labour, and could not have been done alone. I would like to thank the authors for writing such interesting essays, and for their tolerance of our—sometimes ruthless—editions. The members of the editorial board dedicated many hours into this project. Nicole Sandler, President of the History Students’ Association, offered advice and support throughout the year. A special thanks to our layout editor, Tristan Ratchford, who had to learn how to use QuarkXPress in only a couple days, but did a fantastic job. John Singer, a teacher of graphic design at Dawson College, assigned his class our cover as a school project, which is why we have Francis Arcand’s beautiful work encasing our journal. But even with great editors, budding historians and graphic designers, our efforts would have been in vain without our generous donors. The History Department, AUS, Dean of Arts, SSMU and Scotia Bank all made financial contributions that made the journal possible.

Historical Discourses is an important institution at McGill University because it fosters bonds between people; between the writers, editors and readers of the journal. Its viability is assured as long as it continues to be the fruit of a hundred labourers and enjoyed by all who read it.

Troy Vettese
Troy Vettese
Editor-in-Chief
This paper examines the physical and emotional experiences associated with maternity in Stalin’s system of forced labour camps. In spite of starvation, disease, violence, gruelling physical work and the overall oppression of the system, imprisoned women did, for various reasons, become mothers. In an attempt to understand this apparently painful and traumatic phenomenon, I approach the subject from a variety of perspectives. First, I unpack the image of the “liberated” New Soviet Woman in the 1930s: how propaganda created a “double-shift” for women as workers and mothers that had no inherent appeal and failed to revitalize falling birth rates. I then consider female prisoners’ ambiguous “double-shifts” as labourers and sexual commodities, and how the Gulag’s starkly sexualised atmosphere could set the stage for pregnancies in camp. Next, I examine the physical and emotional lives of mothers and their Gulag-born babies, emphasizing in particular both parties’ low levels of health and mothers’ cruelly restricted access to their children. In conclusion, I briefly consider what might have been a lasting consequence of Stalinist terror: Russia’s ever-sinking birth rate. I argue that, in one sense, the state brought this problem upon itself. Despite its propagandistic efforts, Stalinism generated a terrorized atmosphere in the Soviet Union that was hardly conducive to happy families. The treatment of women and infants (who were supposed to be citizens in their own right) in the camps thus illustrates one dimension of Stalin’s repressive, contradiction-ridden regime.

Soviet archival data tends to be “inflated and often spurious” at the best of times. Even if it were reliable, figures and official reports cannot reveal the individual and personal horror of internment. Fortunately, literature can. I will rely most heavily in this paper on the memoirs of Gulag survivors, particularly those of political prisoners Evgeniya Ginzburg and Hava Volovich. Ginzburg’s are the most elaborate, gripping and perceptive of all those I have encountered. She writes from the perspective of a relatively privileged “trustee” nurse who looked after Gulag babies and a weathered veteran of the ‘archipelago,’ as dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn famously called the expansive Gulag system. Volovich’s memoirs are notable as the lone in-depth account I have found of a woman who not only becomes a mother in camp, but who does so deliberately, out of loneliness. Martin Amis’ most recent novel, House of Meetings, is the sole work of fiction I reference because it describes the impact of state slavery on Russians’ ability to love and procreate. Amis, best known for his fiction, is also a historian; his 2002 book on Stalinist atrocities, Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million, lends credibility to his insights. Finally, I must acknowledge the depth and breadth of Anne Applebaum’s research for Gulag: A History. This tome draws from twenty-nine interviews with ex-prisoners, twenty different archives in over a dozen different locations, over two hundred memoirs and works of literature and three hundred and thirty reference works. It is indispensable to any examination of Soviet slavery.

To start, I will take a brief look at the political context in which many of our
subjects made the transition from “free” woman to prisoner. Between six and nine percent of the total camp population was swept up in the arrests of the 1930s, especially during Stalin’s political purges of 1937 and 1938. Known in folk memory as the “Great Terror”, these were the years in which the Gulag transformed from a series of disorganized, mismanaged prisons to a lethal chain of camp complexes where prisoners were deliberately worked to death in unprecedented numbers. Those arrested were often sentenced as “enemies of the people” under Article 58 of the Criminal Code, a special section for counter-revolutionary and political crimes. Labelling people as “class enemies” served the purposes of legitimising the terror and provided someone to blame for the Soviet Union’s continued poverty and backwardness, but reasons for arrest could be obscenely arbitrary. For instance, one could be suspected of having “foreign connections” (an uncle who lives abroad) or spreading “anti-Stalinist propaganda” (writing a subversive poem; telling or even laughing at a politically off-colour joke). NKVD (secret police) members, starting in 1937, began to arrest people without cause according to arbitrarily determined quotas. The official propaganda about “class enemies” ran parallel to reality, which was that tens of thousands of innocent people were being arrested, interrogated, tortured and shipped off to camps for absolutely no reason.

Feminist scholar Choi Chatterjee argues that “the precise noncorrespondence of ideology and reality constituted an important element of the Soviet experience,” not only regarding the incarceration of innocent people, but even within the official discourse about women. In Stalinist propaganda, the New Soviet Woman was first and foremost a worker whose professional success liberated her from gender inequality at home and in public life. At the same time, motherhood was an important civic duty: when a Soviet woman bore a child, she was contributing to a future generation of socialists who would defend the motherland against fascist and capitalist antagonism. Maternal functions were supposed to consume only a fraction of a woman’s time, however; the rest was to be engaged in socialist labour and community-oriented activity. Since motherhood was officially construed as a social act, the health and welfare of pregnant women were also matters of public concern. Officially, children were also viewed as citizens, and, as such, were entitled to day-care centres, kindergartens and medical care. In reality, these facilities were overcrowded and undersupplied, but the labour shortage in the Soviet Union brought on by radical industrialization necessitated a double-shift for women as both workers and mothers. Rather than being viewed as a double-burden, however, this double-shift was intended as evidence of the “indomitable Bolshevik spirit” and the superiority of Soviet women over their counterparts in other countries.

Despite this rhetoric, the reality was that women who found themselves pregnant had limited options. Abortion was prohibited in 1936. Illegal operations were usually performed by older women who lacked medical training, and the women who sought them were portrayed as counter-revolutionary for defecting to the ways of pre-socialist and pre-modern Russia. Interestingly, abortions were also officially regarded as something women were pressured to do by their male seducers who wanted to evade the consequences of their irresponsible behaviour. The state’s logic was that in the 1920s, material conditions were poor enough to warrant abortion, but living conditions and social services had improved so much in the 1930s that there was, supposedly, no reason to deny women their “natural right” to motherhood. Rabotnitsa, a popular Soviet journal, claimed that “in no other country do women enjoy such equality in political, social and
family life” and that “with the growth in prosperity [and] improvement in [culture]… all will desire the natural joy and great act of giving birth to a child.” Soviet historian Robert Service notes that abortion remained the most common birth control technique; it was not unusual for a woman to undergo a dozen aborted pregnancies before reaching menopause. The inability to secure basic goods such as housing, sugar and shoes, coupled with the extreme financial and ideological pressure on women to remain in the workforce, proved to be such a lasting problem that by the 1970s, couples in the Soviet Union were having, on average, only one child. The role of men in the family was propagandistically negligible since there was no parallel ideological goal that encouraged men to combine occupational and family activities. Men were primarily workers: “the work done by men had priority, and the occupational role of women was subordinate” though officially encouraged. Despite the abundance of Party propaganda claiming women’s liberation, the “revolutionary” new role for Soviet women simply entailed “a heavier form of patriarchy.”

A similar but more complex parallel can be drawn to women in the Gulag who faced a double burden of a different form. On top of their role as labourers, women were looked upon by camp administrators, free workers, and fellow male prisoners as sexual commodities, primarily because, like food and clothing, they were in comparatively short supply. Women were estimated to make up less than nine percent of the camp population before 1940, thirteen percent of the camp population in 1942, twenty-two percent in 1948 and around seventeen percent by Stalin’s death in 1953. In Soviet society, it is unclear how women were supposed to benefit from their double-shift. In camp, however, women’s sexual “collateral” was a mixed blessing. Depending on who is telling the story, women’s sexual experiences in camps can be described as tales of degradation, or, conversely, as stories of survival and even genuine romance. Gulag survivor Gustav Herling takes the former approach. He describes a young Polish girl who began work in the camps with “her head raised proudly,” repulsing any men who ventured near her. She eventually “gave in to her supervisor, who, until she did, would not let her steal a single carrot or rotten potato from the food warehouse in which she worked. From then on, however:

…she wandered about the camp zone till late at night like a cat in heat. Whoever wanted to could have her, on a bunk, under the bunk, in the separate cubicles of the technical experts… Once… I found her on a pile of potatoes with… the hunchbacked half-breed Levkovich; she burst into a spasmodic fit of weeping, and as she returned to the camp zone in the evening she held back her tears with two tiny fists.

On the other hand, most female survivors seem to recognize that sexual submissiveness could help women obtain better jobs, food, clothing and a superior status in the camp. Evgeniya Ginzburg describes camp romance as generally amoral, just another incarnation of the barter system. She tells the story of a young woman at work felling trees who gets propositioned by her brigadier leader and one of his friends. The brigadier functions as a sort of broker: “Hey sweetie! My pal here would like to compare notes with you.” Next, the friend comes forth with his proposal:
Lana Povitz

I’m the forwarding agent at Burkhalá [one of Kolyma’s most
dreaded gold mines] … so I can put you in the way of sugar,
butter, and white bread. I’ll give you shoes, felt boots, and a
really good padded jacket… We’ll have to fork out, of course!
There’s a shack available. About three kilometres from here….
It’s not too bad; you can toddle that far…”\(^\text{16}\)

Ginzburg maintains that these merchants were, more often that not,
unsuccessful. Still, she compassionately describes how downtrodden camp women lost
“bit by bit all hold on normal notions of ‘good and evil, of what is permissible and what is
not.” While at first a woman might respond to these offers with tears, terror and
indignation, this gradually gives way to apathy and then to acceptance, as one’s stomach
protests more and more loudly. “And sometimes,” she adds, “there was the voice of sex
too, which made itself heard from time to time despite everything.” Most compelling was
the example of one’s bunkmate, who had recovered her health and, enviably, “had been
able to exchange her sodden, tattered sandals for high felt boots.”\(^\text{17}\) Ginzburg notes that
some women hurtled themselves into “marriage” arrangements as soon as they arrived in
camp. One woman, Nadya, pragmatically defended her right to get married to an urka, or
criminal prisoner. (Political prisoners like Ginzburg and Nadya and criminal prisoners
were generally antagonistic to one another in the camps. ‘Politics’ considered criminals
morally abject, while criminals viewed politics as spineless and weak.)

I’m damn well going to marry him, whatever you say! I know he
spends his time playing cards, I know that he’s a yokel and that I
am a university graduate in Scandinavian languages. But who
needs my Scandinavian languages? I want my own quarters and
my own fireside. And children of my own… New ones… Those
on the mainland we shall never see again.”\(^\text{18}\)

Regardless of a woman’s motivations, most sexual encounters in camp were
conducted with shocking openness. Solzhenitsyn writes that “a multiple bunk curtained
off with rags from the neighbouring women was a classic camp scene,” that women’s
barracks were “incomparably filthy and rundown” with an “oppressive smell,” and that
not only men, but boys as young as twelve and thirteen flocked to the barracks to watch
and learn. An attractive woman was cursed. Far luckier were those whose obvious old
age or physical repellence defended them from men who proposition “with beatings and
knives.”\(^\text{19}\) Hava Volovich describes sex as animal-like: “Things that a free person might
have thought about a hundred times before doing happened here as simply as they would
between stray cats.”\(^\text{20}\)

It would be gross oversimplification to reduce all camp “love,” as these liaisons
were euphemistically called in many ex-prisoner accounts, to prostitution and depravity.
There are stories of genuine romance among prisoners as well. Solzhenitsyn abandons
his characteristic cynicism when he mentions the “unfleshly character” of some camp
romances. In certain cases, love was “more poignant than out in freedom! Women…could
not sleep nights because of a chance smile, because of some fleeting mark of attention
they had received. So sharply did the light of love stand out against the dirty, murky
Nevertheless, these encounters are the exception to the rule. Ginzburg laments that as a youth, she had always subscribed to Hamsun’s dreamy definition of love: “a breeze rustling amid the sweetbrier, or a squall that snaps the mast of boats at sea.” Camp love, she came to see, was the opposite of romance, reducible to “hasty, perilous meetings in some sketchy shelter.” If caught, a prisoner might be sent to a penal labour brigade where work was so dangerous that “you could end up paying for your date with nothing less than your life.” Some authorities punished couples for what they regarded as the shirking of work duties. One couple was given five days’ punishment in solitary confinement for “relations between a male and a female convict involving a horse standing idle for two hours.” After all the accounts I have read, Applebaum’s conclusion that most relationships shared the generally brutal atmosphere of the rest of camp life is hard to dispute.

Pregnancies inevitably resulted from sexual encounters, but not as often as they might have in free society. For one thing, amenorrhoea, or the cessation of menses in female prisoners, could result from insufficient food rations. This was particularly a problem during the later years of the Second World War when supplies were sent to soldiers at the front and even civilians in Moscow and Petrograd were starving. Gynaecologist N. I. Zubov, who, as a prisoner, practiced in the camps for ten years, observed that, statistically, women reacted more swiftly and sharply to arrest and its principal consequence, loss of family. This spiritual wounding, he observed, usually expressed itself though the absence of menstruation. Solzhenitsyn noted that for women who worked in clay pits or at the back-breaking activity of felling trees, bodies became so worn out that “everything that is feminine in a woman, whether it be constant or whether it be monthly, ceases to be.” A woman becomes “ageless… her breasts hang down in little dried-out sacs; superfluous folds of skin form wrinkles on her flat buttocks… several months of logging will suffice for the prolapse and falling out of a more important organ.” Solzhenitsyn is shyly referring, of course, to the uterus. Under such physical duress, many women’s bodies were simply unable to conceive.

Even if women could menstruate, the general level of health among prisoners was so low that there was no guarantee that a woman could deliver a healthy baby. Vitamin deficiency was omnipresent, and diseases of starvation like scurvy, pellagra and various forms of diarrhoea were common. In early stages, these illnesses manifested themselves in the form of loosened teeth and skin sores. Even camp guards regularly showed these symptoms. In later stages, nightblindness and regular dizziness set in. Legs swelled, turned purple, itched and formed blotches that turned into massive boils from which blood and pus trickled constantly. Finally, men and women became virtually indistinguishable except for women’s “pendulous, withered breasts.” They eventually lost the ability to control their bowels, grew demented, ranted and raved and ate anything they could, including birds, dogs and garbage. This minority, known as “goners” (dokhodyaga) or “shiteaters” (gavnoedy), were the camp’s pariah caste. Starvation-related sickness was by no means the only cause of death. There were frequent typhus epidemics, not surprising given the dearth of clean water available in most camps. A 1941 report from Siblag, a large camp in Siberia, states that 8,029 inmates were hospitalised that year, 746 had tuberculosis (109 died), 72 had pneumonia (22 died), 36 had dysentery (9 died), 177 had frostbite (5 died), 302 had “stomach
ailments" (7 died), 210 had had heart attacks at work (7 died) and 912 had circulation problems (123 died).28 Mortality rates in the camps differed depending on the year, time of year, style of administration, availability of food and the kind of labour its inmates did (workers in gold mines would have died more frequently than those in textile factories, for instance). Former prisoner Elinor Lipper, who worked as a nurse at a camp hospital in Kolyma, observed that the average mortality rate was ten to fifteen deaths a month out of fifty beds for male prisoners, and considerably lower for women, though she does not say why.29 She describes tuberculosis, intestinal disease and pellagra as the most common causes of death.30 Feminist historian Emma Mason cites an estimate that mortality rates in the camps were three to four times higher than those of the civilian population for the same age cohorts.31

Unfortunately, I have not been able to find comprehensive figures, even estimates, of overall infant mortality rates in the camps. Applebaum does provide one statistic from a 1949 report on the condition of women in the camps. It notes that of the 503,000 women in the system, 9,300 (or 1.8 percent) were pregnant.32 Presuming all these women carried their pregnancies to term and delivered live babies, and presuming Applebaum’s statistic that there were a total of 2,356,685 prisoners in the system in 1949 is accurate, the birth rate in the Gulag would have increased its population by 0.4 percent that year.33 In comparison, the Soviet Union’s birth rate in 1949 reveals a three percent increase in population.34 The Gulag birth rate, then, would be a mere thirteen percent of the national total. The real number would obviously be much lower: it is improbable to the point of impossibility that all the women in the Gulag would deliver live babies. From this we can say, at least, that “successful” camp deliveries were relatively uncommon.

I have put “successful” in quotation marks because not all women would regard the birth of a child in the Gulag as a positive thing. While working as a nurse in Elgen, a state farm in Kolyma that had a camp for pregnant mothers, Ginzburg thought that the nursing mothers who arrived to breastfeed their infants were “the most appalling thing of all.” Anxious and miserable, “it was hard to tell what they feared more: that their infant born in Elgen would survive or that it would die.”35 Hava Volovich remarks in her memoir that the childbearing instinct may be a beautiful thing in ‘real’ life, but it was terrible to have in the camps. Unfortunately, an imprisoned woman’s reasoning, by the time she decided to have a child, was usually too blunted for her to think very carefully. Loneliness and her need to love determined Volovich’s decision to bear a child in camp:

Our need for love, tenderness, caresses was so desperate that it reached the point of insanity, of beating one’s head against a wall, of suicide. And we wanted a child—the dearest and closest of all people, someone for whom we could give up our own life. I held out for a relatively long time. But I did so need and long for a hand of my own to hold, something I could lean on in those long years of solitude, oppression, and humiliation to which we were all condemned.36

Despite her use of the words “our” and “we” in this quotation, Volovich’s motives are not explicitly echoed in other women’s accounts. Many women prisoners had negative
attitudes towards children. For instance, Elinor Lipper describes a criminal prisoner who averred “I’d rather have got myself syphilis than a brat.” Some women had abortions in camp. Gulag administration appears to have been undecided about to what extent abortions were permissible: sometimes women were allowed but other times they received second sentences for attempting to have one. Applebaum points out that after reading dozens of interviews and memoirs, she has only found two accounts, perhaps because abortion, much like suicide, was something of a taboo in the camps. One woman, Anna Andreeva, describes another woman who “stuffed nails into herself, sat down and began to work on her sewing machine,” and bled heavily. Some men also had negative attitudes about bringing children into a world of slavery. Gulag survivor and Israeli politician Joseph Berger tells the story of a man who, upon release from camp, got married to a young Siberian woman. Before the marriage took place, he insisted upon one condition: they were never to have any children.

“I don’t want to be the father of slaves,” he insisted, “I don’t want to have children who will live in the same misery I’m living in… Life has taught me… that our fate is to perish in our misfortune, and our children will be branded equally unfortunate. That’s why we have no right to have children.”

Berger insists that this attitude was common.

Some women, mainly criminals, supposedly, cynically became pregnant, reasoning that it was one way to cheat the system. Since criminals were rarely literate, they did not leave much (if anything) in the way of memoirs. Consequently, what is known about them has been gleaned from the perspective of politicals. Elinor Lipper expressed a “highly ambivalent” attitude towards them: on one hand, urkas were “products of social injustice combined with hereditary degeneration and feeblemindedness.” On the other hand, politicals “had to share [their] days and nights with these heirs of social misery and parental alcoholism. And while we lived with them, charitable theories did not help; we could feel for them only hatred.” This “more or less morally unified” class of prisoners lived by the ruthless principle “You die today and I’ll live tomorrow.” Ginzburg describes criminals as being “beyond the bounds of humanity.” They engaged in orgies and, when they became mothers, were apt to swear and curse at the attendant nurses who were in charge of looking after their children, threatening to hurt or kill them “if their little Alfred or Eleanor died.” Perhaps these women did love their children; their conspicuous silence in memoir literature makes it impossible to know for sure. Nevertheless, ex-political prisoner Nadezhda Jofe would argue that these women threatened nurses because they were prone to aggression, not because they cared for their infants. The inmates she met while nursing her child in the camp’s wet nurse barracks “didn’t have any maternal instincts.”

At any rate, women who were, for whatever reason, motivated to become pregnant could be sure of some benefits. Depending on the camp, mamki (as nursing women were called in prison slang) could expect to be excused from hard work, receive slightly more or better food, and, in the best cases, benefit from periodic amnesties. One such amnesty was given in 1945 and another in 1948, probably because roughly twenty-six million citizens of the USSR had died in the War. These amnesties did not usually
Official amnesties were rare. Most mothers and their babies had to live under the restrictive, punishing rules of the camp administration. According to GARF (State Archive) records, beginning in 1939, pregnant women and nursing mothers were released from work either one or two months on either side of pregnancy. After three months of pregnancy and until the birth of her child, and also while nursing her child, a woman would be permitted to do less strenuous work (like field work or snow removal) if she had been previously employed in hard labour. Theoretically, women were supposed to receive supplementary rations in the form of extra bread, meat, milk, vegetables, potatoes or sugar. However, it is unclear what female prisoners’ standard rations actually were. What is known is that prisoner diets were of low caloric value and fat content, and that dense, wet, poor-quality bread was the staple. Thin, watery soup was also standard fare, as was a thin gruel or porridge. Women received smaller rations than men in general, and so the possibility of receiving more food was undeniably (for some) an incentive to become pregnant. Women were permitted to breastfeed for up to nine months until 1939, when the rule was changed to six months only. Until the newborn was three months old, a nursing mother could visit with her child a maximum of seven times per day. Between the ages of three and five months, children were allowed six visits, and after five months, only five visits were allowed for nursing purposes. Mamki were only allowed in the feeding room, nowhere else. They would arrive at and exit the children’s barracks under armed guard. Before entering the feeding room, they had to wash their hands, breasts and nipples. They could stay no longer than thirty minutes, and silence had to be maintained. Mothers who had stopped nursing, or whose bodies did not receive enough calories to lactate, were officially allowed to see their babies on the sixth and twenty-fourth day of each month between five and six o’clock in the evening.

These were the rules in theory. As with the rest of camp life, inmates were at the mercy of individual camp bosses, guards and overseers. For instance, Lipper describes the dreaded commander of Elgen, Valentina Mikhailovna Zimmermann, who hated mothers. In spite of threats and warnings, these women nevertheless kept bringing children into the world. Meanwhile, they worked fewer hours and were a drag on camp resources. To punish their insolence (as she saw it), Zimmermann eliminated the limited bi-monthly visiting hours for non-nursing mothers from May to September, on the grounds that prisoners could not be released from their work in the fields. Applebaum points to sources that said women were allowed only fifteen minutes or even less with their children every four hours, so babies who took longer than that to nurse went hungry. Pitiless camp administrators who cared little for the mother-child bond could be made to relax with sufficient bribery. For instance, Volovich’s job felling trees and working at a saw mill meant that, despite having “a chill on the bladder and terrible lumbago,” she could gather a small bundle of firewood every day after work. She would then be able to exchange this wood for the chance to visit with her daughter outside normal visiting hours; unless, of course, the guards at the entrance gates took the firewood for themselves.

Gulag mothers frequently comment upon the staff’s corruption and meanness. Nadezhda Joffe maintains that the cushy nursery jobs usually went to criminals, women
who would spend hours under the stairs with their camp husbands or simply quit the premises, leaving the children unfed, unattended and free to get sick and die without supervision. Lipper says that even though criminals are usually selected for work in the children’s barracks, they are unsuitable for this task, so there is constantly a struggle between the head of the compound, who wants competent nurses, and the commandant of the camp, who does not want to allow counterrevolutionaries access to such preferred work. Volovich describes at length the terrible routine at Elgen in what she calls the House of Dead Babies. Children’s blankets were not tucked in around them at night, but merely placed on top of their cots, ostensibly for cleanliness, despite the ward’s temperature of only eleven or twelve degrees Celsius. In the mornings, children were forced out of their cold beds with shoves and kicks, and washed with ice-cold water. They did not dare cry, though, and instead “made little sniffing noises like old men,” emitted “an awful hooting … [or lay] on their backs, knees pressed to their stomachs, making these strange noises like the muffled cooing of pigeons.” Volovich asserts that nurses were always looking to reduce their workload in order to have some free time. One nurse, responsible for washing, dressing and feeding seventeen children and keeping the ward swept (no easy task), found a way to reduce time spent on feeding by tying each baby’s hands with a towel and “cramping spoonful after spoonful of hot porridge down its throat, not leaving it enough time to swallow, exactly as if she were feeding a turkey chick.” This attendant did this in front of a horrified Volovich, apparently unperturbed that anyone was watching. Babies were also left tied to their potties, which led to prolapses of the large intestines for many children: “no wonder there were plenty of empty beds in the infants’ shelter… Three hundred babies died there every year even before the war started.”

Indeed, death and illness were such a presence in the children’s barracks that one could only guess that willing mothers had little sense, beforehand, of the conditions their newborns would face. Hava Volovich certainly did not. Shortly after she gave birth to her daughter Eleonora, she was transferred from a camp near the town of Magadan to Elgen. Here, her “pudgy little angel with the golden curls soon turned into a pale ghost with blue shadows under her eyes and sores all over her lips.” Over time, Eleonora grew weak and began to fade. Sometimes her mother would visit and find little bruises on her body, and the child would grab her mother’s neck and moan. By the time she was fifteen months old, she seemed to realise her appeals were in vain: she stopped reaching for her mother when she visited, and would instead turn away in silence. The last time Volovich saw her daughter, she picked her up for nursing but Eleonora only “stared wide-eyed somewhere off” into the distance, then started to beat her weak little fists on [her mother’s] face, clawing at [her] breast, and biting it. Then she pointed down at her bed.” When Volovich returned later in the evening, her baby’s cot was empty. She found Eleonora’s naked corpse lying in the morgue among the cadavers of adult prisoners. She died on 3 March 1944, at one year and four months. To this day, Volovich does not know the location of her daughter’s grave, as she was not allowed outside the compound to bury her. “That,” writes Volovich in her memoir, “is the whole story of how, in giving birth to my only child, I committed the worst crime there is.”

While working in the Infants’ Unit at Elgen, Ginzburg encountered innumerable instances of babies’ suffering. One heart-rending passage in her memoir describes a particularly virulent diarrhoea epidemic where infants died in large numbers,
despite being heavily attended by both prisoner and free doctors. “The conditions in which the mothers had lived during pregnancy, the high acidity of their milk, and the climate of Elgen had all taken their toll,” writes Ginzburg. The biggest dilemma was the lack of breast milk in mothers, which was both “acidulous from their grief” and increasingly scarce as time went on. One baby died before he was six months old from toxic dyspepsia, succumbing within three days. His mother could not produce any milk, and the artificial milk did not help him. All the babies in the unit had bedsores, and were getting thinner by the day and increasingly worn out from crying. Some, she reports, wailed thinly, as though no longer expecting anyone to take notice, others howled desperately while others stopped crying and “simply groaned as adults do.” This lethargy, one might speculate, might have been a symptom of serious dehydration, one of the major consequences of diarrhoea.

When Ginzburg is transferred to the isolation ward, she encounters more of the same suffering. She mentions a one-year-old boy with a “pleasant oval face” who wheezed and made convulsive movements with hands that had bright blue fingernails. This condition, called cyanosis, results from a lack of oxygen in the blood. Since Ginzburg describes this boy as having a spot on his lung, it is possible that the boy had a lung disease. But cyanosis is sometimes also caused by environmental factors like exposure to cold air or water, high altitudes, or shock, all which he might have faced at Elgen. Another boy “bore the sins of his criminal father”: he was dying of a congenital case of syphilis. While Ginzburg does not think that children in these camps can be compared with the starved and gassed Jewish children of the Nazi regime, since Gulag babies had the luxury of medical attention, useless though it often was, and received plenty of food, her experiences in Elgen have been permanently etched in her mind. Perhaps most haunting is the image of one baby, known as “the Queen of Spades.” Only five months old, she had “the face of an octogenarian, wise, sardonic, full of irony… as if she knew it all—she who had stopped in our compound, in that little world of hatred and death, for a brief moment of time.” Whenever she was given injections, Ginzburg reported that the baby did not cry but “only grunted feebly and looked straight at me with the eyes of an infinitely wise old lady.” She died within a few days.

While life in camp could be almost unbearably harsh for adult prisoners, there is something particularly horrible about the suffering of young children. As Volovich poignantly puts it, “a child cannot grow used to things or forget them; he can only put up with them, and when that happens, anguish settles into his heart and condemns him to sickness and death.” It will never be possible to adequately quantify or summarize the suffering of these women and children. Tracing the far-reaching effects of the experiences described in this paper is just as challenging. Still, the atrocities of the Gulag (embodied in some ways by, but certainly not limited to, the experiences of these children and their mothers) cannot have been consequence-free. It is difficult to see Russia’s free-falling birth rate, which intersected its ascending death rate in 1992 (forming what Amis calls the “Russian cross”), and the fact that Russia’s population is supposed to halve in the next fifty years, as being completely removed from what happened in the Gulag. Another country was responsible for the killing of millions in the late 1930s and 1940s, but it recovered. The Nuremberg Trials and other post-war punishments imposed by the Allies forced Germans to reckon with their country’s Nazi past. As Amis’ fictional narrator in House of Meetings observes:
Germany isn’t withering away as Russia is. Rigorous atonement… reduces the weight of the offence. Or what is atonement for? What does it do? In 2004, the German offence is a very slightly lighter thing than it was. The Russian offence… is still the same. Yes, yes… Russia’s busy… We will never have the “luxury” of confession and remorse. But what if it isn’t a luxury? What if it’s a necessity, a dirt-poor necessity? The conscience, I suspect, is a vital organ. And when it goes, you go.65

I can, of course, only speculate, but it is hard to resist the logic of this paragraph. Soviet and post-Soviet efforts to make amends for the horrors of the Stalinist years have been trifling to the point of insult, and have resulted in a national lack of interest in its past.66

A concluding comment from Amis’ nameless fictional narrator in House of Meetings, an eighty-four-year-old man who fought in the Second World War and lived nine years in the Gulag, may have been right on the mark:

As the Babylonians were leading the Jews into captivity they asked them to play their harps. And the Jews said, “We shall work for you, but play we shall not.” That’s what they were saying in 1936, and that’s what they’re saying now. We will work for you, but we’re not going to fuck for you anymore. We are not going to go on doing it… making people to be set before the indifference of the state.67

While men were expected only to labour, Stalinist propaganda pushed women to be mothers as well as workers. Rewards were minimal in both cases: the state failed to support women in terms of childcare facilities, and the material quality of life was so low that women worked because they needed the income. Even after outlawing abortion in 1936, official state policy proved unable to reverse what proved to be a lasting trend: women were not as willing as the state would have liked to produce the heirs of socialism. In camps, the opposite was true. Women were having babies, but the “enemy” mother and her child were worth nothing in the eyes of the state.

I would argue that in spite of all its rhetoric, the Stalinist state was more effective at stunting than jump-starting the Soviet birthrate. Stalin’s brutality and injustice did not happen in a vacuum, nor was it reserved for Gulag prisoners. Millions died in the de-kulakization and agricultural collectivisation of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and millions more were killed in the War. Though the specifics of these atrocities lie outside the scope of this paper, it must be said that a system so fundamentally dependent upon repression, one that punishes even its most innocent newborn citizens, cannot hope to produce happily multiplying families. Instead of creating a society into which women would both want and be able to bring children, the Stalinist state subjected its men and women to suffering that is almost beyond comprehension. The traumatic experiences of maternity in the Gulag are but one microcosm of this suffering.
Endnotes

1. My thanks to Karen Petrone at University of Kentucky, Marci Shore, recently of Yale University, Lynne Viola at University of Toronto, Anne Applebaum, and Nanci Adler at the Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam. Their recommendations and support were valuable to me in researching this project.


5. Ibid., 95.


8. Ibid., 61. Soviet policy on abortion changed with the earliest efforts of de-Stalinization in 1955. For a convincing but surprising take on why abortion was re-legalized, see David M. Heer, “Abortion, Contraception, and Population Policy in the Soviet Union,” Soviet Studies 17 (July 1965): 76-83.


12. Ibid., 417.

13. Mason, 133.


17. Ibid., 13.

18. Ibid., 15-14.


22. Ginzburg, 11-12.

23. Ibid., 15.


26. Ibid., 235.

27. Ibid., 335.

28. Ibid., 339.

29. Lipper, 294.

30. Ibid., 299.

31. Mason, 144.

32. Applebaum, 322.
33. Figure based on the calculation \[9300/2,356,685 = 0.0039\]. This rounds to an increase of 0.4 percent of the total Gulag population.

34. Based on “FIGURE I. – Birth and Death Rates in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, 1861, 1965” which reveals the birth rate to be thirty live births per thousand. This translates to a three percent annual increase in the total Soviet population. David M. Heer, “The Demographic Transition in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union,” *Journal of Social History* 1 (Spring 1968): 213.

35. Ginzburg, 9.

36. Volovich, 260.


38. Applebaum, 319.


40. Lipper, 147-148.

41. Ginzburg, 12, 9.


43. Service, 295.

44. Applebaum, 318.

45. Mason, 141.

46. Ibid., 141-142.

47. The energy cost of lactation is 2095 kJ a day, or roughly 500 calories. The diet of a parturient woman should contain around 10,050 kJ, approximately 2,400 calories. Women who have been well nourished during pregnancy have fat stores of up to 125 700 kJ, or around 3000 calories. Jeremy Oats and Suzanne Abrahamson, “Maintenance of Lactation,” *Llewellyn-Jones Fundamentals of Obstetrics and Gynaecology*, Eighth Edition (Edinburgh: Elsevier Mosby, 2005), 93. While I have not been able to find an average calorie intake for women prisoners, nowhere have I read anything that would lead me to believe that an average female prisoner, pregnant or not, was given anywhere near 2,400 calories worth of food.

48. Mason, 142.

49. Lipper, 121.

50. Applebaum, 322.

51. Volovich, 262.

52. Applebaum, 322.

53. Lipper, 121-122.

54. Volovich, 262-263. Volovich does not describe how came to know this deathrate. Perhaps it is just a guess.

55. Ibid., 263-264.

56. Ginzburg, 7.

57. Ibid., 16-17.


61. Ginzburg, 10.

62. Volovich, 263.


64. Ibid., 209.

65. Ibid., 211.

66. Applebaum, 573.
67. Amis, 237-238.
Social Memory, Public Space, and Collective Action

Katherine Saunders-Hastings

Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was governed by a junta, which waged a self-styled “dirty war” against leftist subversion. It became infamous for its tactics of state terror that included the abduction, torture, and murder of tens of thousands of Argentines and introduced the noun “disappeared” into the international lexicon. On 24 March 1996, the twentieth anniversary of the coup that marked the beginning of the dictatorship and the disappearance of thirty thousand Argentines, President Carlos Menem enjoined his fellow Argentinians to practise “the sound exercise of memory” while reflecting upon this episode. But thirteen years after the transition back to democratic civilian rule, not all Argentines could agree on what might constitute the responsible use of memory and its appropriate role in society. As the president urged his compatriots “not to ‘rub salt in old wounds’” by bringing up painful history, a newly formed group of “surprisingly youthful relatives” of those persecuted by the junta were vociferously contesting the dominant narrative of this era of history in the streets of Buenos Aires.

While in the early years after the return to democracy there were investigations and trials of some members of the junta accused of ordering or carrying out atrocities, the late 1980s saw the passing of laws foreclosing this process to allow Argentine society to “move on.” Following the 1990 presidential pardon of those generals who had been convicted, there was little official or public discussion of the events that occurred in the period. Formed in late 1995, the organization HIJOS (Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice against Oblivion and Silence) sought to resist and reverse what Susana Kaiser has termed the prevailing “culture of impunity” of Argentina in the 1990s.

The escrache is the characteristic strategy developed by HIJOS and later adopted by other youth activist organizations in the Americas and in Europe. This is a “militant festival” in which demonstrators occupy the spaces around former secret detention and torture centres or the homes and offices of junta-era represores (a generic category that includes the murderers, torturers, kidnappers, political figures and profiteers of state terror). The term escrache is taken from Argentine slang and implies the public exposure or unmasking of hidden facts and people. This practice, “reminiscent of the way in which lepers were marked in medieval times,” aims to rescind the anonymity and normality granted to those implicated in the dictatorship’s crimes, rendering them vulnerable to social scorn and ostracism. One activist at a 2002 escrache conceptualized the objectives of the demonstrations by explaining that “we are convinced that memory, just like justice and politics, is action, it is construction, that we must do from the bottom up, and therefore we are constructing social condemnation.” Sandrine LeFranc described the carnivalesque, raucous atmosphere created by the young protestors:

The place where the repressor lives is marked with flour, eggs,
black and red paint...Escraches have none of the aspect of a parade of mourning orphans. Guilt is assigned: “Alert, alert, alert all neighbours...living next to you is a military assassin!” Drums, trumpets, whistles, and music groups produce a deafening noise to break with more than twenty years of silence. Fire spitters, clowns, mimes from street theatre troupes, painted silhouettes of the disappeared, paint stains are there to condemn the place, to expose it to the greatest possible visibility.9

These highly public protests constitute a dramatic accusation directed at both the represores who continue to enjoy impunity for their crimes and the political culture that allows them to do so.

Convening their demonstrations at a high traffic public space, HIJOS members lead the escrache along a parade of sorts with banners, music, and taunting chants towards the residence of the target represore. Along the way, street theatre performances and speeches describe the person’s crimes and the escrache’s aims, while the “Street Art Group” affiliated with HIJOS posts their placards and mock traffic signs warning the neighbourhood of the presence of a represore in the midst, signalling the public space they pass through as one for “Juicio y Castigo” (Justice and Punishment). Arriving at the represore’s home, the demonstrators witness the “marking” of the residence: “First, the organizers paint the road with the word ‘murderer,’ and then they throw balloons full of red paint at the house or building. The red marks symbolize bloodstains.”10 The narrative of the past that they are articulating seeks to break down the walls built by the official history to isolate the period of repression from the accepted and celebrated course of national history.

Kaiser argues that the escraches can only be understood “within the context of the memory battles taking place in Argentina.”11 What are the roots of the historical narrative and official discourse of impunity that the HIJOS are reacting against? How does the engagement of HIJOS with Argentina’s repressive past differ from the dominant representation? As the escraches appear so novel and have proved highly controversial with many sectors of the general public, it is important to explore their origins in Argentine popular culture. If, as Javier Auyero argues, collective actions draw their strategies from a “cultural repertoire,”12 to what traditions in the performative, political use of public space do the escraches trace their lineage?13 The social and historical factors informing the escrache movement are manifold and complex and have suffered a dearth of academic attention. The late 1990s, in part through the mobilizing efforts of HIJOS, was a time in Argentina when “the past had decisively intensified its presence in the public sphere.”14 Working towards understanding the processes and actors involved in this shift illuminates the social dimensions and dynamics of memory and history.

Narrative Construction and Memory Contests in the Public Sphere
Memory has often been dismissed by traditional historians as too amorphous to constitute a central part of the record of the past; the recollections of persons, with all their fallibility and partiality, were perceived as a concern more appropriate to psychoanalysis than to history. In recent years, however, the relationship between history and memory has increasingly become the focus of cross-disciplinary study in the social
sciences, with a growing consensus that ‘what actually happened’ includes the subjective perceptions and experiences of social actors’ as much as it does the facts assembled from documentary evidence. Mauricio Halbwachs argues that just as individuals are inescapably intertwined with a social fabric, so too are personal recollections inextricably bound up with collective narratives; the memories of individuals or groups are at once shaped by and productive of the histories in social circulation. History and historical narratives are now being re-evaluated, with scholars looking not for the neutral truth they impart about some portion of the human past, but rather for their social and political content and effect. Kaiser points out that to ‘some extent, the significance of any historical period depends on the value that it has in the present.’ Some have gone so far as to assert, following Alexandra Portelli, that the ‘relevant historical event is not what actually happened, but the memory of the event.’

Several Latin American specialists, notably Susana Kaiser and Elizabeth Jelin, have applied theories of social and collective memory developed primarily in European contexts to post-dictatorial Latin American nations. They argue that, far from being irrelevant personal mythologies, memories are formed within and act upon social networks and processes, and are integral to understanding how societies cope with and move forward from periods of state repression and violence. Jelin emphasizes that it is ‘human beings who have the capacity to remember, and they are always located in specific group or social contexts. It is impossible to remember or re-create the past without alluding to those contexts.’ History, in terms of how the past is understood, is not then solely or even primarily textual in nature, but rather is an evolving series of ‘social events’ as people actively form, transmit, and contest new narratives about the past over changing circumstances. According to this analysis, the present is the beginning—the access point—to history since the meanings attributed to the past by social actors are framed by the political commitments, social agendas, and power relations that form their present context. This feature lends memory its dynamic, conflictive, and fluid character; hence the need to “historicize” or contextualize memory: changing historical circumstances within a given community influence the content and meanings attributed to history itself. Struggles over memory take place in the public sphere of debate, and also in the public space of symbols. Memory can thus be conceptualized as ‘cultural capital that inscribes itself symbolically,’ with those holding the most power in a society having the easiest access to venues for promoting their visions of the past. Powerful political interests work to erect an institutionally sanctioned and broadly accepted canon of memories which will reify some visions and dimensions of history while eliding many others. This lionization of certain realms of historical experience necessarily narrows or even eliminates the public discursive space available to other dissenting or more complex expressions. In the context of the escrache movement, it is important to recall, as Susan Eckstein points out, that people ‘rebel because they have limited alternative means to voice their views and press for change.’

Kaiser, who in 1998 interviewed young Argentineans born during and after the dictatorship, asserts that amidst the boom in research on memory in societies emerging from periods of mass human rights abuses, there is a major lacuna concerning the generations born during or after this violence, generations who therefore have only socially mediated understandings of this recent history. Having proposed that the meanings attributed to one ‘history’ will inevitably evolve with changes in context, Jelin
argues that the “succession of cohorts or generations necessarily implies the emergence of new contexts” and that this process of demographic replacement is closely tied to that of social memory. Generations, according to Pierre Nora, as products and repositories of memory, both form and express their shared narratives in the course of social interaction and collective participation in public sphere activities, notably events such as demonstrations. The HIJOS activists who engage in the escraches belong to the first generation of Argentines coming of age and formulating or perpetuating collective and conflictive narratives without direct personal memories of the dictatorship, a generation that has been described as “torn between indifference and indignation” towards their nation’s violent recent history. These young adults inherited a particular dominant story that, inscribed with particular omissions, had evolved in and occupied much of the Argentine public sphere since the end of the dictatorship. By the mid-1990s, this official discourse nearly monopolized the traditional and institutional channels for debate, and those who sought to contest it had to innovate new communication strategies to voice their opposition. The most vociferous denunciation came from the youth involved with the escraches, which follows Jelin’s hypothesis that it is often the generations entering the public sphere after periods of violence who go the furthest in rendering visible and questioning the silences and inconsistencies of the narratives transmitted by the witness generation.

The Official Story

 Echoing Benedict Anderson’s argument that at the core of every nation’s history lies those episodes that its citizens have communally forgotten, Kaiser proposes that post-repression societies must undergo “a process of reconstructing a common history and memory of which what is to be remembered and what is to be forgotten are essential components.” The Argentine governments after the transition back to democracy certainly engaged in such construction, and the focal points and silences of the dominant narrative that emerged have had an important impact on the nation’s social memory. Several historians have examined the transitional period of political democratization as a “process of democratic regime construction” in which the political logic of institutional consolidation had to be balanced with, and often prioritized over, demands for justice and reparation arising from the abuses of the dictatorship. This negotiation at the political level is mirrored by a similar process in the formation of social memories and narratives regarding acceptable inclusions and necessary omissions. The democratic governments in power in the first decade after military rule made political choices that involved the creation of officially-sanctioned silences regarding several very significant elements of Argentina’s era of state terror.

Even before the military gave up formal power at the end of 1983, the task of constructing memory and pursuing justice was made difficult for its successors. In their last months in power, the fourth junta passed an amnesty law, seeking to protect themselves from prosecution for any crimes committed while in power, and, in November of 1983, ordered the destruction by fire of all materials documenting the “struggle against subversion.” Despite these and other impediments to the truth about this period, the beginning of civilian rule was a “moment of great expectation” for truth and justice for most Argentines. Raúl Alfonsin of the Radical Party, the first civilian president after the dictatorship, ran his campaign and was elected on the basis of his human rights
agenda, and, within days of taking office, had announced the formation of CONADEP (the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons); Argentina’s truth commission. When CONADEP published its final report, Nunca más (Never Again), several months later, it instantly became a bestseller in Argentina. Argentine historian Tulio Halperin Donghi recounted how “this overwhelmingly monotonous tale of systemic cruelty became the favourite reading of hordes of [Argentine] tourists who converged on Mar del Plata during the summer, making copies of the Informe as much a part of the beach scene as bottles of suntan lotion.”

Argentines were avidly consuming the horrors of their recent past, but the critical question is with what aspects of the past the report led them to engage. The prologue to Nunca más begins with the sentence: “During the 1970s, Argentina was convulsed by a terror that came as much from the extreme right as from the extreme left.” This is an early and influential formulation of the “Theory of Two Devils,” an explanation of the human rights violations of the dictatorship period that assigns blame in roughly equal measure to the irrational violence of leftist terror and an overzealous response from the military. It conveys a sharply polarized picture of the conflict, presenting general civil society as an innocent onlooker, isolated from participation, held hostage by and caught in the crossfire of bipartisan violence. This rhetoric has become a prominent feature in the dominant narrative and social memory of the junta, but it is, in fact, a distortion of history. The same prologue that begins by framing state terror in terms of a battle between soldiers and terrorists later notes that almost all of the repression was directed against

union leaders who were fighting for a simple raise, young people who had been members of a student centre, journalists who were not supporters of the dictatorship, psychologists and sociologists for belonging to suspicious professions, pacifist youths, nuns and priests who had brought the teachings of Christ to impoverished neighbourhoods. And friends of any of these, and friends of friends.

The major flaw with assigning equal blame to two violent forces is that the military lacked an opposing army to confront, and the havoc wreaked by leftist terror can hardly begin to be compared in scale to the system of extermination installed under the dictatorship. According to Kaiser, at the upper limit, the combined guerrilla forces of armed political groups such as the Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Army) could have accounted for barely five percent of the thirty thousand disappeared Argentines. By comparison, prior to and during the dictatorship, 687 people died in attacks perpetrated by the guerrillas, all but eight of whom were military or security personnel: that is, slightly over one percent were civilian casualties.

The manipulated rhetoric in the account of the past initiated by Nunca más and reaffirmed by later institutional developments served the function of exonerating civil society of any participatory role in the system of state terror, staging the violence as a morality play that contributed to the general public’s “near total inability to critically confront the past.” The work of the Truth Commission marked an important step in isolating democratic Argentina from its dictatorial past. Its narrative, compounded by the
criminal trials and legalization of impunity that would follow, removed human rights violations from their context in concrete dynamics of social power and conflict, making no attempt to historicize the violence. The picture that began to emerge was one of “a chronological history in which the 1970s appear as an almost incomprehensible lapse, during which the devil took Argentina by storm.” This framework represents an abdication of the responsibility to actively engage and come to terms with the factors that led to and permitted the systematic extermination of tens of thousands of Argentines.

In 1985, the Alfonsin government brought to trial several military commanders implicated in the dictatorship’s atrocities, a step that marked “the first time in Latin America an illegal regime was being tried in the very country where it had been in power.” While laudable as a gesture towards justice and accountability, these trials, followed in minute detail by the Argentine press and public, perpetuated the process initiated by CONADEP of sealing off the violent past from the present, and furthered the pattern of excusing society at large of the need for critical reflection on this history. Both the truth commission and the trials were “charged with examining the specifics of individual acts of violence according to accepted norms of national and international jurisprudence.” In this capacity, they contribute to what Grandin has identified as an important part of the democratic transition across Latin America: a shift from a governmental and popular focus on social rights to more narrowly defined legal ones.

Jelin reads these trials as a prime opportunity to depoliticize, and consequently to dehistoricize, the conflict and its actors. Within the formal judicial framework of criminal trials, actors with ideological and political commitments are recast as passive victims of state repression and are seen as acted upon iniquitously rather than engaged in productive struggle. Adriana Calvo, a political activist and member of the guerrilla group the Montoneros who survived four Argentine prison camps and testified during the 1985 trials, was left bitter that she had been barred from discussing her political commitments, able only to recount the heinous things that had been done to her. She believed that a “true system of justice would have allowed discussion about why people like her had joined political groups such as the Montoneros,” opening a space for debate about the social struggles that preceded the dictatorship. Instead, the legal framework produced a highly individualized narrative of the past, treating the violations perpetrated by a system of state terror as merely a very large number of discrete crimes. By this means, “political violence was stripped of meaningful causes, attributed to a passing folly” and could be placed within a discursively and historically “closed narrative order.” This allowed the period of state terror to be portrayed as a senseless aberration in the normal, heroic course of Argentine history, rather than as a historically embedded episode with roots deep within Argentina’s history and important consequences and legacies for its contemporary society.

The trials of the junta’s commanders in 1985 were followed in 1986 by the Punto final (Full Stop) law, which put an end to bringing any new cases against represores before the courts, and by the Debe obedencia (Due Obedience) law of 1987, which absolved the crimes of any military personnel who had kidnapped, tortured, or killed under orders. The government was gradually surrendering the field of justice for past abuses and after a short time, institutional efforts waned and calls for justice were left to civil society. In 1990, Menem issued pardons to the handful of military commanders still
serving prison sentences and to several guerrilla leaders in the name of “national reconciliation,” a move designed to demonstrate that the “violent past had now been institutionally closed.” This decision came following years of unrest and several abortive coup attempts from the military, and the process of instituting impunity has been interpreted as the gradual erosion of the democratic government’s commitment to redressing human rights violations in the face of political negotiation and conciliation with the still-powerful military and other reactionary groups. The foreclosure of legitimate institutional arenas for debate around the meaning of the past under Alfonsin and Menem drastically limited the public spaces available to such discussions. For Kaiser, the pardons were the final nail in the coffin that “radically altered the moment of great expectations that had characterized the commencement of civilian rule” and completed the whitewashing of Argentina’s public historical discourse.

The evolution of the government’s official narrative of the past from the democratic transition to the 1990s was mirrored in its strategic use of public spaces explicitly tied to this history. Once again, institutional efforts featured gestures towards recognizing the violence during the dictatorship without really engaging with the social trauma it had left. Social memories are constituted within spatial frameworks, and therefore struggles over the content of historical narrative often centre on the meanings attached to particular sites featured prominently in either conflicting or painful stories of the past. In the end, these contests can result in the space being “recovered for memory,” as with the eventual excavation and commemoration of the site of the Club Atlético clandestine detention centre in Buenos Aires; conversely, physical markers may be obliterated, along with the material manifestation of the memories associated with them, as was the case when a shopping mall was constructed over the Punta Carretas jail in Montevideo that had been put to repressive use during the Uruguayan dictatorship.

In Argentina, the map of memory sites—the roughly 340 secret detention centres where detainees were held, tortured, and often killed—has met varying fates under civilian rule. In one case, a statue of a cherub and ornamental garden was placed at the entrance of one former detention centre in Buenos Aires where hundreds were tortured. Such facilely sentimental additions seem to make a grotesque parody out of a site of horror and terror. Menem’s decree, in 1998, that the Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), perhaps the most infamous detention centre in Argentina, be demolished to make way for a monument to “national unity” was overturned by public outcry. The impulse behind this proposal seems to follow Sigmund Freud’s argument that “communities confront common crimes by covering the location of the crimes with monuments that allow them to be forgotten.” Monuments are, almost by definition, memorials to things past; the closed chapters of public history. As one Buenos Aires high school student pointed out to Kaiser, it would be much easier for the public to assimilate and ignore yet another “monolith with a soldier and a flag” nearly identical to dozens of monuments throughout the city than it is for them to turn a blind eye to ESMA’s stark concrete reminder of the brutal realities of the dictatorship.

**Hegemonic History and Social Silences**

The Alfonsin and Menem administrations were not alone in attempting to erect a barrier between their nation’s repressive past and democratic present. Across the South
American continent, the early 1990s were, at the institutional level, “a low point in actions and initiatives related to human rights violations during dictatorship.” This political void was largely replicated at the broader social level, with conflicting feelings of impotence and indifference prominent in the social narrative. One of the primary goals of the official narrative that evolved in the 1980s had been to establish individual responsibility for the past violence, with the military commanders in the trials and with members of leftist guerrilla organizations under the “Theory of Two Devils”; this rhetoric appears to have been broadly accepted.

The attitude towards the past of the older Argentine generations, those who witnessed the period of state terror, seems to be characterized by what Riocoeur terms “evasive memory,” the deliberate avoidance of potentially upsetting or difficult memories that often prevails in post-repression societies. Many have incorporated into their personal understanding of history the “Theory of Two Devils” formulated in the early years of civilian rule, allowing them to assign blame and move forward without “entering the long, soul-draining, and painful revision of a past full of violence.” This discourse serves to assuage the guilt of those large sectors of society who “functioned as a ‘large acritical social mattress’” for the military during the dictatorship. In the pages of the Argentine periodical Página/12 in 1995, the same year that HIJOS formed, the criminologist Stanley Cohen commented on what he saw as the source of a generalized social silence on the recent past: “They do not want the subject to be discussed, because if it is discussed they themselves will have to do some explaining.” This deferral of responsibility, or even discussion, has been internalized by many members of the post-dictatorship generation who, in contrast to HIJOS activists, accepted, or at least resigned themselves to, the prevailing desire to close debate over the past and its meaning for the present. One student explained the general penury of information about the dictatorship by saying that the older generations were reluctant to discuss the topic because “people want to forget.” In speaking to adolescents and young adults in Buenos Aires in 1998, Kaiser encountered a widespread sense of impotence typified by comments such as, “It’s over, this is the only possible country, the only possible reality.” While the majority of youths expressed disagreement with the legalization of impunity and felt that represores should be in prison, many felt that they lacked the agency to challenge the decisions taken by the witness generation.

**Authoritarian Enclaves in the Democratic State**

HIJOS and other grassroots human rights movements in Argentina have endeavoured to restore political and historical context to the systematic state terror of military rule, recognizing broader trends and movements that preceded, informed, and survived the dictatorship. A crucial dimension of this has been identifying continuities between the past and present regime and publicly allying themselves with those working for social justice in contemporary Argentina. Changes in political regimes are often conceived and explicitly framed as radical breaks with the past. Post-dictatorship Argentina, with all the institutional attempts to set a rigid boundary within history and to isolate human rights abuses in the past certainly fits this pattern. What emerges from the prevailing interpretation of the Argentine past is a vision of history “as parable rather than as politics.” In this frame, systemic violence is contained within the temporal boundaries of March 1976 and December 1983; the intervening horrors are
viewed as occurring within an ethical and historical vacuum that is invoked to keep liberal democracy on the straight and narrow, but which bears no relation to the constitutional order of contemporary Argentina. This narrative excuses both the government and civil society, yet imagining state violence as a defined aberration ignores “the authoritarian ethos that has been entrenched in Argentine society since its inception.” 68 In contrast, the target of the very first escrache organized by HIJOS in 1995 was Menem’s Vice-President Carlos Ruckauf, who as a member of Isabel Perón’s administration had in 1975 signed a decree authorizing “the ‘Annihilation of Subversion’ and that same year had given orders to ‘let the bullets fly.’” Later that same afternoon, protestors surrounded the office of Aldo Rico, a leader of the 1987 Easter Uprising by the military that pressured the government to foreclose legal proceedings and secure pardons for represores. 69 HIJOS extends responsibility for state violence and impunity to both the historical predecessors and successors of the commanders of the junta.

The fact is that repression of Argentine citizens by the state did not sharply break off at the end of 1983. Many in the military were left unscathed by the transition, including, among other known represores, Alfredo Ignacio Astiz, the “blond angel” who killed a seventeen-year-old bystander at a stakeout, served as the Argentine naval attaché in South Africa where he gave a series of seminars on torture techniques to members of the apartheid-era security forces, and infiltrated and betrayed the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in a 1977 operation that led to the death of several human rights leaders and two French nuns. Excused from standing trial due to the Punto final law, Astiz was twice promoted within the navy after the transition to democracy, and on the occasion of being made a full captain in 1988, was also decorated for valour in the “fight against subversion.” 70 Not until the new millennium was there any attempt to seriously restructure the police and security forces, and some disturbing patterns were allowed to continue unchecked. 71 From 1988 to 1990, thirty-five percent of the homicides in Buenos Aires were committed by the police, and, as late as 2003, President Kirchner announced that the police were implicated in the majority of kidnappings in Buenos Aires province. 72 Jelin notes that youth were a major target of police and military repression during the dictatorship, with most of the disappeared in their twenties or even their teens when they were abducted, and this pattern too has remained constant. 73 Of the 705 civilians killed by the Buenos Aires police force between 1985 and 1989, the majority were youths. 74 In 1993, the police kidnapped, tortured, and killed twenty-three-year-old Miguel Bru. His friend Josefina Gigli described her feelings of shock and disbelief upon hearing the phrase “Miguel’s disappeared” a decade after the transition to civilian government. “I realised it was something that didn’t stop happening.” 75 His mother expressed her despair and anger that “they continue killing our children with the same impunity as during the last dictatorship.” 76

Social Justice and a Politicised Past

HIJOS activists do not limit their claims to justice for past violations: they have also become deeply involved in movements against imperialism, globalization, social inequality, and police repression. They see contemporary social injustice and inequality as merely “le prolongement de la répression” that has been ongoing for decades. 77 At a rally in March 1996 attended by more than a hundred thousand people, a “Popular...
Declaration was read, according to which the military coup was meant to favour ‘anti-
national, anti-popular and pro-imperialistic’ politics, which ‘had laid the foundations of
the current model of social exclusion.’” 78 In advancing their broad political and social
agenda for contemporary Argentina, HIJOS explicitly reclaimed and strategically
deployed the political identity of their disappeared relatives, reinterpreting history to
contest both the government’s vision of the past and its projects for the future.

The junta’s system of state violence aimed at and amounted to the extermination of an entire generation of activists, yet Kaiser’s interviews of Argentine youth revealed an almost complete ignorance of the political commitments of the disappeared or the social struggles that preceded the coup among those without personal connections to the disappeared, an effect of the apolitical and unhistorical narratives transmitted to them. 79 HIJOS seeks to resurrect what has been silenced by the official history that evolved in post-dictatorship Argentina. HIJOS advances an alternative vision of generalized struggle and repression that frames the desaparecidos as a collective of socially and politically-committed agents rather than as an abstract series of victimized, atomized rights-bearing individuals. During a massive rally to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the military coup, one HIJOS representative declared on behalf of the organization’s members: “We are proud of our revolutionary folks.” 80 Many children of disappeared persons have found a way to grieve and to recover the memory of their parents by identifying with their activism. Mariana Eva Perez, in a sentiment echoed by many others in interviews with Adrés Jaroslavsky and Susana Kaiser, recounted that she “realised that if I didn’t find out about [her parents’] activism, I would understand nothing about them.” 81 These youths position themselves not as the next generation of victims, but as the inheritors of a legacy of a deep commitment to social justice in the context of a society that was, and remains, profoundly unjust. In the escraches and in HIJOS’s political activism more generally, issues of memory, truth, and justice converge because “the meaning of the past that is being fought about is, in fact, part and parcel of the demand for justice in the present.” 82

**Social Space in the “Culture of Impunity”**

The explicit and primary purpose of an escrache is “to eliminate or limit the societal spaces that represores have gained” since the amnesties and pardons. 83 As the space for debate and discussion about the past became progressively narrower in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the realm of the public sphere comfortably open to those who had participated in state repression became proportionally wider. Narratives about the past in Argentina have promoted the “focused iconization of evil,” spotlighting infamous figures such as Jorge Videla, Emilio Massera, and Leopoldo Galtieri and their crimes. 84 By the early 1990s, many members of the post-dictatorship generation publicly ridiculed the more infamous members of the dictatorship; their willingness to confront the past fuelled the escraches. 85 Yet many hundreds of the represores spent years in anonymity. CONADEP, although it listed the victims of state repression who had given testimony before the commission, avoided naming any of the perpetrators of the abuses catalogued in Nunca más. 86 In some cases, unnamed perpetrators included men who kidnapped and tortured small children in front of their parents during interrogation; others stole the infants of their victims and raised them as their own. As well as legal absolution, Kaiser’s concept of a “culture of impunity” recognizes a disturbing normalization of sharing
social space with brutal criminals. 87

There are also those represores who have cultivated, and been granted, attention and admiration in the public sphere since the end of the dictatorship. Mariano Grondona, a fervent supporter of the dictatorship and wrote the junta’s first speech, was in 2003 a columnist for the newspaper *La Nación* as well as the host of the television show *Hora Clave*, and remained “one of the most influential journalists in Argentina.” 88 A notoriously brutal dictatorship-era commander, General Antonio Domingo Bussi, was elected governor of the province of Tucumán in 1995, a post he had been granted nearly twenty years earlier by the junta. 89 In an incident demonstrative of the ethical perversions that arose under this “culture of impunity,” Raúl Topa, a henchman to Bussi during Bussi’s first governorship in Tucumán and later vice-governor under Bussi’s second administration, was in 1997 invited by leaders of the region’s Jewish community to speak at the commemoration of the 1994 AMIA terrorist attack on the main Jewish community building in Buenos Aires. As Diego Reynara, whose parents both disappeared in Tucumán during the dictatorship, describes the scene, “Topa began speaking. About the right to know the truth…about justice.” Reynara shouted angrily at Topa—allegedly his mother’s murderer—calling him a “Nazi” and an “assassin” and was ejected from the ceremony and later censured by many in the press. 90 It is the hypocritical tolerance for known criminals that HIJOS seeks to reveal and overturn with their *esraches*, resurrecting silenced and damning memories of the systematic violence of the dictatorship.

**Snapshots from the Geography of Protest**

The innovative public demonstrations organized by HIJOS consciously engage with the symbolic dimensions of public space. Jelin sees memory formation as a process anchored in large part “in symbolic and material markers,” 91 and the claims *esraches* make on space are linked to their understanding of the past. Public spaces become symbolically charged largely through performances by social actors; the meanings and symbolism appertaining to space are constructed through social action and dynamics, but in a reciprocal relationship, social action is also embedded in and derives its own set of meanings from its spatial context. 92 Over time, historical traditions regarding the appropriate use and extent of public space evolve within a culture, with certain sites becoming particularly rich depositories of social capital. These traditions then influence how and where social movements articulate their messages in public. 93 Tarrow proposed that social movements “frame their collective actions around cultural symbols that are selectively chosen from a cultural tool chest.” 94 Along the same lines, Tilly developed the idea of a repertoire of collective action, a body of culturally sanctioned forms of public performance, at the margins of which innovation may occur, though with risk of scandal and rejection if the boundaries are pushed too far. 95 Many observers have noted that a salient characteristic of Argentinean society has long been a significant, popular street presence, mobilized both by political interests and around political or social issues. 96 The *esraches* thus have a tradition from which to draw precedents in their politically charged use of public space.

Argentine historian Ricardo Salvatore, in his discussion of official public festivities during the Rosas era of the mid-nineteenth century, reveals the roots in Argentina of what he terms “politics in the burlesque mode,” a phrase certainly apt for
describing the raucous *esraches*. The Federalist political ceremonies were used by Rosas to incorporate the popular classes into the body politic, for as Diana Taylor notes, the choreography of public rites and demonstrations “situates members of the population in relation to each other.” Significantly, these nineteenth century political festivals emphasized “the shaping of a collective memory around episodes of war and key moments in the history of the federation.”

In her discussion of public space and political culture in Buenos Aires in the late nineteenth century, Karen Robert sees the crowded downtown streets as the “city’s most democratic space,” the locus of contests over the access to and control of the urban landscape. This still holds true for Argentina’s capital, although the struggles now focus primarily on the city’s symbolic rather than material resources. The study also highlights the government’s attempts to promote unifying symbolism in its public spaces, much the same as Menem’s memorializing impulses. Robert describes how in debates in the early 1870s over what kind of monument would best suit the newly renovated Plaza de Mayo, then and now “symbolically the most important political space in Argentina,” the municipal government came out in favour of a relatively politically neutral Victory figure that would “displace ideological battles from the plaza.”

The *esraches* are not the first protests to invade the residential neighbourhoods that are generally not seen as part of the symbolic political landscape. On 17 October 1945, Buenos Aires saw a massive working-class mobilization in support of Juan Perón, demanding his release from incarceration. The demonstrators, residents of the working-class barrios, wove their way through the wealthier suburbs before congregating in the Plaza de Mayo. This invasion of elite arenas subverted “implicit notions of spatial hierarchy,” a transgression compounded by their behaviour as the carnivalesque mood, “dominant tone of irreverence and ironic good humour,” and the “increasingly insulting and ridiculing” chants and songs directed at the wealthy disrupted the habitually staid atmosphere of the residential districts. According to Daniel James, this “irreverence, blasphemy, dancing and reappropriation of public space” represented a “form of ‘counter-theatre’, of ridicule and abuse against the symbolic authority” of the dominant social order, a dimension strongly apparent in the mood of the *esraches*. In 1993 in the provincial city of Santiago del Estero, rioters protesting the corruption of the regional government and the resulting economic crisis invaded and looted the homes of those politicians perceived as especially corrupt and also burned several public buildings. The demonstration targeted both private residences of political and criminal offenders and symbols of public power and order; similarly, HIJOS hold their *esraches* in residential neighbourhoods in front of the homes of *represores* or former clandestine detention centres, and also frequently demonstrate in already symbolically charged sites such as the Plaza de Mayo.

**Performing Memory in the Public Sphere**

The HIJOS deftly deployed these traditions of public performance to press their opposition to the social space available to *represores*, while at the same time pushing the boundaries of their inherited cultural repertoires. They exploited symbolic spaces and actions in voicing their protests, as an analogous group of children of disappeared persons in Chile did when they adopted the *esrache* form beginning in September 1999, convening participants for their first *funa* (a Chilean slang term with a meaning very
similar to escrache) at the busy intersection of Huérfanos and Esperanza Streets, “literally where Orphans meet Hope.”

But despite the historical antecedents that inform elements of the escraches and general public sympathy for the cause behind them, the practice itself was highly controversial when it first appeared, and remains so. Police repression and public resistance were especially strong around the early demonstrations when member of HIJOS were “incarcerated, threatened by telephone, filmed and menacingly followed;” detractors would appear at the protests distributing false flyers and instigating activities that drew negative press to the protests. When Kaiser sought to gauge public opinion regarding escraches in 1998, many respondents felt that, in disrupting neighbours and especially in vandalizing private property, the demonstrators went too far. Admiral Massera, a commander of the first junta known to have become wealthy from property looted from the disappeared, brought charges including attempted robbery and property damage against the HIJOS following an escrache that was repressed by police. Defending the tactics of the organization, one HIJOS activist suggested that “the minimum someone who commits genocide deserves is a little paint on his house.” Surely if ever there were a sign that the principles of liberal democracy were soundly consolidated in Argentina, the moral equation of minor infractions against property rights with impunity for the systematic extermination of political activists must be it.

The escraches are contentious because they seek to extend the boundaries of the public sphere to include the private residences of those who perpetrated crimes against Argentine society. Despite the controversial nature of this blurring of the public and the private, the tactics used by HIJOS reflect the way that the dictatorship brought public violence into private spaces, collapsing the boundaries between the two domains. It must be remembered that the majority of abductions documented by CONADEP took place in the disappeared person’s home in front of witnesses. HIJOS now seeks to bring public accountability to the private lives and anonymous social spaces that represores have gained under the dominant interpretation of the past. In a public realm where many victims of state repression have encountered their torturers or the murderers of their parents in cafés, hotel lobbies, or even on television talk shows, escraches represent the “metaphorical repossession of the streets by freeing them from these criminals’ presence.” Through collective action, “an inert public space can be activated,” and this is what the escraches seek to do in bringing debate over buried crimes and criminals back into the public sphere. Over time, they have become more successful in having their methods of protest accepted, as their strategies and efforts have evolved since the first escraches, “maturing from spontaneous and aggressive tactics to more planned, cooperative, and broad-based work aimed at civil society.” HIJOS has become an international organization, with thirteen chapters across the country belonging to the Argentine network, two further unaffiliated chapters, and seven in various Latin American and European countries. In recent years, the escrache form has been adopted by groups all over Argentina and Latin America seeking to bring attention to a wide range of political and economic issues. Drawing on traditions of protest and performance established by Argentine political interests and social movements of the past, HIJOS thrust a radical and new form of demonstration into public space that, over the past decade, has become a veritable institution of grassroots claims-making in its own right.
Conclusion

A central project in any post-trauma society must be, as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission set out its mission, to “construct a ‘historic bridge’ between ‘a deeply divided past of untold suffering’ and a ‘future founded on the recognition of human rights.’” The relationship to the violent past becomes highly problematic and divisive when, as in Argentina, that bridge is burned after the gulf is spanned and channels for critically examining history are peremptorily and prematurely shut down. Rejecting the official narrative mandating forgiving and especially forgetting, members of the post-dictatorship generation involved in escraches seek to resurrect and reframe the past in public space. Building on Argentina’s “cultural repertoire” of collective action, HIJOS formulated a new shaming ritual designed to target human rights violators and to challenge the general public to think about what it means to live in a society where these men are free. Beginning in the mid-1990s, “institutional forgetting was challenged by a memory ‘from below’” as members of a new generation reclaimed a politicized and historicized legacy out of the violence that had affected their families and used it to press their demands for social justice in the present. In the esrache movement, “la memoria es la lucha del hombre contra el poder.” The activist memory which the escraches advance challenges the prevailing amnesia of Argentine social memory and seeks to bring historical depth to their struggles against contemporary injustices. Escraches continue in Argentina, targeting both represores and their successors in civilian government.

Along with the efforts of other human rights organizations such as the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the negative international attention their activities garnered for Argentina, HIJOS and their escraches ought to receive credit for some success in reclaiming legitimized channels for debate about the past in Argentina. In 1998, following trials and in absentia condemnations of several prominent leaders of the junta in Spain, Italy, and France for crimes committed against their nationals, the congress repealed the Punto final and Debe obedencia laws, opening the way for new prosecutions in Argentina. That same year, as political and legal circles debated whether the decision to abolish these laws ought to be upheld, both Videla and Massera were arrested on charges of kidnapping the babies of young women who gave birth while imprisoned by the dictatorship, a crime not covered by the initial amnesty laws. 1999 saw the appearance of a novel form of institutional truth-telling, as the cities of Rosario and Batia Blanca initiated a trend of “truth trials,” judicial investigations that sought to examine the extent, circumstances, and social impact of the crimes committed under the regime of state terror. Since the nation’s highest court declared Punto final and Debe obedencia unconstitutional in 2001, trials of represores have been ongoing. The social space of impunity has not yet been fully re-conquered, but the struggle for justice in the streets has been joined and bolstered by institutionally legitimated efforts to once again engage with the history and legacy of repression. As a new generation came into political consciousness, the refusal of young activists to bear the inherited silences of social memory had an impact on reopening history and fuelled the dynamic process of coming to terms with the past in Argentina.
Endnotes

6. Ibid., 161.
10. Thomas, 92-93.
13. Other issues that warrant further investigation include the nature of the interaction between HIJOS and other prominent human rights groups in Argentina such as the Madres and Abuelas of the Plaza de Mayo and how their activities have complemented or conflicted with each other; how the place of Argentine youth in the public sphere was affected by state terror and the paths along which it has evolved since then.
16. Ibid., 11.
19. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 118.
38. Sábato, 9. Original text: dirigentes sindicales que luchaban por una simple mejora de salarios, muchachos que habian sido miembros de un centro estudiantil, periodistas que no eran adictos de la dictadura, psicólogos y sociólogos por pertenecer a profesiones sospechosas, jóvenes pacifistas, monjas y sacerdotes que habian llevado las enseñanzas de Cristo a barriadas miserables. Y amigos de cualquiera de ellos, y amigos de esos.
41. Grandin, 51; 53.
42. Evangelista, 116.
43. Grandin, 51; Jaroslavsky, 214.
44. Grandin, 47.
46. Kaplan, 155.
47. Di Paolantonio, 449.
48. LeFranc, 131-132; Di Paolantonio, 441.
49. Guillermo Lorenz, 18.
52. Ibid., 162; Jelin, *State Repression*, 39.
56. Ibid., 164.
57. Ibid., 166.
59. Grandin, 54.
60. Ibid, 19.
63. Quoted in Evangelista, 114.
64. Kaiser, Postmemories of Terror, 67.
65. Ibid., 103; 121.
68. Di Paolantonio, 450.
69. Kaplan, 162.
70. Ibid., 165–166.
74. Robert & Gutierrez Hermelo, 14.
75. Jaroslavsky, 163-164.
76. Denissen et al., 96.
77. LeFranc, 140. “the extension of the repression”
78. Guillermo Lorenz, 19.
79. Kaiser, Postmemories of Terror, 31; 40.
80. Guillermo Lorenz, 19.
81. Jaroslavsky, 220.
82. Jelin, State Repression, 30.
84. Kaiser, Postmemories of Terror, 103. Brigadier General Videla, who headed the March 24, 1976 coup, represented the army in the First Junta and assumed the presidency two days after the military came to power, retaining the post through the most repressive years of the dictatorship, until 1981. Admiral Massera was the naval representative of the First Junta until 1978 and oversaw the operations at ESMA during its most repressive use. Galtieri, the army representative to the second and third junta’s and held the presidency from 198–1982.
86. Ibid, 105.
87. Ibid., 104, 109.
89. Ibid., 203.
90. Ibid., 205.
91. Jelin, State Repression, xv.
93. Eckstein, 10.
94. Cleary, 32.
101. Ibid., 214; 290.
103. Ibid., 33.
105. Kaplan, 168.
107. Thomas, 92.
110. Taylor, 102; *Nunca Más*, 17.
113. Thomas, 92.
114. Ibid.
115. Grandin, 46.
White Knights and Damsels in Distress

Gender and Sexual Identities in the Press Coverage of the 1910 Montreal Herald Disaster

Brenton Nader

As the sun rose over Montreal on the morning of 14 June 1910 it illuminated the austere, stone facade of the Montreal Herald building. Standing defiantly, the five-story glass and sandstone wall was all that remained of the building that was consumed the previous day in a furious vortex of fire and water. On a normal business day, dawn would be cause for bustling activity, as writers, editors, typesetters, binders, and myriad others prepared the daily newspaper The Montreal Herald for publication. But on this day, the scene on the street below attested to the immensity of the disaster that had taken place. A large crowd gathered in the adjacent Victoria Square; most were curious onlookers, but some were the bereaved, mourning the absence or loss of a loved one. Cries of anguish and words of comfort had replaced the sounds of the punch-clock and the printing press, firefighters and fire-wagons had replaced the coming-and-goings of newspaper carriers and carts of newsprint and ink. And while the stately facade in many ways belied the horrors of the previous day, behind it lay a smoldering heap of ruins and thirty-two bodies.

It was shortly before 10:30 am on 13 June 1910 when the disaster at the Herald Publishing Company began to unfold. A water tank containing 113,000 litres of water for the Herald's sprinkler system, and weighing more than 110,000 kilograms, dislodged from its supports on the roof of the building and fell through the five-story structure until it came to rest in the basement. Printing presses, rolls of newsprint, gallons of ink, lead for the linotype machines, and employees from the Herald's various departments were swept into the abyss created by the falling tank. Ruinously, the water tank severed numerous gas lines as it barreled downward through the building, and only moments passed before a fire began and flames engulfed what remained of the upper floors.1 The collapse of the building and the ensuing fire claimed the lives of thirty-two Herald employees (thirteen women and nineteen men) and hospitalized a further twenty-five.2 However, the full extent of the human tragedy was not immediately apparent to those pouring into Victoria Square to observe the spectacle taking place behind the Herald's persevering façade; as firefighters arrived on-scene and attempted to grapple with the disaster so too did reporters.

With the exception of mining-related accidents, rarely had a Canadian workplace disaster been so visible, occurring as it did in the urban heart of Canada's largest city. The magnitude of the disaster, and particularly the fact that thirteen of the victims were women, provides us with a good case for examining how society perceived gender roles at that time. Men seem to be portrayed in the press as the heroes of the disaster, women the helpless victims. While the majority of the Herald victims were men, most of the press coverage concerns the sentimental accounts of women, to the point of sensationalism. Not only was the idea of women in the workplace unfamiliar to readers in 1910, but the idea that they should lose their lives in the effort to support themselves.
or their families must have seemed incredible. I will argue that the language and themes used in the newspaper articles reflect not only the social perception of gender roles in 1910, but also implicitly question any movement away from those roles toward women in the workplace.

Notably, and common to all the newspapers that I examined, the “rescuer” is the predominant male identity, while a helpless individual in need of rescuing is the predominant female identity. The images of men as rescuers go beyond the depictions of male firefighters rescuing disoriented survivors. The reporters repeatedly focus on the men’s physical prowess and acts of courage and self-sacrifice. Such perceptions of masculinity were intimately related to imperialist discourse, and were articulated strongly in 1899, during recruitment for the South-African campaign, and again in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War. Holding such prominence in the social discourse of the period, it should come as no surprise that this idealized masculine identity found its way into the press. 3

Examining the newspaper articles more deeply reveals another sexual dichotomy. By portraying men as heroes, many articles suggest that men possess an innate familiarity with the Herald ruins, and are able to navigate the debris and obstacles with considerable ease. In contrast, the newspapers consistently portray women as disoriented and physically unable to comprehend—let alone navigate—their surroundings. This perception is more of a refraction of reality than a reflection, as these women would have been as familiar with the workplace as their male coworkers. This dichotomy in the press may be taken as a subtle reaffirmation of the workplace as the domain of men, and, consequently, a proposition that for women the workplace is dangerous and unfamiliar territory, and a suggestion that perhaps their role in the workplace should be reconsidered. It is also no coincidence that this contrast in the newspapers should occur during a period of recalcitrance among linotype unions to accept women into their trade. 4

The physical appearance of women is another theme articulated in the press coverage of the Herald disaster. The recurring references to the condition of women’s bodies, and the type and condition of their clothing, may be contrasted with the comparatively few references made to men’s bodies and their clothing. Moreover, newspapers are often careful to note the appropriateness and respectability of the clothing worn by women, and their dignified—if disorderly—appearance. This attention to body and clothing, and the quality of clothing, is significant for several reasons. First, it illustrates a social preoccupation with the physical appearance of women, which, during this period, was the most visible indicator of respectability. Second, by portraying the women as respectable, such language further romanticizes the efforts of the rescuers, and completes the chivalric, and at the time nationalistic, image of a hero rescuing a damsel in distress: respectable men rescuing respectable women in turn emphasizes the importance of valor in society at large. By extrapolating the language and themes inherent in the newspapers’ concern with the appearance of women, we may gain a more complete understanding of the social conceptions and ideologies of this period.

This essay is grounded largely within the realm of journalism history. However, a reading of newspapers for inherent conceptions of gender and sexual identities—such as I am attempting—is a relatively recent historiographic development. As a result, there are only a few related studies that help to inform the analysis and
methodology of this essay. In her 2005 study, “Working Women and the Triangle Fire: Press Coverage of a Tragedy,” Elizabeth Burt examines the press coverage surrounding the 25 March 1911 fire at the Triangle Waist Company in New York City, which killed more than 140 employees, nearly all of them women. Indeed, there are several parallels to draw between the Triangle fire and the disaster at the Herald. The fire at the Triangle, occurring only ten months after the Herald disaster, was also a highly publicized tragedy that was covered by both the local and national presses. Moreover, the Triangle fire, like the Herald disaster, was doubly shocking because the dead were overwhelmingly women. Burt analyses further:

This was a time when society cherished the belief that women were honored, protected, and cosseted by the men of their families. The Triangle fire threw this myth to the wayside. It showed women, instead, as victims of both their greedy employers and careless officials who did not ensure their protection.  

This notion that the women of the Triangle fire were exploited workers—the victims of industrialization—instead of ideologically subversive radicals who abandoned their domestic roles to seek wage employment engendered sympathy among the press, which in turn reconsidered its image of working women: “Thus, the working women in this story were [portrayed in the press as] victims, not agitators, and they were working because they had to, not because they were challenging the status quo.” Such sentiments are related to the Herald disaster inasmuch as the newspapers that I examined convey a purely conciliatory and sympathetic attitude toward the victims of the Herald disaster. However, the sympathy in the press should not be understood as an acceptance of women’s presence in the workplace. Rather, it is sympathy in the sense that women in the workplace are to be pitied for society’s inability to protect them. Beyond lionizing men and victimizing women, these archetypes form the vehicles through which the press analyses these gender roles, thereby assessing the legitimacy of men and women in the workplace.

This essay is also something of a working-class study, drawing as it does upon several working-class histories and examinations of moral discourse. Crucial among these, and also relating to the Triangle fire, is Annelise Orleck’s 1995 monograph Common Sense & a Little Fire: Women and Working-Class Politics in the United States, 1900-1965. Orleck examines the roles of immigrant women in the American labour movement during the early twentieth-century by focusing on the labour activism of four Jewish immigrants: Fania Cohn, Rose Schneiderman, Pauline Newman, and Clara Lemlich Shavelson. All four women were prominent participants in labour agitations between 1900 and 1960, and all four were employed at the Triangle Waist Company. These four women, Orleck notes, “devoted their lives to the empowerment of working-class women.” This activism, combined with their increasing prominence in the labour movement, meant that Cohn, Schneiderman, Newman, and Shavelson sacrificed much of their respectability as they transgressed social norms prescribed for women of their class, ethnicity, and generation. Poignantly, Orleck adds that “Choosing careers as political activists left them vulnerable to charges that they were failures as women.”
Orleck’s examination of respectability has been particularly useful in informing my analysis of newspapers’ depictions of gender roles. Common to the press coverage of the Herald disaster, men and women act within a prescribed set of social and thematic boundaries, of which there is little transgression allowed in the newspaper articles examined.

For this study, I elected to analyze seven newspapers: five based in Montreal—The Gazette, The Montreal Daily Star, The Standard, La Presse, and Le Devoir—and two based in Toronto—The Globe and The Toronto Daily Star. I believe this sample represents a broad cross-section of audiences and journalistic approaches. The first brief articles concerning the disaster appeared in the 13 June 1910 edition of La Presse and the evening edition of The Montreal Daily Star. The Gazette and The Montreal Daily Star covered the disaster most extensively, with twenty-one and twenty-four articles respectively. La Presse, Le Devoir, and The Standard, covered the event least extensively, with thirteen, eight, and five articles respectively. These seven newspapers published their final articles concerning the Herald disaster on June 17, in La Presse, Le Devoir, and The Toronto Daily Star; June 20, in The Globe; June 21, in The Gazette; June 22, in The Montreal Daily Star; and June 25, in The Standard. In total, I draw upon 108 articles for my analysis, all published between June 13 and June 25. It should also be mentioned that since newspapers generally did not use bylines, determining the author of a particular published article is exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, newspapers seldom published lists of contributors, so even ascertaining vaguely who wrote for a particular newspaper is problematic. On the one hand, knowing the author of an article, if for nothing else to determine their sex, would illuminate some potential biases and colour any subsequent examination and analysis. On the other hand, since this essay focuses on the larger linguistic and thematic trends apparent in the press coverage of the fiery Herald disaster, knowing the specific author of an article is not entirely necessary for the sake of credibility.

Given the unprecedented nature of the Herald disaster, the duration of press coverage it elicits appears surprisingly brief. After 16 June 1910, the amount of press coverage declined dramatically, with no articles concerning the disaster appearing after the 25 June 1910 edition of The Standard. This coverage may be contrasted with that of the Triangle fire, which was embraced intensively by the press for a period of several weeks. Moreover, beginning on 15 June 1910 there is a notable shift in the focus of the press, from the recovery and rescue work at the Herald site to the investigation into the disaster at the coroner’s inquest, which began the previous day. This investigation, centring largely on determining the cause of the water tank’s collapse, dominates the press coverage. (Interestingly, there is no mention of the Herald disaster in the 1910 editions of the Labour Gazette, a yearly government publication that is meticulous in reporting on all aspects of labour in Canada.) While attempts to expound upon the factors behind the short-lived press coverage are purely speculative, some insight may be gained by contrasting the Herald disaster with the Triangle fire. Burt suggests that the sensational press coverage that the Triangle fire received was largely due to the sensational nature of the disaster. The investigation into the Triangle fire discovered that several emergency exits had been chained closed, and that the building’s fire escape was inaccessible. The press, sympathetic to the victims of this public tragedy, was quick to lay blame on the owners of the Triangle Waist Company and a “quest for justice” remained
prominent in the press for weeks. This was not the case in Montreal. The fact that the collapse of the *Herald* building appears to have been a tragic workplace accident, but an accident nonetheless, with no malicious actions on the part of the owner, appears to have tempered the nature and intensity of the press coverage. Finally, the failure of the coroner’s inquest to determine decisively the cause of the collapse of the water tank, and therefore who might be held accountable, certainly did not fuel the fires of sensational journalism.

While the *Herald* disaster may not have engendered the degree of sensationalism that the Triangle disaster did, common to both was a similar perception of, and concern for, working women. While it is difficult to assess the workers at the *Herald Publishing Company* individually, generalizations can be made. The majority of the men and women who worked at the *Herald* would have come from lower-income, working-class families. Many, though not all, of the women would also have been single. Their marital status, combined with their wage income and shift work, would have allowed these single women limited time for leisure pursuits—promenading on commercial strips or visiting dance halls, for example. Though limited in extent, such activities were not simply for amusement’s sake: they also provided the participating women with a social identity, for better or worse. As historian Carolyn Strange notes, non-domestic wage-labour created social strains, and there grew an obsession with working women’s time off rather than on the job. The emerging concern was over the respectability of those single women who lived on their own and who took part in such amusements. Apart from their families and other guiding moral influences, these women, it was held, were susceptible to the amoral influences of unrespectable men and improper courting practices. As Strange notes: “wage-earning woman and the moral consequences of her presence in the city preoccupied moral rescuers, journalists, and social surveyors as well as medical and psychiatric experts. Working girls manifestly violated behavioural norms set out for marriageable women, not so much because of the work they performed but because of the social conditions in which they worked.”

The reform movement that emerged to tackle the negative influences of wage-work on single women involved large swaths of society. Civic reformers, who worked toward a morally upright city, required strict codes of behaviour for all citizens. While the principal target of their efforts was wage-earning, single women, they were also concerned with prostitution, divorce, illegitimacy, “Indians and Chinese,” public education, suppression of obscene literature, prevention of prostitution, the rescue of fallen women, and shelters for women and children. The reformers’ ultimate objective was to purify and regenerate society, and it was often the well-educated, urban Canadians who led these movements. Chief among these popular reform movements was the social purity movement, as historian Mariana Valverde explains:

> The social purity movement was a loose network of organizations and individuals, mostly church people, educators, doctors, and other community or social elites, who engaged in a sporadic but vigorous campaign to ‘raise the moral tone’ of Canadian society, and in particular of urban working-class communities.
Newspaper owners, editors, and, to a lesser extent, journalists, would also have been influenced by, and attempted to articulate and convey, the ideals of the social purity movement.

The following article subtitled “Women First, the Cry”, appearing in the Gazette on 14 June 1910, describes in vivid detail our damsels in distress and their saviors, and I include it in its entirety:

Remarkable and spectacular heroism was displayed by an unknown workman of The Herald staff, a mere lad. Immediately after the falling of the tank, when young girls frantic with terror were screaming for help from the top story windows, he appeared on the ledge running around the top of the building, and with cool courage organized a safe descent of the girls down the ladders placed by the fire department. Through his excellent example and cheery words the girls recovered their courage and were prevented from casting themselves to the street. In the end, when all the young women were safely on the ladders, he himself consented to descent. A living line extended down the ladders which moved slowly, and while the brave men waited for the girls to get down a mass of flame burst from the windows near at hand. Even this imminent danger of roasting did not affect the unknown workman’s wonderful nerve. When the ladders were run up, it was ‘women first,’ and not one of the men made an attempt to get a foot on the ladders before all of the women and girls had been rescued. Those who had received injuries were next taken down, and finally the men came rushing down the ladders to safety.20

Similarly, a 14 June 1910 article in The Toronto Daily Star entitled “Firemen Still Digging for the Montreal Victims,” lauds William Washer, an employee in the Herald’s photographic department, for his heroism:

Rushing bruised and bleeding down from the third storey ... he heard the faint moans of a girl. ... He picked her up and carried her to the ground. Here his strength gave way and he fell unconscious to the sidewalk. He soon recovered and refused to go to a hospital for treatment, saying that others should be cared for first. The young woman whom he rescued was unconscious and badly injured.21

In a 14 June 1910 Le Devoir article entitled “La Catastrophe Du ‘Herald,’ Stephen Tanner “was able to struggle to the third floor with other men, and bravely carry two girls safely out of the building.”22 A 15 June 1910 article from The Montreal Daily Star, entitled “Heroic Firemen Wept,” praises the firefighters for their heroic courage:

Too much praise cannot be given the firemen. Seldom, if ever, have men played better the part of heroes. They braved the terrible heat and danger to rescue the girls from the upper storeys [sic] ... The firemen told some pathetic stories. I saw a
woman in there,’ said one grim fighter, pointing to the top storey, ‘but she was pinned under a beam, and I couldn’t move her. It was awful to hear her scream.’

The fact that “Heroic Firemen Wept,” may seem like a contradiction to the image of a heroic rescuer; however, as the article goes on to explain, it is only after failing to perform the duty expected of him does a man weep: “Another grey-haired veteran wept as he failed to save a life amid the wreckage in the rear. It was there that the flames were the hottest, and there the dead and dying were piled amidst the debris.” A 14 June 1910 article in The Gazette also commends the heroism of the firefighters: “Not the least noteworthy instances of this [heroism] were furnished by the men of the fire brigade, who faced the danger and braved imminent death on many occasions to save life.”

Initially, these articles may appear to be literal narratives of men rescuing women, but upon closer examination, we see a heroic language emerge consistently throughout. Phrases such as “remarkable and spectacular heroism,” “cool courage,” “wonderful nerve,” “brave men,” and “heroic” imply a level of bravery and heroism expected of men during this period. Such attributes, as clearly manifested in Washer’s self-sacrificing behaviour, were intimately linked with imperialist sentiments. As was the case during recruitment for the South African campaign in 1899, and as would become apparent during the recruitment for the First World War, social discourse expected such valourous and self-sacrificing attitudes among respectable British men. Therefore, to be an honourable and respectable man was to possess Washer’s, the “mere lad’s,” and the “heroic” firemen’s level of bravery and willingness to self-sacrifice. This expectation of heroism and self-sacrifice is perhaps best articulated in a 14 June 1910 article from The Globe entitled “Instances of Heroism”:

As usual in such catastrophes the tale of gloom is brightened by the many instances of individual heroism which it brought to light. In one instance, a man, as yet unknown, after rescuing two girls on the third floor, determined to do his best to save a third, who was pinned under. He was trying to free her when the rest of the building went, and he died with the girl he was trying to save.

While the majority of the newspapers examined do not contain such extreme accounts of self-sacrifice, the articles, and this article particularly, suggest that a certain level of manly heroism and sacrifice was a “usual” companion to disasters.

It is notable that the language of heroism evident in the newspapers appears to be reserved solely for men, with no examples found of similar language associated with women. This exclusivity lends further credibility to the suggestion that distinct gender roles are articulated in the press coverage of the Herald disaster. That such heroic language and images are developed in all of the newspapers examined further suggests that journalists were tapping into preexisting social discourses concerning respectable masculinity, such as imperialist ideology and concepts of respectability. Because the disaster was highly visible, and occurred in the urban heart of Montreal, it had to be respectable masculinity that journalists tapped into, since by emphasizing the heroism of the men working at the Herald, the newspapers emphasized the “Britishness” of the men.
involved, and thereby the overall respectability of the city.

In contrast to the heroic image of men, the newspapers consistently portray women as helpless and incapable of saving themselves. As noted in “Women First, the Cry,” in The Gazette on 14 June 1910, the arrival of “mere lad” to spearhead their rescue meant that a group of women, “frantic with terror, ... [r]ecovered their courage and were prevented from casting themselves to the street.” This theme of feminine helplessness in the face of danger (juxtaposed as it is with the courage of a young boy) is articulated further in subsequent newspaper coverage of the disaster. In a 15 June 1910 article appearing in The Globe and entitled “That Terrible Crash,” we learn of the typical reaction among women during the disaster, and also of the heroic rescue of another woman:

Miss Philornesie Guidon was working in the binding department. It is a pathetic story she tells. ‘Oh, we were all so frightened,’ she sobbed. ‘That terrible crash. I will never forget it. Some of the girls were hit. Some shrieked. One just beside me fainted; there were others too. I’m afraid some of them are in there yet. Oh, it is horrible. I got to the window somehow, and I saw the firemen below. They put up one of those big ladders and took me down. I hope the others got out behind. Oh, how I hope they did.”

The natural reaction of women, as suggested here, was to either shriek or faint, and they were utterly helpless until the firefighters arrived. Building upon this notion of helplessness and deference to authority is an article entitled “Fire Chief’s Story,” which appears in The Gazette on 16 June 1910. In this article, Montreal’s fire chief praises the women of the Herald for their obedience: “I would like to say a word in praise of the cool-headedness and nerve shown by the girls in the bindery. They were most obedient to the instructions of my men, and that under the most harrowing circumstances.”

While not the hysterical image suggested in other articles, the women are nevertheless portrayed as demonstrating the deference to authority expected of them in the presence of male authority figures, and expected of respectable female workers. As another example of women’s portrayed lack of agency, La Presse reports on 14 June 1910 that Blanche Thibedeau was able to escape the building by pure chance by seemingly falling to safety:

Thibedeau, a young girl of 18 years ... said that her escape had been miraculous. She heard the great noise, and before she could think what was happening she was on the bottom floor in a heap of boxes and other debris. The smoke was blinding and she could not make out where she was until she was taken to the ambulance.

Images of helpless and panicking women are further constructed in “Bindery Girls Panic at Approaching Fire,” which appeared in The Montreal Daily Star on 15 June 1910:

Jonathan Turgot, pressman at the Herald, was horrified by what
he saw in the midst of the inferno. ‘I looked across the expansive void that had resulted from the collapse of the building to a group of girls–five or six of them,’ he noted. ‘They were panic stricken at the sight of fire and they just stood there in a daze. I yelled at them to hasten toward the rear of the building, but they seemed unable to hear me. I would have gone down there myself and organized a rescue if it were possible, but, as it was not, I was resigned to be a witness to their plight. 30

From these examples begins to emerge an image of women as disoriented and helpless among the Herald ruins. It is this depiction of disoriented, helpless women in unfamiliar territory—even though it was by no means unfamiliar to the female employees—and the corresponding depiction of men as intuitively familiar with their surroundings, that constitute the analytical vehicles of the press’ examination of the roles and legitimacy of men and women in the workplace.

For the sake of this argument, it is important to note that a central tenet of late-Victorian ideology held that a woman’s energies should be focused primarily within the home, where she was to see to the nurturing and raising of her children and to caring for and satisfying her husband; a belief maintained by educational texts, literature, the press, popular culture, and religious teachings. 31 However, while Victorian ideology did provide that women should remain within the domestic sphere, Victorian society did not provide the economic conditions to make such an existence possible. Women took jobs primarily as domesticservants, farm hands, or factory workers, defying many virtues traditionally associated with the Victorian conceptions of womanhood: domesticity, piety, purity, submissiveness. These women worked for meagre wages often out of necessity.

Conceptions of masculine and feminine abilities, together with an underlying assumption that women only sought temporary employment, afforded employers the justification to pay women one-third to one-half the wages paid to men. 32 A living wage for working women was determined to be only sufficient to permit them to sustain themselves during their expected transition to marriage and motherhood. 33 As Christina Burr suggests, the perception that women worked only temporarily prior to marriage is evidentially unfounded:

The idea that women worked temporarily during a brief period before marriage did not reflect the reality of living conditions for the bulk of women wage workers ... where the income of unmarried daughters or married women was often needed to sustain a family. 34

Society’s perception of working women is summarized nicely by Carolyn Strange: “wage-earning women were viewed as temporary contributors to the wealth of the nation on their way to their more profound contributions as wives and mothers.” 35

Further conspiring against working women was recalcitrance among male workers, especially among male-dominated typographical unions, to accept women into their workplace. In her examination of the Toronto Typographical Union, Local 91, Burr suggests that typographical unions were highly defensive of masculine notions of skill. This is a crucial point, and Burr argues that at the end of the nineteenth century,
with increasing pressures on newspaper executives to employ women, a “crisis of masculinity” developed within the male-dominated typographical unions. She suggests that this crisis was transformed into a set of “exclusionary strategies formulated by male craft unionists ... [to defend] masculine notions of skilled worker status.”

At the root of the issue was concern among men for the integrity of the “art” of their craft. It was popularly perceived that the entrance of women into the male workforce would generally decrease the quality of work and, correspondingly, its value and men’s wages. Additionally, the preceding shift from small, artisan production to industrial-capitalist, mass-production further complicated men’s perceived self-image, as it led to a fissure between craftsmanship and quality on the one hand, and efficiency and productivity on the other. In *The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925*, Mariana Valverde discusses this crisis of self-perception:

Representations of masculinity shaped the ways in which journeymen and labour reformers dealt with industrial-capitalist transformations. The craftsman ideal imported from Britain, ... reasserted the power of the skilled working man, and reunited ‘art’ with ‘labour,’ contrary to the fragmentation ... brought about by industrial capitalism.

As Valverde goes on to suggest, this crisis resulted in a dichotomy of sexual identities, with a reassertion of the workplace as the domain of men, and disbelief in the value or necessity of women’s work:

Sexual difference was constructed by journeymen and employers alike to suggest that women’s work was temporary, and that they would leave the printing trades upon marriage. Women were denied access to the ‘mysteries of the craft’ and were never formally apprenticed into the printing trades.

Ultimately, the perception that women’s work was temporary resulted in less pay for women and alienated them from induction into the knowledge of the craft. Such sentiments contrast greatly with the necessity of working women’s wages for working-class families, and while men of the typographical unions did not appear to express much concern for this necessity, men of lower income would have undoubtedly been aware of the hypocrisy of such exclusionary policies.

The fraternal values of unions, rooted in artisan tradition and solidified by the developed union structure, also limited the entrance of women into the workplace and marginalized them both at work and in the home. Such a stance, however, was controversial: the unionist belief in equality of workers, implying also equality with women workers, contrasted with the traditional view of women’s role in the workforce. As historians Alice Klein and Wayne Roberts note, these conflicting views are apparent in the labour papers of the early twentieth century. Eventually, unions would consent to the participation of women, but as consumers, not producers: women would support the unions by purchasing only union-made products. By harnessing the consumerism of women, unions gained their support while retaining both a traditional sexual division of duties and the masculinity of the workplace. Where women did enter the workplace,
apprehension remained the dominant view held by typographical unions. Many of these sentiments are apparent in the press coverage of the Herald disaster.\textsuperscript{43}

As noted, newspaper articles concerning the Herald tragedy convey an image of men as physically dexterous and innately familiar with their physical (workplace) surroundings. Such portrayals suggest a subtle reaffirmation of the notion of the workplace as the domain of men. For example, in an article entitled “A Boy’s Escape,” and published in The Standard on 14 June 1910, the physical prowess of a man, in this case a “young lad,” is clearly articulated, as is his ability to navigate the ruins with considerable ease:

John Dickson, a young lad, ... saw a woman’s arm sticking from under some timbers. He endeavored to lift these off, but they were too heavy for him. He rushed back to the fire escape. A plank had fallen so that it formed a connection between the Herald building and the one across the alleyway, and by this means he escaped.\textsuperscript{44}

Additionally, men’s familiarity with the Herald site is articulated in the article “Women First, the Cry”:

Immediately after the falling of the tank, when young girls frantic with terror were screaming for help from the top story windows, he appeared on the ledge running around the top of the building, and with cool courage organized a safe descent of the girls down the ladders placed by the fire department.\textsuperscript{45}

John Dickson’s escape from the Herald building and the “cool courage” displayed by the “young lad” when running about on the precipices of the building suggest an unmistakable familiarity with the building itself and the workplace in general. The utter helplessness of the woman that Dickson failed to save, or the “frantic” women that the “young lad” helped to rescue, portray women not only as helpless and vulnerable, but also as inherently unfamiliar with their workplace.

While it was the desire of typographical unions to exclude women from the workplace, other groups sought to limit women’s role in the workplace and reaffirm their domesticity. The period from 1880–1920 saw a tremendous expansion of national women’s organizations and the ideological entrenchment of the primacy of mothers in maintaining the integrity and supremacy of the British race.\textsuperscript{46} New women’s organizations, including the Dominion Woman’s Enfranchisement Association, Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, National Council Women of Canada, Woman’s Art Association of Canada, and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, were all to some degree motivated by maternal feminist ideologies.\textsuperscript{47} These groups were particularly concerned with the amoral influences of the workplace on women and on their ability to mother respectable children. As Klein and Roberts note:

The consensus held by those defining themselves as spokespersons for the working girl ... judged their problems as part of a grave and generalized social crisis. The increasing number of women in the work force and the dismal conditions they faced was primarily a threat to the reformers’ definition of
Maternal feminist ideologies, as articulated by Klein and Roberts, greatly informed the actions of these organizations. Since women were defined as the bearers of the nation’s moral standard, their entry into a workforce dominated by an amoral male ethic that subjected them to temptation and distracted them from their true calling of motherhood was indeed a critical aspect of the social crisis. All of this is not to say that reformers frowned upon heterosexual contact; it was encouraged, but only if it was respectable. Contrasting with the Victorian ideology of spatial separation of the sexes, an interest in, and encouragement of, the emotional and sexual bonds between women and men began to develop in the early decades of the twentieth-century. However, relationships between men and women remained a matter of social scrutiny. For example, eugenicists argued that without proper monitoring of the amoral influences of unrespectable men, society could succumb to moral and biological contagion from ill-suited or improper relationships. Such afflictions would then be passed on to their partners and the next generation via their children, thus weakening the integrity and respectability of society as a whole. It is interesting to contrast this doctrine of maternal feminism, whereby there is a tremendous concern for the amoral influences of unrespectable men, with the heroic and respectable images of men conveyed in the newspaper coverage of the Herald disaster. In such a situation where heterosexual contact would have been so intimate and unavoidable, it would have been unfavourable for the integrity of society and for the men and women to be portrayed as anything less than respectable.

Finally, I should mention that I do not intend to reify the concept of respectability. As Joan Sangster notes, respectability was never a static or precise concept, but rather a “fluid ‘process’ of creating pride in oneself and one’s family that changed over time and took on a particular hue in each community, based on the community’s social structure, workforce, and cultural make-up.” Capturing the essence of respectability is complicated further by the fact that it can be defined and explained differently according to who is being addressed, when, and for what purpose. Although respectability may have been a dynamic and “fluid” process, a woman’s sexual modesty and fidelity were consistently integral to perceptions of respectability, and these perceptions are regularly articulated in the press coverage of the Herald disaster.

Newspaper coverage of the Herald disaster often characterizes the women involved by their spousal and maternal relationships. These characterizations are informed by many of the previously noted ideologies and perceptions, and they draw upon contemporary conceptions of feminine respectability. Additionally, the press’ preoccupation with the women’s domestic, maternal and spousal affairs illustrates its inability to comprehend them as typical workers in the midst of a workplace catastrophe. This emphasis, together with the image of helpless, vulnerable women, suggests that the press viewed women as most appropriately suited to their role in the house, and not in the workplace. An article entitled “Her Lover Dead,” published in The Toronto Daily Star on 14 June 1910, shows a typical feminine response to the disaster:

There were individual instances of the uttermost pathos and emotion. Miss Janet Simpson, a young girl of twenty years, was among those who stayed at the morgue at night, refusing to
return to her home, refusing refreshments, refusing all consolation. She was to have been married within three weeks’ time. Yesterday her fiancé H. Morrison went to the Herald to apply for work, and while there he was caught in the falling debris and has not been seen since.54

A similar example emphasizing an appropriately feminine reaction in the aftermath of the fire is found in La Presse on 16 June 1910: “Another of the victims was to have been married at the end of the month. Miss Jennie Robertson, a delicate girl, is heartbroken at the loss of her fiancé, D. H. Walsh.”55 In The Globe, on 14 June 1910, is an article that conveys an image of a mourning woman whose actions border on hysteria:

Pacing the roadway in front of the wrecked building throughout the night was a young woman who would have been a bride in a few weeks’ time. Her fiancé had just concluded arrangements yesterday to start work in The Herald office to-day when the crash came.56

Without discounting the understandably devastating experience of losing a fiancé, these examples should be recognized as images of loyal and mourning women, inconsolable at the loss of their partners. Moreover, the women in these articles are voiceless, and there is no apparent effort on the part of the press to permit them a voice; their actions alone—adhering to an understood standard of respectability—are taken as sufficient to convey their sentiments and thoughts. A related theme of maternal mourning and daughterly obedience is touched upon in an article entitled “Will Never Come Home,” which appeared in The Montreal Daily Star on 14 June 1910:

’She worked in the bindery, too.’ Said Mrs. Allan, and in reply to a question whether her daughter had come home or not, said with tears streaming down her face, ‘No, she won’t come now. I know she won’t. She was a good, obedient girl,’ said the mother.57

The frailty of women in mourning is further conveyed in an article entitled “Frantic Mothers in Tears,” in The Gazette on 14 June 1910: “Frantic mothers, with tears coursing down their cheeks, begged and pleaded with the police and firemen to find their loved ones. The temporary office of The Herald was besieged by crowds anxious for news of the missing.”58 Similar themes are articulated in an article appearing in La Presse on 15 June 1910:

While waiting at the morgue this afternoon for the arrival of the body of her son-in-law, Edmund Saucier, who is among the missing, Judith Damien, fell in a fainting condition and was revived after great trouble.59

In The Gazette, an article entitled “Sad News for Sisters,” and published on 16 June 1910, conveys a powerful image of domesticity:
Everybody had a good word to say of Miss Elise Irene Merriman, 18 years of age, who lived with her widowed mother, Merriman, at 75 Britannia Street. Her three sisters were at home last night when Father Dufresne, of St. Anne’s Church, arrived to break the sad news to Mrs. Merriman, who is suffering from nervous shock over the recent death of her mother. … What gave the family consolation last night was that Irene went to confession in St. Anne’s Church last Sunday.

This final example from the Montreal Daily Star on 14 June 1910 is titled “Only One Left of Six”. As with so many similar articles, it conveys a delicate and emotional impression of womanly domesticity:

Not far away is the humble residence of Mrs. Heart, at 4 Conway Street, whose daughter Olive was carried down in the crush along with other girls in the bindery. Mrs. Heart, who had returned from her work at 6 o’clock only to learn that her daughter was missing, repeated with tear-stained eyes last night that the victim was her baby girl, the youngest in the family. ‘Olive was a little late,’ said Mrs. Heart last night, ‘and I asked her not to go to work till the afternoon, but she said she would get there in time.’ … it was 6 o’clock, when she was returning home, expecting to meet the family at supper that the terrible news was told her that her daughter was gone. ‘This is the fifth child I have lost, and I have but one left now, a boy.’ Said this working mother.

In contrast to the overwhelming attention devoted to women—their virtues and respectability—there are comparatively few instances that portray a man in mourning or a household grieving the loss of a son or father, even though such a loss would have been catastrophic to a family. Such an image of lamentation would conflict with the depiction of men as heroes, and it may be for this reason that such articles are rare. One article from The Montreal Daily Star, on 15 June 1910, entitled “Little Girl Waits,” does in fact portray a young girl mourning the absence of her father:

Little Maisie Miller, the thirteen year old daughter of Duncan Miller, is to-day waiting for papa to come home and celebrate the anniversary of her birth. All arrangements were made a week ago, but her father’s crushed body lies with those of his fellow workers under that great heap.

However, in this article, the sympathy lies with the girl, not the father, and the image of a helpless woman returns in the daughter who is helpless without her father.

Women’s physical appearances constitute another theme of womanly respectability that is treated extensively in the press coverage. The recurrent references to the condition of women’s bodies, and the type and condition of their clothing, may be contrasted with the comparatively few references made to men’s bodies and clothing. Moreover, the newspapers examined are often careful to note the appropriateness and
respectability of the clothing worn by women, and their dignified—if disorderly—appearance. There are several reasons for this apparent discrepancy in the press, and each has its origins in the social discourse of the period. Perhaps the most fundamental factor is the social objectification of women’s bodies. Additionally, maternal feminist and nationalistic ideologies emphasized the reproductive role of women, and the physical connection between mother and child. The belief that a healthy mother produced a healthy child, who in turn contributed to nation building, was intimately connected to imperialist and nationalist ideology, which was a substantial tenet of late-Victorian social discourse. Given the prominence of these concepts and ideologies, it should not be surprising that they are manifest in the press coverage of the Herald disaster.

Newspaper coverage of the Herald disaster contains numerous articles that refer to women’s bodies. A typical example is found in an article entitled “Head Burned to Crisp,” in the 14 June 1910 edition of The Toronto Daily Star: “The unidentified body of the women found [the first female employee removed from the wreckage] was mutilated beyond belief. It was devoid of arms or legs and the head was burned to a brown crisp. The features were wholly unrecognizable.” Similar attention to women’s bodies is found in an article entitled “Two Girls Pulled from Ruins,” which appears in the 15 June 1910 edition of The Gazette: “Shortly after dusk, two girls were extracted from the twisted pile of concrete and steel, frail in their condition. Their long hair was singed, and their delicate hands and faces cut, scratched and covered with dirt. Their appearance was utterly pathetic.” Such references to the female body as frail or delicate occur regularly in the press, and often occur in concert with references to clothing.

The attention to clothing and the quality of clothing apparent in the press coverage is significant for several reasons. First, it illustrates a social preoccupation with the physical appearance of women, as clothing was the most perceptible categorizer of women’s respectability. Similar to the press’ preoccupation with the domestic and wifely characteristics of women, the attention devoted to the respectability of clothing suggests a reinforcement of traditional social values, and, concomitant with this, a reinforcement of traditional gender roles: men in the workplace and women in the home. Second, by describing the women as respectably dressed, journalists further romanticized the efforts of the rescuers, and completed the chivalric image of a hero rescuing a damsel in distress. One particularly gruesome article referring to both the body and clothing of a woman is found in The Montreal Daily Star, on 16 June 1910:

A hair ‘rat’ was found, with some burnt pieces of corsets, which made it sure that the remains were those of a woman. After more picking through the mess it was found that the body was standing straight up on its head, with the legs and arms—or the stumps that the flames had left—doubled inwards, the whole being huddled together into a ghastly remnant.... It was so charred that unless some scrap of clothing lying near may serve identification does not seem possible.

It is interesting that the identifying article of clothing mentioned is a corset, a distinctly feminine garment. By comparison, there are relatively few instances of articles referring to men’s clothing, especially distinctly masculine attire.
As historian Kathy Peiss notes, while clothing was a visible aspect of respectability, it was not the only one: “Patterns of speech, manners, levels of schooling, attitudes toward self-improvement, and class consciousness differentiated groups of women beyond the obvious divisions of ethnicity and religion.” These other aspects of respectability would have been difficult to evaluate in the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of the Herald building. It is perhaps because of the difficulty with which they are tangibly perceived in such a situation that these additional aspects of respectability are not clearly touched upon in the press coverage of the disaster.

That newspapers made efforts to emphasize the respectability of women’s working-clothes is significant. Sunday clothes would have been a woman’s finest and most respectable. By contrast, a woman’s working clothes would largely be determined by her occupation, and any respectability derived from such clothing would be associated with the occupation and not the clothes themselves. Peiss has commented on this dichotomy in her monograph, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York*:

> Among laboring families hard pressed for income, dress divided itself into two types, work clothes and Sunday clothes. Work clothing necessarily varied with the requirements of job and employer.... Sunday clothes, however, were visible displays of social standing and self-respect in the rituals of church-going, promenading, and visiting. Appropriate attire was a requirement of social participation.  

A woman’s clothing also had implications for her perceived sexual morality: the more a woman adhered to conceptions of proper dress, the more sexually respectable she was considered. This concept is linked closely with nationalist sentiments. As noted previously, maternal feminism held that respectable mothers produce respectable children—the essential ingredient to successful nation building. Anne McClintock, in *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, further articulates the relation between clothing and nationalist sentiments:

> More often than not, nationalism takes shape through the visible, ritual organization of fetish objects—flags, uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, national flowers, national cuisines and architecture as well as through the organization of collective fetish spectacle—in team sports, military displays, mass rallies, the myriad forms of popular culture and so on. Far from being purely phallic icons, fetishes embody crises in social value, which are projected onto and embodied in, what can be called impassioned objects.

McClintock goes on to suggest that clothing, especially women’s clothing, represented a tangible aspect of nationalism: not only was a woman’s clothing the key to her respectability, but it was also crucial to the integrity of the nation as a whole.

With strong social concern for the negative effects of the workplace on wage-earning women, the question should be asked: Why did the Herald disaster not spur on
place reforms in the same way that the *Triangle* fire in New York did? As Burt notes of the *Triangle* fire: “Those who followed the stories about the fire could only conclude that working women were in danger, America had failed to protect its women, and something had to be done.” In New York, the graphic accounts of the victims’ attempts to escape the burning building, the grief of their relatives, and the shock of witnesses stunned readers and the public. The story also attracted attention to the miserable working conditions in the garment industry and the hardships faced by the women who worked fifty-nine hours a week in factories such as the *Triangle*. Publicity generated by the fire, the criminal investigation and trial, and a campaign by the Women’s Trade Union League to change factory working conditions brought constant pressure on public officials that bore fruit. In May 1911, State Senator Robert Wagner established the New York Factory Investigation Commission with State Legislator Al Smith as vice-chairman and Frances Perkins as one of its chief investigators. In 1913, based on the commission’s recommendations, New York State passed a law that reduced the workweek for factory and mercantile workers to fifty-four hours. By 1915, the commission’s recommendations also had resulted in sweeping new safety codes for factories.

Some of these trends—the graphic accounts, the grief, and the shock of witnesses, for example—are common to the *Herald* disaster, but the rest are not. The fact that fewer employees were killed in the *Herald* disaster than in New York may be one reason behind the failure to secure labour reforms. Another might be the fact that the deaths at the *Herald* were not as disproportionately one-sexed as at the *Triangle*, nor were they as immediately visible, occurring as they did behind the facade of the *Herald* building. A final factor may have been that *The Montreal Herald* was Montreal’s reformist newspaper, and it goes without saying that it was compromised by the disaster at the *Herald Publishing Company*. Remarkably, the day after the disaster, *The Montreal Herald* was published from the office of *The Gazette*, though in a greatly reduced form. Containing primarily wired articles, and generally disordered, *The Montreal Herald* was not the effective voice of reform that it could have been at this time. The newspaper, like the building that once housed it, presented a resilient facade to the world; however, it was devoid of structure internally.
Endnotes

1. There was great dispute in the press, and later at the coroner’s inquest, concerning the exact chronology of events that occurred during the disaster at the Herald. Specifically, it remains unknown whether the supports for the water tank collapsed first, or whether the centre wall of the Herald building, on which the tank was supported, buckled first and subsequently caused the collapse of the tank. However, broadly speaking, the events at the Herald unfolded as described. See, for examples, the 14 June 1910 editions of any of the papers cited; or, specifically, “29 Missing,” The Gazette (Montreal), 14 June 1910, 1.
2. This is the final tally of casualties as reported in each of the papers examined. See, for example, The Gazette (Montreal), “Death List 32-14 Still in Ruins,” 16 June 1910, 5.
5. The Jewish and Italian immigrants working at Triangle, most of them young women, produced the fashionable shirtwaists—women’s blouses loosely based on a man’s fitted shirt—popularized by commercial artist Charles Dana Gibson, whose famous ‘Gibson Girl’ had become the sophisticated icon of the times.
10. Ibid.
11. The Gazette (Montreal), The Montreal Daily Star (Montreal), La Presse (Montreal), Le Devoir (Montreal), The Globe (Toronto), and The Toronto Daily Star (Toronto) are all daily circulations; The Standard (Montreal) is a Saturday circular.
13. See the 14–25 June 1910 editions of the newspapers selected for examination in this essay.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 4.
18. Strange, 16.
25. See Miller; Wilkinson; Rotundo; Gullace.
33. Strange, 45.
34. Burt, 355-356.
35. Strange, 27.
36. Burt, 349.
37. Ibid., 347.
40. Ibid., 98.
42. Klein and Roberts, 220.
43. Strange; Klein and Roberts, 222.
49. Ibid.
51. Strange, 118.
53. Sangster, 115.
66. Peiss, 64.
67. Ibid., 63.
68. Ibid., 52-72.
70. Burt, 197.
71. Ibid.
Treating the Soul
Medical Metaphors in Medieval Religious Writings

Jessica Adam-Smith

The religious writings of the Middle Ages are infused with metaphors and analogies intended to make abstract spiritual concepts more tangible and easily accessible to their audience. A great number of these comparisons relate spiritual states to medical conditions and practices. Moreover, amongst all these medical analogies, there lies one common metaphorical concept: that of Christ and his agents on Earth as physicians who heal the diseased or the spiritually sick. The medicines used to heal them are forgiveness and salvation, or the spiritual remedies of Christian practice, which are able to restore the ill to health. Joseph Ziegler, a historian who has written extensively about spiritual and medical writings between 1200 and 1500, refers to this network of similes as “the medical model.”

This essay will focus on the use of various facets of this metaphorical framework in the West, spanning from late Antiquity to the 1300s. The origins of these metaphors certainly do not lie in the Middle Ages, but have a long history of use in both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, as well as in early Christian and even pagan works. However, the nature and elaboration of this medical analogy changed and developed during its transmission in medieval Europe. Over time, the metaphors operating within this schema became more complex, detailed and systematized, reflecting historical forces such as the shift of both theological and medical training to the universities and the increase in medical knowledge as new Latin translations of medical texts became more readily available. That being said, there are also indications that the connection between spiritual and bodily health was not solely metaphorical. Indeed, some sources suggest that medieval people believed and sought to explain how the two were linked in reality.

At the center of the metaphorical image described above is the concept of Christ as the Divine Physician. This metaphor has its roots in the Judeo-Christian concept of God, as derived from Jewish and Christian scriptures. In the Hebrew Bible, God is described in numerous verses as the one who heals. For instance, one psalm proclaims that He “healeth the broken in heart, and bindeth up their wounds,” while another explains that it is He “who forgiveth all thine iniquities; who healeth all thy diseases.” Thus, in Jewish thought, God emerged as the origin and enactor of all spiritual (as well as physical) healing. Christianity borrowed this tradition and expanded it, portraying Christ as a physician and healer of humanity. However, He is also described as a physician in a metaphorical sense, as one who heals souls. This is seen in the Gospel of Matthew, which tells readers that when asked why he dined with sinners and publicans, Christ replied: “They that be whole need not a physician, but [rather] they that are sick [spiritually].”

Several centuries later, the Christian theologians of late Antiquity and the Middle Ages drew upon the scriptural use of this metaphor, and used it in their own writings. Clement of Alexandria, a Church Father writing in the second century CE,
spoke of Christ as a physical and spiritual physician. Clement argued that Christ was capable of healing the afflictions of the soul, and not merely the body, having established His clear superiority over the pagan healing god Asclepius, whose worship was popular among Clement’s pagan contemporaries. Later on in the Classical Era, the writings of Origen, Macarius, and Diadochus also included references to Christ as a physician in the spiritual sense. These theologians, writing between the third and fifth centuries, spoke of Christ as the healer of souls, offering cures for the afflictions of mankind’s evil and corrupt nature. This trend continued into the Middle Ages, as references to Christ as a physician continued to be common. For instance, the writings of Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims in the ninth century, referred to Christ as the true physician, giving healing to man who had been wounded by Satan. Such allusions continued to be frequent through to the fourteenth century, such as in the works of Galvano da Levanto, who described Christ as the “supreme Physician” and the “celestial Apothecary.” Giovanni di San Gimignano, an author of a fourteenth century encyclopaedia of metaphors for use in sermons, included this construct in his works as well.

If Christ is represented as a spiritual physician, then it follows that this same metaphor can logically be extended to His agents on earth—the clergy. Gregory of Nazianus, writing in the third century, compared the responsibilities of a priest to the toils and suffering of a physician, who must labour ceaselessly to treat his patients and prevent their death. He also pointed out that the mission of the priest, in restoring the spiritual health of souls, is doubtlessly superior to that of a physician, whose work is ultimately fruitless (since all his patients will die eventually). Numerous examples of this comparison continue to appear in the Middle Ages, especially with reference to the disciplinary actions that must be taken by Church authorities. Thus, the Rule of St. Benedict, written in the early sixth century, advised abbots dealing with disobedient and unrepentant monks to “do what a wise physician would do.” If corrective methods had been exhausted, abbots were told to “use the knife of amputation,” and expel the disobedient brother from the monastic community. In the ninth century, Hincmar of Rheims also compared a bishop’s course of disciplinary action to that of a physician who uses increasingly drastic means to heal the patient if the original treatment has failed. In addition, the twelfth century penitential of Bartholomew Iscanus, Bishop of Exeter, similarly counselled priests not to shy away from assigning severe penances:

physicians who try to apply medicine to bodies in no wise spare on account of respect...in the use of cautery or knife or other severe measures [towards] those whom they desire to heal, much more is this principle to be observed by those who are physicians not of bodies but of souls.14

The metaphors that describe clerics as physicians who use their judgement and skill to dispense the medicine of penance to believers, are found in earlier penitential literature from outside the clergy as well, and certainly persisted over time. The Penitential of Theodore, the Bigotian Penitential, the penitential tentatively ascribed by Albers to the Venerable Bede, and a penitential section from the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council all employ the metaphor of the priest as a physician of the soul. These works span from the fifth century to the 1200s. Nor was this idea restricted to penitential
works, as theological literature outside of penitential works continued to use this metaphor well into the twelfth century. Martin von Trappau, a Dominican friar writing in the eleventh century, described priests as physicians who check the vital signs of believers to assess their spiritual health. Similarly, his contemporary Giovanni di San Gimignano compared priests who lapsed in their responsibilities to foolish physicians who kill their patients instead of healing them. Authors in the 1300s such as Jean Gobi and Galvano da Levanto also used this metaphor to expound on the desirable qualities of preachers, such as good judgement, perception, and the ability to be both compassionate and harsh depending on the needs of the individual they are ‘treating’.  

According to this tradition, thus, all ‘physicians of the soul’ seek to cure their patients of a variety of diseases, which in this metaphorical framework represent the condition of the soul. Using bodily illnesses as symbols for spiritual sickness has a long heritage in Judeo-Christian religious texts, and many instances of such analogies can be found in both the Old and the New Testament. Early Christian theologians in the second, third and fourth centuries often described sins and heresies as diseases, and debated whether some of these illnesses were ‘hopeless cases’ which could not benefit from the healing medicine of Christian practice. Origen, writing in the sixth century, compared the inevitability of human sins with the inherent frailty of man’s body. In another example from the seventh century, Theodoretus related unbelievers to mentally deranged patients who may not realize that they are sick, and whose outbursts and insults must be borne by physicians (i.e., the clergy) in order to treat them. 

This use of diseases to represent spiritual conditions, particularly certain sins, continued through to the later Middle Ages. In the early fourteenth century, Giovanni di San Gimignano drew direct comparisons between particular diseases used in Biblical analogies and the sins that they represent. To him, for example, melancholy was representative of sloth, constipation of avarice and dropsy of pride. Writing in the same time period, Arnau de Vilanova, physician and theologian, claimed that all types of bodily afflictions can be used to represent spiritual failures. Galvano da Levanto, also writing in the 1300s, made use of this metaphor in his treatise on digestion, in which he commented on the spiritual meanings that can be extracted from the digestive processes. By extension of his logic, any diseases of the digestive system could also be symbols of imbalances or failures in those spiritual qualities.

The remedy for all of these spiritual ailments was of course the love of Christ and the fulfillment of Christian religious duties. As early as the second century, Church fathers such as Clement of Alexandria compared the Word of God to a medicine that could cure mankind of any spiritual corruptions. Origen, an adherent of Clement’s writings, described how, just as God has provided cures for physical diseases in nature, He also “made provisions for medicaments of the soul in utterances that He sowed and dispersed through the divine Scriptures.” As previously discussed, disciplinary actions of the Church authorities were also portrayed using analogies of medical treatments. Hincmar characterized participation in the sacraments of the Church as the ultimate instrument of healing, capable of curing the “infirmities of sin.” However, the body of works using this metaphor most frequently was perhaps the medieval penitential literature, in which penance was consistently touted as the cure for spiritual afflictions. Thus, the penitential of Cummean, written in the seventh century, states at its outset: ‘here begins the Prologue of the health-giving medicine of souls. As we are about to tell
of the remedies of wounds...first we shall indicate the treatments.” To make such a comparison between penance and medicine makes sense in the context of the larger analogy of this medical model. If sins are likened to diseases, then atoning for these sins is the logical course of ‘treatment’.

If this treatment is successful, then the patient is healed and becomes healthy again. In the metaphorical framework of the medical model, this represents forgiveness and the attainment of salvation. To this end, an Irish penitential from the ninth century CE suggests that a sinner should seek pardon “that he may be healed in spirit.” Hincmar of Rheims drew parallels between the aim of both earthly medicine and spiritual healing, namely that the common achievement within both was to be a state of wholeness. The early Church Fathers similarly used the framework of Classical medical theory to compare the condition of health to the freedom from material desires and sins. However, they also maintained that the achievement of such a state, like health, can only be fleeting since such a balance is by definition subject to change. Indeed, the early Church Fathers did not believe that the achievement of complete spiritual salvation was possible before the final Resurrection. This metaphor was also used speculate about the nature of terrestrial paradise before the Fall of Man. Alexander of Hales, for instance, appropriated the medical idea of a balanced humoural complexion within his conception of Adam’s spiritual state before The Fall. His work uses medical terms such as ‘complexion’ and ‘radical moisture’, which Alexander consciously modified for his purposes to convey spiritual, religious meanings. The absence of sin is thus represented as the equilibrium of constituent elements and physical perfection.

Having established the use of the various metaphors making up the larger analogy of the medical model, it is of value to examine the factors that influenced their integration into Christian theology and the reasons that they persisted over time. The spiritual and metaphysical connotations of medical vocabulary certainly did not originate in Christianity: Classical medicine also related health to the well-being of the soul as well as the body. Christianity seemed, as Jacqueline Lagré suggests, to have adopted this holistic meaning of health and added the concept of salvation and purely spiritual healing. Moreover, the adoption and continued use of medical metaphors was based on the view taken by many Christian theologians that all things created have inner, spiritual meanings. Hugh of St. Victor, for instance, asserted that nature possessed much moral significance, both in the structural forms of material things and in their active organic processes. Christian theology presents both a dichotomy and an intimate connection between body and soul, which allows for both their comparison as opposing creations as well as their use as analogous entities. Giovanni di San Gimignano, in compiling his encyclopaedic work, saw the inclusion of medicine in religious metaphors as justified by the relationship between body and soul. These two items were considered by him to be mirror images, possessing a symmetry that lends itself to analogy.

Of course, the use of the metaphors contained in the medical model did not remain static and unchanged over time. As Ziegler notes, the symbols used in language are a “direct pointer to the deepest layer of belief of the speaker and his audience.” Thus, the evolving use of this analogy over the centuries reflected the historical processes that also produced significant societal and cultural changes in the Medieval West between late Antiquity and the fourteenth century.

Specifically, the similarities drawn between the body and the spirit within the
metaphorical framework of the medical model tended to become more complex and elaborate as time progressed. For instance, in the sixth century Origen made use of this metaphor when he wrote that God’s word is like “the physician of the soul, who uses various fitting and most timely ways of treatment for those who are ill.” Following him in the eighth century, Hrabanus Maurus, archbishop of Mainz, used a similar analogy comparing the various actions of priests to the array of treatments used by physicians:

This excerpt from Hrabanus’ writings uses the metaphor in a more detailed manner than Origen had, comparing each specific action of the priest to a particular medical treatment. Still, the reason for ascribing the Church’s doctrines to a poultice is not delved into at this point. In the fourteenth century however, that additional layer of specificity in the metaphor is developed. Galvano da Levanto, in comparing Christ’s life and suffering to certain drug compounds, explained the spiritual quality that each ingredient represented. For instance, the water in the recipe was taken to be a metaphor for Christ’s tears, the honey for His grace, and the heat used to cook the drug was the fire of caritas (Christian love) for mankind that burned in His heart.

Since the medical analogies in the works of Christian theologians often made use of the prevailing medical theories of the time, it is not surprising then that their complexity increased with a corresponding development of medical practice during the Middle Ages, particularly from the eleventh century onwards. The increased availability of classical medical texts translated into Latin from Arabic, as well as contemporary works by Arabic authors, vastly increased the understanding of humoral medical theory in the West. This provided the writers of religious works with a wider arsenal of medical vocabulary, clearer explanations of the properties and processes governing the body’s systems and diseases, and more advanced insights into anatomy. That is not to say, of course, that medical theory was not taken into consideration by the writers of religious works before these advances. As early as the fifth century, John Cassian, a proponent of the early monastic movement in the West, explained penance using the basis of allopathic humoral medicine, which was the dominant medical theory at the time. Sins of one kind (such as gluttony), according to Cassian, were to be treated by their contrary (such as fasting). However, towards the later Middle Ages greater emphasis came to be placed on the value and positive implications of learning and knowledge of both religious and scientific subjects. Theologians using medical metaphors began to cite more medical sources in addition to scriptural ones. In this manner, the increase in the body of medical literature changed the nature of the analogies that they employed.

With the decline of monastic medicine, which occurred from about the twelfth century onwards, how then did the authors of religious texts come to access and
understand the new medical knowledge? Part of the answer to this question lies in the rise of the university as a setting for both theological and medical training. Although the clergy were much less involved in medical practice than they had been in the early Middle Ages, sharing the same location with the centres of medical learning presented opportunities for the exchange of knowledge and written resources between the two disciplines. One can imagine that any interested student of theology would not have found it too difficult to study the works of Classical medicine if they attended a university during this period with classes in that subject. As well, increasingly more medical professionals were found to be undertaking second degrees in theology and becoming clerics themselves. The incidence of such cases apparently peaked, at least at the University of Paris, in the fourteenth century. Several of the important sources considered in this essay were in fact doctors who later became theologians, such as Arnau de Vilanova and Galvano da Levanto. The use of medical metaphors in their writings thus is understandably quite advanced and scientific compared to those of their uneducated peers. However, even the theologians who did not have formal medical degrees in this time period, such as Giovanni di San Gimignano, still showed markedly more detailed understanding of medical theories than their predecessors.

Over time, using the metaphors of the medical model in religious texts also seems to have become more systematic and conscious. In earlier works, the metaphors were scattered throughout the text, and were rarely analyzed beyond the surface comparison they made. Yet, by the end of the Middle Ages, these analogies were fully developed, methodically dissected and increasingly systematized. This is demonstrated in the encyclopaedia compiled by Giovanni di San Gimignano. This text was compiled as an aid to those writing sermons, and as a reference guide for the spiritual messages that could be drawn from stories in the Scriptures. It was arranged into ten books, each devoted to a different field, with medicine receiving one of these detailed sections. Additionally, there is the aforementioned example of Galvano da Levanto’s metaphor of Christ’s life as a particular medicine, a general analogy which was subsequently broken down into smaller comparisons between the ingredients and their spiritual parallels. These approaches are very scholastic in nature, and the increased use of medical symbols in religious works thus corresponds with the rise of academia in the context of universities. The use of medicine as a source for spiritual imagery also appears to be more conscious in the late Middle Ages than it had been previously. Ramon Llull, writing in the fourteenth century, explicitly justified the use of medical concepts in religious analogies by asserting that a skilled preacher was one able to incorporate non-religious branches of knowledge into his sermons. Using such a diversity of examples, he argued, could aid in the understanding of abstract spiritual concepts. Giovanni di San Gimignano also seems, as Ziegler has suggested, to have given medicine a privileged position amongst other disciplines; suggesting that he believed it was a particularly good source of figurative language for preachers.

This discussion of medical imagery in religious writing thus far has made one critical assumption—that the connections made between the health of the soul and the health of the body were purely metaphorical. There is much evidence that suggests otherwise: some examples, such as those cited in the previous pages, were clearly using medicine as a metaphor, and many of them explicitly indicated that they were doing so. In other cases, however, the link between spiritual reality and physical existence was
treated as a fact rather than a symbol.

The connection made between disease and sin exemplifies this point. Not only was disease used as an analogy for sin, it was also sometimes viewed as the direct consequence of sin. Indeed, disease was thought only to have come about as a result of Adam’s sin against God. Before that, Adam and Eve (and indeed, all of God’s Creation) was thought of as being completely free from any sickness or infirmity. Theologians such as Hildegard of Bingen and Alexander of Hales theorized that Adam’s sin led to some fundamental physical change in the nature of his body. According to Hildegard, Adam’s sin resulted in the modification of his blood and created a humoral imbalance from which all diseases arose. Alexander of Hales, as mentioned previously, related Adam’s physical condition before he sinned to a perfectly balanced complexion. Galvano da Levanto likewise regarded sickness, and thus the existence of medicine, to be a necessary outcome of the Fall of Man, since Adam’s sin engendered all suffering, corruption, and death in this world.

The consideration of disease as a punishment for sin was also applied at the individual level. Even in the early days of Christianity, disease was often regarded as a chastisement from God. A Christian ascetic, whose biography was recorded in the sixth century, underwent amputations of his limbs afflicted by cancer without displaying any indications of pain. According to his story, the ascetic explained his calm demeanor to his companions by saying, “it may well be that my members deserve punishment and it would be better to pay the penalty here than after I have left the arena”

This interpretation of the etiology of illness may have drawn on Biblical sources as well. For instance, after Miriam spoke against Moses in the Book of Numbers, God punished her with disease “and behold, Miriam became leprous, white as snow.” She was cured only when Moses prayed to God to heal her. The book of Ecclesiastes, which discusses medicine, also implies that illness is the consequence of sin, advising the sick to “leave off from sin, and order thine hands aright, and cleanse thy heart from all wickedness.”

The belief that disease was a punishment for sin implied that penance was a medicine not only in the metaphorical sense, but in the somatic sense as well. After the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, the Church asserted that physicians must ensure that the moral causes of an illness were addressed before any medical treatment occurred. By “moral causes of disease,” the Church of course meant any sins that had not been atoned for, with the doctor now required to be certain that the patient had already seen a confessor before they began to treat the disease’s physical manifestations.

In an increasingly scientific and academic manner, some theologians and physicians in the late Middle Ages attempted to explain the nature of the physiological mechanisms linking soul to body. Alfred Anglicus, for example, who wrote during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, proposed that the soul operates its effects on the body through the intermediaries of the vital spirits. Particularly, Alfred addressed what he saw as the soul’s close connection to the motions and heat of the heart. The heart was given life through the action of the soul which in turn caused the irradiation of spiritus (“vital spirit,” or “breath”) throughout the entire body, imbuing all the organs and tissues with their virtues. Arnau de Vilanova also conceived of a physical link between the soul and the body. He based his idea on the Galenic model of the soul as a complexion that results from a harmonious mixture of elements. Arnau believed that he could determine an individual’s religious and moral complexion through his
understanding of both physical medicine and the Scriptures, and thus diagnose the condition of their soul. If there were any imbalance in this complexion of the soul as a result of sin, Arnau thought he would be able to identify it and cure the disease by addressing its ultimate spiritual cause.\(^{47}\)

That being said, many writers in the Middle Ages still recognized the metaphor for what it was—a figurative analogy, and not indicative of any sort of reality. Dionysius the Carthusian (1402–1471), for instance, reminded the people in vain that it was but for the sake of comparison that he called sin a fever.\(^{48}\) However, this quote also raises an interesting issue: that the literal connection between the spiritual concept and the medical one, not always intended by the preacher, was nonetheless taken as such by his audience. Why was this so? The explanation for this lies in the very nature of metaphorical language. As Ziegler points out, metaphors create a “new unit of meaning,” which causes the principal subject to be affected by the subsidiary subject and vice versa.”\(^{49}\) Through the constant association of medical concepts with Christian religious subjects, it appears that the two groups began to share increasingly close links in the minds of medieval people. The spiritual condition of the soul became ‘medicalized’, so to speak, as a potential cause of bodily disease. The infirmity of the body, in turn, became ‘spiritualized,’ as its causes were thought of more in moral and religious terms.

Over time, as these associations developed, members of medieval society may have begun to actively consider these metaphors in relation to their personal lives. Giselle de Nie speculates that this may have been the case in her discussion on the healing miracles recounted by Gregory of Tours. In Gregory’s writings, as in other medieval religious writings, the boundary between symbol and reality is blurry. It is difficult to know if his recounting of an event was meant to be a symbolic representation of a spiritual transformation, or if it was actually intended to be describing a historical occurrence. De Nie suggests that it is doing both. Like other oral cultures, medieval society included elements of ritual drama that were used by individuals to enact deeply embedded metaphors of the body. The connection between physical and spiritual well-being then, though initially just a symbolic literary device, could become so entrenched in the mindset of some in the Middle Ages that it came to be acted out physically by the people of that time. Physical manifestations of sickness and healing, then, may have been culturally acceptable outlets for the expression of spiritual struggle and redemption. For instance, a woman who dragged her paralyzed body to the foot of a shrine and was healed was engaging simultaneously in a physically painful and cathartic act, as well as an act of metaphorical significance, symbolizing her spiritual rebirth.\(^{50}\)

The extensive use of metaphor in theological works during the Middle Ages makes it clear that the culture at that time was “permeated by medical themes at all levels.”\(^{51}\) Many of the metaphors used in religious writings spanning from late Antiquity to the fourteenth century fell within the larger framework of the medical model. This symbolic framework remained important in theological writings over this time period. However, its use did change over time, as the metaphors became more detailed and elaborate, incorporated more advanced medical theories, and used more systematized approaches. These changes reflect wider contemporaneous societal trends such as the availability of a much wider and more advanced range of medical texts, the rise of universities as centres of both medical and theological education, and the increasingly scholastic nature of all disciplines of knowledge.

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Yet there are also indications that medicine and spirituality were, in many texts, linked by much more than metaphor. Certainly, the boundaries between the medicine of the soul and that of the body were not always clear cut in any of medieval these works. In the minds of some medieval people, these two seemingly separate subjects were connected to each other in a very literal sense, and attempts to rationalize such a bond were frequently made by some theologians in the Middle Ages. The very use of medicine as a metaphorical image in Christianity, in both the Scriptures themselves and the works of the Church Fathers, seems to have contributed to the formation of this literal link, creating a culture in which such spiritual metaphors were enacted, made literal, and sometimes physically embodied by individuals. Such evocative symbolism, embedded in and indeed arising from religious texts, wove the healing of body and soul together, and transformed both into “powerful spiritual realities.” 52
Endnotes

2. Psalms. 147.3 King James Version.
3. Ibid., 103.3.
5. Mark 2:17, King James Version.
7. Temkin, 144, 157, 159.
11. Temkin, 142.
15. Ibid., 151, 182, 221, 414.
17. Temkin, 127, 138-139, 140, 143.
20. Temkin, 144.
21. Ibid, 140.
24. Ibid., 167.
26. Lagrée, 237.
32. Temkin, 144.
34. Ziegler, Medecine and Religion, 143-144.
35. McNeil and Gamer, 19, 44.
39. Ibid., 126-127.
42. Temkin, 155.
44. Ecclus. 38.10. Deuterocanonical Apocrypha.
46. Bono, 116-117.
49. Ibid., 106.
52. de Nie, 277.
US Drug Policy in the Vietnam Era

Laura Mojonnier

In the late 1960s, backlash against the Vietnam War among American youth led to growing intergenerational conflict and social unrest in the United States. These young Americans formed the so-called “counter-culture”—a blanket term used to describe a multitude of groups including social activists, intellectuals, and vagabonds—and were known for their highly publicized drug use. The prominence of such figures as Harvard psychologist and LSD advocate Timothy Leary, events such as Woodstock in 1969, and the “Summer of Love” in 1967 made the association of drug use with counter-culture extremely visible, causing many Americans to abhor this ostensibly new “social problem.” Simultaneously, increasing marijuana use among middle-class teens forced some American lawmakers to rethink harsh punishments for possession. All the while, a glut of newspaper articles attempted to describe and investigate the mounting problem, drawing on the personal experiences of many Americans and magnifying the varying and often contradictory opinions of scientific experts and the law. Lawmakers attempted to address the increasingly complicated attitudes toward drug-use in America by enacting a number of laws, specifically the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, which, in effect, launched the modern day “War on Drugs.” By distinguishing the middle-class college student from the social deviant, these laws reflected the rapidly-changing nature and perception of drug use in the United States during the late Vietnam Era.

Throughout the 1960s, the well-publicized increasing drug use among American youth created a near hysteria in American news media, with the focus primarily on LSD and marijuana. Though less commonly used than marijuana, LSD received copious publicity due in large part to the aforementioned Harvard psychologist Timothy Leary. Leary conducted a number of tests using the hallucinogenic drug in the early 1960s, including administering it to prisoners before release to see if it would lower rates of recidivism. Leary’s personal use of LSD and other drugs drew the attention of the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in 1962, and the obscure academic became an instantaneous celebrity. Soon, newspaper stories emerged telling of the horrors of the drug. Famously, the commissioner of the Office of the Blind in the Pennsylvania State Welfare Department fabricated a story about six college students going blind after staring into the sun while on LSD, burning through their retinas. Days later—and after various Pennsylvania politicians had publicly attested to the story’s accuracy—it was revealed that the commissioner made up the entire story out of concern about LSD use by teens. Another New York Times article reported the smoking of banana peels as a trend at college campuses because of the fruit’s possible hallucinogenic effects. Other popular stories included that of a five-year-old Brooklyn girl who had her stomach pumped after swallowing a sugar cube laced with LSD left in the refrigerator by her uncle and a former mental patient charged with murdering his mother-in-law, who claimed he was high on LSD at the time of the killing. These articles all reflect the paranoia of the era; a fear that drugs were destroying American youth and innocent children and abetting violent criminals.
Only the media attention given to marijuana could compete with that given to LSD. While the latter drug’s advocates were more flamboyant and its side effects more insidious, marijuana was used with a frequency that could not be ignored. Though the drug had been a “problem” in the United States for decades, it was a problem reserved for, at least in the poll of popular opinion, the inner-city poor and, as the 1972 report by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse put it, “certain insulated social groups, such as jazz musicians and artists.” Only when middle-class college students started smoking marijuana in greater numbers did the drug’s use become an issue of broader social concern. According to a survey issued by the Commission, more than forty percent of America’s college student population and thirty-nine percent of America’s young adults aged eighteen to twenty-five had tried the drug by 1972. Thus, wrote the Commission, “The stereotype of the marijuana user as a marginal citizen has given way to a composite picture of large segments of American youth, children of the dominant majority and very much a part of the mainstream of American life.”

The changing nature of drug use required a change in federal law. The New York Times reported in 1969 that the director of the National Institute of Mental Health Dr. Stanley F. Yolles testified to Congress that the punishment for marijuana possession was “strict enough to ruin the life of a first offender and totally disregarded the medical and scientific evidence concerning the drug’s effects.” These assertions by federal officials were supported by media reports of draconian sentences for marijuana offences, such as a twenty-one year-old Texas man convicted of selling two marijuana joints being sentenced to fifty years in prison.

The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 reflects the increasingly complicated federal and popular attitudes toward increasing marijuana use across the country and drug prevention in general. Title II of this act, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, attempts to distinguish different drugs based on their addictive properties, medical uses, physical danger, and potential for abuse. Divided into five “schedules,” these categories determine the severity of punishment for various drugs. The schedules are defined as follows: I – “high potential for abuse,” has no medical use, extremely dangerous to ingest; II – “high potential for abuse,” has a medical use, abuse could lead to severe dependence, e.g. morphine, cocaine; III – less potential for abuse than I or II, has a medical use, abuse could lead to moderate dependence, e.g. barbiturates; IV – low potential for abuse, has a medical use, abuse could lead to limited dependence, e.g. tranquilizers; V – lower potential for abuse than IV, has a medical use, less likely to lead to limited dependence than IV.

To the dismay of many, the Act classified both LSD and marijuana as Schedule I drugs, despite the fact that both drugs were used medicinally and a general consensus existed at the time that neither was highly addictive. Marijuana was placed in this category at the behest of Assistant Secretary of Health Roger O. Egeberg, who suggested it be categorized as Schedule I until the recently established Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse gave its report. Moreover, some further provisions in regards to the use of Schedule I and II drugs seem to speak directly to Leary and his followers. The Act dictated that anyone who planned to obtain drugs classified in these first two categories had to receive express written permission from the Attorney General and that “it shall be unlawful for any person to obtain order forms issued under this section for any purpose other than their use, distribution, dispensing, or administration in
the conduct of a lawful business in such substances or in the course of his professional practice or research.” Leary and his colleagues were no longer safely under the radar.

Despite their harsh classification, the 1970 Act distinguished the penalties given for LSD and marijuana offences from those allotted for other Schedule I and II drugs, as anyone convicted of attempting to distribute, grow, manufacture, or sell those two drugs would be sentenced as if dealing a Schedule III drug. A first-time offender could receive up to fifteen years in jail and/or a twenty-five thousand dollar fine and a “special parole term” of three years for dealing a Schedule I or II narcotic while a first-time offender convicted of dealing a non-narcotic Schedule I or II drug (read: marijuana or LSD) or any kind of Schedule III drug could only receive up to five years in prison and/or a fifteen thousand dollar fine plus a minimum two-year parole sentence. These sentences would be doubled for a second offence. By distinguishing marijuana and LSD from narcotics in terms of penal code but still associating the two types of drugs by putting them in the same schedule, middle-class Americans were able to maintain their moral disapproval of marijuana and LSD while saving their children from harsh sentences. And while the provisions for non-narcotic Schedule I or II drugs also applied to LSD, its main intent and perceived effect was to lessen the severity of penalization for offences involving marijuana, a drug that was increasingly distinguished in the minds of the American people as considerably less sinister than other drugs.

The 1970 Act also significantly reduced penalties for simple possession, distinguishing between dealers—stereotypically of lower socioeconomic positions, or, even worse, foreigners—and casual users: now, increasingly, white middle-class students. The Act states that if a defendant had no prior convictions and was found guilty or pled out, the judge presiding over the case could suspend a sentence and place him or her on probation. The maximum penalty for first-time possession was one year in prison and/or a five thousand dollar fine, while the maximum penalties for a second-time possession charge were twice that. The marked leniency shown toward those convicted of possession reflected popular ambivalence toward increasingly ubiquitous marijuana use in the country; middle-class Americans wanted “criminals” punished, but remained unwilling to lump their children in with the drug-using hordes. Accordingly, the law detailed increased punishments for engaging in “continuing criminal enterprise” and distributing to persons under the age of twenty-one. For the former offence, the Act stipulated a mandatory minimum of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment and/or a fine of up to a hundred thousand dollars for a first-time offender, ten times the sentence for a first-time possession charge. For the latter offence, the Act dictated a maximum sentence of thirty years and a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars for Schedule I and II narcotics and ten years and up to ten thousand dollars for Schedule I non-narcotics and Schedule III drugs, with no possibility for the judge to suspend a sentence. The 1970 law also established the “no-knock” policy, which gave officers executing drug-related search warrants the right to break into a building if they believed that evidence could be quickly disposed of or that making their presence known might endanger the officers. The Act clarified that this policy was only viable if the sentence the theoretical evidence could potentially garner would be more than one year’s imprisonment, characteristically excluding first-time possession charges.

These policies and sentences reflect the sentiments of those in power that the criminals were the ones who made, grew, or sold the drugs, while the “good kids” who
used them were merely duped; their recreational or problematic drug use was seen as a product of poor decision-making or of the pressures of bad influences as opposed to a reflection of their moral character. When frequent recreational drug use was only prevalent amongst the lower classes and urban poor of the United States, marijuana offences were punished indistinguishably from other drugs. Now that its use was common among the middle class, it was seen as a social problem that needed to be prevented by cutting off the drug supply, as opposed to focusing on punishing those who merely partook of it. While the Act’s relaxed possession sentencing most likely had little direct effect (it does not dictate specific state codes and the federal government prosecuted relatively few possession cases), the law’s tone and guidance, however, certainly influenced many states to differentiate marijuana from other drugs. By 1972, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had adopted the 1970 Act’s guidelines.

Two years later, Congress passed the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act, a piece of legislation meant to complement the 1970 Act, this time placing the emphasis more on drug prevention and treatment than penalization. The legislation was largely sympathetic to the plight of drug users; its tone somewhat contradicted President Nixon’s harsh “War on Drugs” and “public enemy number one” rhetoric. The 1972 Act recognized that “drug abuse is rapidly increasing in the United States and now affects urban, suburban, and rural areas” and that “too little is known about drug abuse, especially the causes, and ways to treat and prevent drug abuse.” The Act also stated that drug enforcement required both effective law enforcement against drug traffic and “effective health programs to rehabilitate victims of drug abuse.” This language once again highlights lawmakers’ tendency in the early 1970s to discern the criminality of low-level dealers and drug lords alike from the social causes and health effects of drug abuse by “well-intentioned” Americans. The Act also designated funds to states to start prevention programs, establish the National Institute on Drug Abuse as a branch of the National Institute of Mental Health, and develop education, research and training for drug education and prevention. Title III of the Act, entitled National Drug Abuse Strategy, set up long-term goals for research, requiring the “analysis of the nature, character, and extent of the drug abuse problem in the United States, including the interrelationships between various approaches to solving the drug abuse problem.”

Though the 1970 Controlled Substances Act and the 1972 Drug Abuse office and Treatment Act addressed many concerns about federal laws, Congress desired a more thorough and long-term look into the specific personal and social effects of marijuana. Thus, backed by Nixon, Congress created the aforementioned Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse in 1970, after it became clear to lawmakers and much of the American public that contemporary punitive penalties for marijuana users were both too harsh, often garnering jail time equivalent to that for manslaughter, and ineffective, as drug-use increased throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s. Over the next two years, the Commission, chaired by Republican Pennsylvania Governor Raymond P. Shafer, closely studied the use of marijuana by Americans. Less than a month after the 1972 Act was passed, on 22 March 1972, Shafer presented the Commission’s report to Congress, recommending, above all else, the decriminalization of possession of small amounts of marijuana. The report was quick to establish that the most important aspect
in the development of marijuana use as a “social problem” was, in fact, its illegality in the first place: “inconsistency between behaviour and the legal norm is not sufficient, in itself, to create a social problem.” The report emphasized the fact that the deleterious effects of alcohol and alcoholism were widely known at the time, yet drinking was socially accepted and by no means considered a public crisis. The report cited three factors in the recent perception of marijuana use as a social problem: the drug’s increasing visibility, its “perceived” threat to “the health and morality not only of the individual but of society itself,” and, finally, Americans’ tendency to view marijuana as symbolic of greater social tensions and unrest. The report’s language when outlining the second of these three factors indicates a hesitation on the part of the Commission to insinuate that marijuana is an essentially harmful drug. The report further stated that by 1969, a general consensus existed that previous beliefs on marijuana’s effects were mistaken, especially in regards to its addictive nature, its tendency to promote “aggressive behaviour or crime,” and its psychotic effects. This government-sanctioned, Republican-chaired Commission censured decades of official opinion and penal code regarding marijuana, going as far as to blame the media whirlwind surrounding the rise in its popularity for Americans’ false perceptions of the drug. The Commission completely cast aside the logic that classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug in 1970, which suggested marijuana has “a high potential for abuse,” has no medical use, and is extremely dangerous to ingest. But this aside, even the Commission’s relatively sympathetic report could not resist stereotyping the counter-culture. “The drug’s youthful users abetted the media in this regard by flaunting their disregard of the law. Few of us have not seen or heard of marijuana’s being used en masse at rock concerts, political demonstrations and gatherings of campus activist.”

But, regardless of the report’s typecasting of marijuana users, its general thrust was towards the decriminalization of relatively minor marijuana-related offences. The Commission’s recommendations included the decriminalization of the “possession in private of marihuana for personal use” as well as distribution of small amounts of marijuana without a profit, remarkably including dealers in its purposed leniency, to an extent. In public, the possession of one ounce of marijuana or less would be decriminalized as well, and possession of more than one ounce, public smoking, or intent to distribute would accrue a fine of one hundred dollars, dramatically reduced from the potential ten thousand dollar fine and ten-year jail term stipulated by the 1970 Act. Those convicted of “disorderly conduct” associated with public marijuana use would also receive a hundred dollar fine, but could also be issued a possible jail sentence of up to sixty days. Operation of a motor vehicle while using marijuana would be a misdemeanor publishable by a maximum fine of a thousand dollars and up to a year in jail. In all cases, the marijuana in question would be “contraband” and subject to repossession. The relaxation or removal of penalization still applied most obviously to the stereotypically white, middle-class user, as the “cultivation, sale, or distribution for profit and possession with intent to sell would remain felonies,” once more reflecting the contradictory attitudes of American’s towards the drug’s rising prevalence. However, the Commission’s tone called for an overall revaluation of marijuana’s place in and harm to American society, suggesting media and popular paranoia surrounding the drug was, at the least, misguided and overblown. Additionally, the Commission proposed a Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which would universalize all of its recommendations and, theoretically, ensure that when felony chargers were brought, sentencing would be fairer.
The Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse reflected changing attitudes in American society in terms of drug use amongst its youth, a potentially self-serving wider acceptance coupled with a continuing wariness. The Commission’s recommendations would lessen penalties for personal use while maintaining stiff regulations for those selling, growing, and distributing marijuana. These recommendations allowed Americans to reconcile the increasing use of marijuana by middle class youth with maintaining a staunch moral reproach towards the drug. The new laws, then, implicitly suggested that college and high school students who tried the drug were simply influenced by the wrong sort, and thus did not deserve a severe punishment. Although marijuana was never decriminalized in the US in the manner the Commission suggested, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, both enacted before the Commission’s report, reflect its general thrust while maintaining stiffer penalties.

Though the American government and legislative body had been concerned with drug enforcement for almost a century, it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the goal of drug enforcement changed into what it is today. This newfound “War on Drugs” reflected both the fact that drug use was becoming an increasing social menace while acknowledging that the drug users were no longer beatniks and derelicts but mainstream, middle-class teenagers and young adults. While the media heightened the popular hysteria concerning drugs by saturating the American people with a glut of information, the government attempted to reconcile the law and penal code with compassion and concern. The stigma surrounding drug users did not disappear during the Vietnam era, but it certainly evolved. Drug users were now merely misguided youth, taken advantage of by evil and insatiable drug lords, in need of a little paternalism and a helping hand.
Endnotes

11. Ibid., 280.
12. Ibid., 281.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 283.
17. Drugs and Drug Policy in America, 293.
20. Ibid., 284.
24. Ibid., 154-55.
25. Ibid., 152.
A Pernicious Temptress

_Nineteenth-century Actresses and the Ideologies of Gender_

Lacey Yong

On 28 September 1868, English actress Lydia Thompson and her burlesque troop of “British Blondes” performed their first show in New York City.¹ Their play, entitled _Ixion; or, The Man at the Wheel_, was a ribald satire that poked fun at the “fashionable weaknesses” of society and the peculiarities of politics. Peppered with puns, political jokes, and classical and literary allusions, the show also featured the Blondes singing witty verses to popular tunes, and doing high-kicks and jigs to the music.² The true attraction of the show, however, was not the humorous dialogue or the girls’ comic singing, but rather the actresses themselves. Dressed in tights, short skirts, or tunics, the Blondes wore clothing that flaunted the curves of their upper bodies while revealing the lower halves of their thighs.³ Thompson, during her cross-dressing scenes, traversed the stage in tights, short pants, and close-fitting corsets. The troupe’s physical beauty was their greatest asset, and it made them an overnight sensation. These burlesque houses continued to be sold out after opening night, and respectable audience members and theatre critics alike flocked to see their performances.⁴

Yet, less than six months after their stunning debut, the British Blondes became the target of bitter public condemnation. They faced criticism that historians have since termed the “nineteenth-century anti-burlesque hysteria.”⁵ The panic began when New York newspapers started using vitriolic rhetoric against the Blondes, effectively scaring away their middle-class audiences.⁶ In a theatre review published on 5 February 1869, one anonymous critic from the _New York Times_ denounced Thompson’s troupe for “dispossess[ing] themselves of their clothing”; he further claimed that the company belonged in “a bawdy-house.” Another observer said that the Blondes were making “an unnecessary and lewd exhibition of their persons, such as would not probably be tolerated by the police in any bawdy-house.” Moreover, the burlesquers’ “broad, low, and degrading language” instantly made them anathema to “anyone of respectability.”⁷ Perhaps the greatest vilification of Thompson’s company came from a journalist working for the _Times_. In his article, the reporter accused the Blondes of being English contaminants to American society:

_Some dismal folk have predicted destruction to our community from the example of the burlesquers. It is feared that the light hair, the clotheless and the convulsive symptoms may spread to every home and carry desolation to every hearth. The true remedy…is quarantine!_

Looking back at these malicious statements, we are now obliged to ask: why did contemporaries react so violently to the Blondes and their particular brand of burlesque? The answer is simple, that contemporaries were provoked into a moral outrage because of the Blondes’ blatant sexuality, which undermined contemporary notions about gender and femininity. Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans believed that the ideal
woman was to be pure, modest, religious, and weak. Moreover, she was to be a paragon of domestic virtue—a view that reflected the ideology of separate spheres. According to this ideology, men belonged to the public world of business and competition, whereas women inhabited the private world of the home. Sheltered from the corruption of the public domain, women were charged with keeping the sanctity of the home and the moral well-being of their families. John Ruskin, in his lecture “Of Queens’ Gardens” stated that a woman must secure the “order, comfort, and loveliness” of her home in order to counterbalance the external sphere, “where order is more difficult, distress more imminent, loveliness more rare.” Women were also expected to protect their children from vice and give spiritual support to their husbands, who would necessarily be tainted by the cutthroat environment of the external world. The “angel in the home” was a vital component for a happy and decent family life, and by extension, a stable and productive society. After all, if the fireside angel could not maintain her family, then the community, and eventually the nation, would suffer from “crime, indolence, and rebellion.”

Lydia Thompson and the British Blondes clearly defied this “Cult of True Womanhood.” Unlike “true” women, they paraded themselves in public, invading the traditional sphere of men. Their outspoken nature and scandalous outfits mocked male expectations of female delicacy and meekness. Even their dancing, which “hinted that women had their own desires and pleasures,” was subversive: it countered the widespread notion in medicine and popular culture that women lacked sexual needs. The Blondes were therefore a threat to the male order, and as a result, needed to be marginalized. In their attempts to reassert male dominance in the theatre, critics compared the actresses to prostitutes who would infect every good American home with English contagions. However, it was not the first time that such rhetoric had been employed against actresses. Women of the theatre had been denounced as “whores” ever since the seventeenth century, when they were first allowed onto the English stage. As the historian Kerry Powell notes, actresses were considered inhuman, deranged, and diseased. Nevertheless, female performers like the Blondes were still able to use this dominant discourse to create one of their own. By looking at different actresses throughout the nineteenth century, it is clear that these women exploited their marginal status in order to subvert the domestic ideology and transcend the doctrine of female limitation in America.

One prominent actress who took advantage of her unchaste reputation was Adah Isaacs Menken (1835–1869). Menken’s status as “a synonym of all that is depraved in the female sex” originated from her profession, unorthodox personal life, and cheerful willingness to display her body for profit. She was publicly denounced as a prostitute by her second husband after he discovered that she was still married to her first spouse. The press joined in the name-calling when they found out that she was also carrying an illegitimate child. Strong and adaptable, Menken made the best of a bad situation by turning her notoriety into exciting personal and economic opportunities. Realizing that people would believe the worst of her anyway, Menken proceeded to ignore all social propriety. She cropped her hair, smoked cigarettes, and attended political rallies alone. She also wrote newspaper articles, arguing that women should be self-sufficient and have other destinies besides becoming wives and mothers. Most importantly, Menken’s rebellious attitude compelled her to take the leading role in Mazeppa, a drama based on the poem by Byron. The actress’ turn as the Tartar chieftain who is stripped naked by his
enemies and than lashed to the back of a wild horse immortalized her. During her performances, Menken actually allowed herself to be tied to a real horse. Ever ready to exploit her own body, the actress also used photography to show off her racy costume, which consisted of pink silk tights and a short, light tunic. As a result of *Mazeppa*, which was staged in the 1860s, Menken became the highest-paid actress in the world, once earning nine thousand dollars for sixteen shows.

Menken’s story demonstrates how a marginalized actress might use the language of her detractors to escape from the restrictions of the dominant gender ideology. Menken was reviled as a “whore”—a renegade woman who had nothing in common with the normative wife and mother. As a result of this label, the actress did not feel the need or desire to conform to the Cult of True Womanhood; rather, she was free to defy it, and she did so with pleasure. The brazen “adventuress” had what few women possessed in the nineteenth century: economic freedom. Unattached to any man—although she did have many lovers after her two husbands—Menken made a fortune enticing her largely all-male audience to see her almost naked in *Mazeppa*. While financial success could have been attainable through greater talent, the actress was no fool: she recognized her limits and decided to capitalize on her overt sexuality instead. By exploiting her image as a promiscuous woman, Menken effectively released herself from economic dependency; she challenged the assumption that women were supposed to be reliant on a man for their well-being.

Menken’s reputation as a wanton female also granted her other types of personal freedoms. For example, since a “whore” could not be expected to be virtuous, modest, or domestic in nature, Menken was liberated from having to be all of these things. She could act outrageously if she wished, and judging from her actions off-stage, it appears that she did. While her female contemporaries were required to remain within the safety of the home, Menken was dressing like a man, entering the public domains of gambling dens and racetracks, and conversing with men whom she was not related. Such unorthodox female behaviour illustrates how Menken used her marginal status as actress and prostitute to pursue an alternative lifestyle—one that rebelled against a way of life prescribed to most women of her time. The rhetoric that relegated the actress to the edges of society had carved a space for Menken to assert herself in ways that were not available to female contemporaries outside of the theatre. In this way, Menken challenged the domestic image of the ideal woman and her non-existent role in the public sphere.

Aside from the label of “whore,” contemporaries seeking to limit the “subversive potential” of an actress could also describe her as inhuman—a woman who was not a woman at all—but some strange being whose intimidating authority on stage immediately excluded her from the ranks of “true” females. Such language was exacerbated when an actress cross-dressed and successfully played the part of the opposing sex. Charlotte Cushman, “the best breeches figure in America,” is a fitting example of an actress who was both admired and castigated for her “unnaturalness.” Cushman was a tall, imposing woman, whose personality and figure lacked any distinct feminine qualities. Her facial features were harsh, and her movements broad and unrefined. One actor described Cushman’s walk as “strident,” unlike the “quaint little movements” that betrayed a woman who paraded in male garb. Moreover, she had a voice that was deep and rough, which made her sound uncannily like a man. Cushman had a
preference for male roles, and she excelled in all the “breeches” parts offered to her. In her famous role as Romeo in 1858, one female audience member noted that Cushman was “in face, form and general make-up a most perfect specimen of the impetuous and yet loving Romeo.” Nevertheless, one of Cushman’s earlier co-stars, Edwin Forrest, was offended by her easy masculinity: he declared that she was not a woman, “let alone womanly.” His sentiment was echoed by many theatre critics. Even when Cushman was not playing a man, one reviewer, who saw her rendition of Lady Macbeth, proclaimed that “she was inhuman, incredible, and horribly fascinating.”

From these reactions, we can see that Cushman’s “inhumanity” was her ability to display such masculinity and power on the stage. In an article for the *Tribune*, William Winter acknowledged his contemporaries’ anxiety over this show of female authority: “You might resent her dominance, and shrink from it, calling it ‘masculine;’ you could not doubt her massive reality nor escape the spell of her imperial power.” Cushman’s “imperial power” challenged the way contemporaries understood gender. Here was a woman who eschewed female weakness and a “fixed domestic identity.” Such nonconformity meant that the actress and her dangerous performances needed to be consigned to the shady, immoral fringes of society. Edwin Forrest attempted to do this by painting the actress as a freak: she was neither a man nor a woman, but an “alien sex” that could never belong to mainstream society. However, this scathing rhetoric—much like the word “whore”—allowed actresses such as Cushman to experience things typically forbidden to nineteenth century women. The public’s inability to ascribe one sex or another to Cushman meant that she could slip into “male talk and walk and gesture and motive” more easily than her female contemporaries. While women outside the theatre were being arrested in the streets for dressing like men, Cushman’s marginality as an actress and freak of nature enhanced her ability to embrace more “masculine” characteristics like aggressiveness and power. By assuming these formidable features on and off the stage, Cushman effectively turned the Cult of True Womanhood on its head.

The “actress in her breeches” roles also made the ideology of separate spheres more problematic. The notion that men and women belonged to different domains was founded on the assumption that the sexes were fundamentally dissimilar. Modern historians of sexuality called this the “essentialist” view on sex; women were “essentially” one thing and men “essentially” another. Yet, the idea that a person’s sexuality was innate and unchanging received a serious blow when Cushman appeared on the stage. Her ability to perfectly impersonate a man suggested that gender could be learned and feigned; that a woman could be equally commanding and as capable as her male counterpart if she only tried and practiced that behaviour. Cushman’s “inhumanity” was the critical factor that enabled her to intimate these ideas through performance. Without this marginalizing characteristic, it is uncertain whether she could have challenged the nineteenth century’s dominant ideologies in the way that she did.

Part of the greater rhetoric against actresses also included calling them deranged or diseased. As we have seen with the British Blondes, a language of sickness was often associated with women of the theatre in both popular and medical discourse. According to sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, female cross-dressing on stage was a sign of “homosexual instinct,” which was itself an indication of physical illness, or “functional degeneration.” In the popular mind, actresses were also thought to be mad:
unlike the ideal woman who suppressed her emotions, actresses freely expressed irrationality and violent feelings through their performances. Their behaviour onstage would land a woman outside the theatre in an insane asylum. However, the potential for this negative discourse to be subverted did exist. As Florence Nightingale remarked, madness and illness were sometimes “feminine forms of protest.” In several nineteenth century novels, actresses were depicted bypassing the constraints of their sex through the representation of madness. In *A Mimic Life*, for example, the actress-heroine cries, “Mad! Mad! ... Who isn’t mad here? We are all mad!” From a sane woman, this outburst—coupled with an obvious critique of society—would have been unthinkable. Yet, since the actress-heroine is perceived crazy, she is not bound by conventional gender roles: she does not have to be timid or sweetly unaware of social ills because she is entirely incapable of doing so. Real actresses doubtlessly found their enacted insanity to be equally liberating in some ways. Thus, within this framework of madness, actresses could experience a sense of empowerment that was foreign to most women bound to the domestic ideology and the Cult of True Womanhood.

During the nineteenth century, the stage presented one of the few places where women could escape the societal limitations placed on their sex. In front of an audience, women could speak and assert themselves in a public and powerful manner, while being employed in a real profession. If they were successful, actresses could also gain independence and economic freedom. Nevertheless, any woman who entered the acting profession could not hope to keep her good name. The conditions of the theatre necessitated that women work alongside men and express actions or emotions that were sometimes unfeminine. This inversion of the Cult of True Womanhood meant that contemporaries often felt threatened by the actress, and they actively sought to limit her influence on females outside of the theatre. As a result, actresses were described in a number of unflattering terms intended to remove these women to the edges of society: “whore”, inhuman, mad, or contaminated. Yet, some actresses found ways to take advantage of such taunts. Adah Isaacs Menken, Charlotte Cushman, and the British Blondes were all women of the theatre who found that if they embraced their marginal status, they could actually challenge the notion of separate spheres, the fireside angel, and the restrictions women necessarily faced from both ideologies.
Endnotes

3. Ibid., 164.
4. Pullen, 95.
5. Ibid., 95.
7. Pullen, 93, 97.
8. Ibid., 103.
13. Pullen, 93.
14. Dudden, 166.
15. Johnson, 50.
17. Johnson, 151.
18. Ibid., 149.
19. Ibid., 149, 151.
20. Dudden, 157
22. Dudden, 159.
23. Ibid., 157.
25. Powell, 35.
27. Dudden, 98.
29. Dudden, 98.
33. Powell, 27.
34. Pullen, 98.
35. Dudden, 99.
36. Ibid., 99.
37. Ibid., 93.
38. Powell, 35.
39. Ibid., 35-6.
40. Ibid., 37.
41. Ibid., 3-7.
42. Johnson, 176.
Maelve Jones

In the late medieval and early modern periods of England, the law punished perpetrators of high treason with hanging, drawing, and quartering. This grisly sentence was reserved for the most serious of offences: assault upon the monarchy itself. Although exceedingly violent by today’s standards, the punishment was a neatly prescribed, multi-staged process sentenced on the basis of logical calculations. The standard penalty comprised of three components: first, it took the life of the offender; second, it damaged and dishonoured the body of the victim; and third, it extended shame and infamy to the entire family of the condemned. This paper examines the workings of judicial torture as delivered to the traitor’s body, both alive and dead, noble and commoner, in sixteenth and seventeenth century England.

Treason against the monarch was regarded as one of the gravest of legal offences. Concern for high treason was especially salient during the reign of King Henry VIII; the King disavowed papal authority through the Act of Supremacy and provoked widespread opposition. Reformation politics upset the political order and customs of the time, thereby heightening the possibility of threats to his station as sovereign. As such, Henry believed it necessary to supplement current legislation against les majeste in order to deal with new threats to his throne. The Treason Act of 1534 expanded the state’s legal arsenal against high treason. First, it condemned those who attempted any bodily harm to the king, queen, or heirs, or who attempted to deprive them of their titles. Second, those who called the king a heretic or attempted to seize components of the military were deemed traitors. Third, the Act deprived traitors the privilege of sanctuary and laid out the process for their expatriation to England. Finally, it disinherited the lands of those convicted of high treason and handed over their worldly possessions to the king. Misbehaviour, as defined by the Act, constituted those actions that could compromise the legitimacy of the king or otherwise unseat him, but it did not detail the punishment accorded to those guilty of high treason. Instead, the Common Law courts determined that the appropriate punishment for treason was hanging, drawing, and quartering. The Treason Act was pertinent because it defined the crime that filtered through several layers of reasoning to yield hanging, drawing, and quartering. This law represented a legislative response to a rising threat to the King, which was subsequently realized through attacks upon the bodies of traitors in the form of punishment.

The crime of treason contained two components. First, it broke the law of the monarch and hence offended those rules enshrined by his authority. As Michel Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, any violation of law necessarily defied those who enforced it, and so the king owed legal retribution to those offenders. Punishment was proportionally magnified in this case, as disregard for law represented an assault on the kingdom’s strict social order. Second, high treason directly threatened the king and his right to govern. In the most extreme cases, the crime resulted in either
his deposition or death. According to the *Treason Act*, efforts to undermine the King, his authority, or his heirs were crimes thought to be as egregious as inflicting bodily harm on the King himself. Foucault would have argued that this stipulation was natural because the monarch embodied the wholeness of the realm and its laws. Therefore, physical injury to the king was equivalent to injury to his station as sovereign. Given that contemporaries viewed the individual person as bound up with the physical body, this convergence of sovereign leadership in the body of the monarch is not surprising.

The crime of high treason was understood to warrant retribution for defying the king and attacking his person. It called for revenge because such an act undermined the power of the state, which was symbolized by the person of the king. Therefore, the state sought retribution upon the body of the offender. Punishment projected an inverted violation of the king’s body onto the traitor’s in order to expiate the crime. Therefore, if undermining and injuring the sovereign was the pinnacle of crimes then the sentence of hanging, drawing, and quartering was the gravest punishment.

The confluence of the person with the body was a central tenet of English capital punishment. Foucault argues that late medieval and early modern English people believed that the origins of treason, as well as all other crimes, emanated from the body. Whereas modern English penal systems typically pass judgment and impose penalties on the mind of the individual dissociated with the body, sixteenth and seventeenth century Englishmen conflated the guilt of the person with the culpability of the body. Therefore, it was the corpus that received the punishment. Legal sentences on the body, however, were not arbitrary. Hanging, drawing and quartering aimed to punish the traitor in specific ways for having so grievously threatened the king. In *Rituals and Retribution*, Richard J. Evans highlights the notion that capital punishment, although violent and cruel, was neither an emotionally-laden outburst nor a sporadic response to odious crimes. On the contrary, the English judiciary approached capital punishment methodically, resulting in specific designs for the bodies of criminals. Although Evans’ point refers to late medieval French and German capital penalties, the same mindset applied to English hanging, drawing, and quartering. Just as modern penal strategies arise in the wake of extensive debate informed by social dialogues of morality and effective methods of justice, so too did hanging, drawing and quartering arise with a specific meaning and strategy for retribution. The three English punishments must be understood as using the body for various cultural, political, and experiential meanings.

Culturally, capital punishment translated the language of the crime into tangible actions that could be performed to exact justice from criminals. The penalty for treason was the inverted symmetric offense of the crime itself on the body of the perpetrator. This language of the body as an expression of justice and retribution worked, according to Arlette Farge, “because society at that time was so visual and mannered, it was customary to interpret much on the basis of the body’s signs and signals.” Consequently, the public displays of violence that undermined the integrity of one’s body were significant and effective means of exacting justice. The social aim of demarcating guilt was to degrade and dishonour the individual and to compromise his social status. Evans clarified this relationship by arguing that the period’s public capital punishment “involved an implicit or explicit branding of the offender as dishonourable, using the language of the body to reassign him to a new place in the social hierarchy...
Mutilation cast a permanent stigma of dishonor upon the offender from which it was extremely difficult to escape.” To return to the concern of the king’s integrity, the system mirrored the moral injury delivered to the monarch in high treason by disgracing the offender’s body. Evans argues that, politically, these sentences stamped the authority of the monarch on the body of the offender. Foucault supports this assertion, adding that the political function of judicial torture was to proclaim the power of the sovereign within his population via demonstrations of power over the bodies of his subjects. Violent and public judicial retaliation reinforced the symbols of a king’s otherwise insecure authority. It achieved through the criminal’s body “reassertion of the sovereign’s power… not merely branding [his might] on the offender’s body, but destroying that body altogether, burning it to ashes, dismembering it, [and] crushing it entirely.” By cancelling out the offence that upset the monarch’s authority, sentences like hanging, drawing and quartering made use of the traitor’s body as a political object.

Capital punishment aimed to perform cultural and political functions. Additionally, the act of hanging, drawing, and quartering drew on the experience of torture as an important component of methodology. William Blackstone opines, in *An Analysis of the Laws of England*, that many other serious crimes, such as desertion and murder, received only punishments of hanging. The addition of torture to that sentence represented a significant variation of justice. Foucault states that torture was a garnish penalty attached to offences significant enough to warrant not simply the revocation of life but also the deliberate infliction of pain. He argues that the degree of agony inflicted on the body correlated with the type, rank, and gravity of the crime. For the gravest crimes, physical punishment was prolonged and life sustained for a long duration in order to inflict maximal suffering upon the body of the convicted. In this respect, the torturous process of hanging, drawing, and quartering emerged not just from the violation of the law, but from the terrible injury done to the king through treason. The process transferred the insult of injuring the monarchy onto the offender’s body by making it suffer. Sustained displays of suffering delivered by disemboweling the offender while alive marked the victim with the infamy of having performed the gravest of crimes. In public, the torture projected a definition of the gravity of the offence on the traitor and then traced around it the signs of his dishonour. Most important was not the complete deconstruction of the body itself, though this certainly played a part, but rather the spectacle that marked the shame of the perpetrator and magnified the damage of the crime onto his reputation as a human being.

Strategies of torturous punishment were calculated and prescribed. The degree of pain inflicted on the traitor was predetermined by legal courts and was in proportion with the seriousness of the crime. For instance, a London judge ruled in one 1679 case that quartering the offender’s body after death was unnecessary. Therefore the wounds delivered to treasonous bodies were deliberate functions of the legal process that reflected its functional purpose of delivering justice through specific and deliberate actions.

These actions were the most severe forms of capital punishment. Hanging, drawing, and quartering dramatically unpacked the offender’s entrails in order to mark public disgrace, making certain not to completely kill the traitor until afterwards. Those unable to maintain consciousness during the procedure were often resuscitated.
Administering prolonged and heightened degrees of pain before the eyes of the offender meant manifesting his disgrace so that he visibly embodied it while conscious. Such a process played out as a dialogue between the executioner and the traitor. The executioner mutilated the offender’s body with his own hands in a startling demonstration of authority that highlighted both the dishonour and submission of the victim. Foucault elucidates this understanding of the judicial functions of torture, “the body of the condemned man [became] the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, and opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces.” So important and embedded was this step in cancelling the crimes of a traitor that spectator citizens demanded its conduct. Alexander Andrews’ nineteenth century comment on the customs of his grandfathers cited one example in 1735 of a convict who poisoned himself to forego his sentence of execution. In response, citizens allegedly dug up and mutilated his corpse in order to enact the retribution he had dodged.

Each step in the process of an execution was socially important. In hanging, drawing, and quartering, the various components of the penalty captured certain related and necessary operations of punishment. To investigate the stages of the sentence, contemporaneous legal proceedings and personal records offer rather detailed descriptions. Examples from the last decade of the period demonstrate the legal mechanisms. Other secondary accounts confirm their consistency with those of the earlier sixteenth century. An entry in the Diary of Samuel Pepys on 13 October 1660 offers a colourful view of hanging, drawing, and quartering:

I went out to Charing Cross, to see Major-general Harrison hanged, drawn, and quartered; which was done there, he looking as cheerful as any man could do in that condition. He was presently cut down, and his head and heart shown to the people, at which there was great shouts of joy. It is said, that he said that he was sure to come shortly at the right hand of Christ to judge them that now had judged him; and that his wife do expect his coming again. Thus it was my chance to see the King beheaded at White Hall, and to see the first blood shed in revenge for the blood of the King at Charing Cross.

Once sentenced, hanging, drawing, and quartering immediately subordinated the physical body of the traitor through a series of rituals marking transitional rites of passage and the progressive robbing of honour from the offender. John Bellamy, in The Tudor Law of Treason, outlined each step in detail. Offenders rarely waited more than a few days between sentencing and punishment. In the meantime they were chained and jailed. It was during this period that the denial of the individual’s agency over his own body began. Given that English society at the time expressed honour and integrity through physical and coded markers of status, this enforced submission to an authority paved the way for the traitor’s degradation and dishonour. From jail, the offender was transported to the site of execution by dragging on a wicker hurdle behind a horse with his hands tied behind his back. This step denied the free will of the individual and rendered him symbolically at the mercy of his monarch’s judgment. Dragging did not
simply deprive the convict of the right to walk on his own; it employed a form of transportation typically reserved for carcasses, corpses, and other low-value cargo. As such, it symbolized the beginning of the death of the traitor, marking that milestone in a humiliating and dishonourable manner. The procession, as well as the execution itself, was carried out by English officers and in the presence of soldiers. Aside from keeping the peace, Foucault suggests that these officers symbolized the authority of the monarch in carrying out the punishment. As well, public witnesses participated in the degradation by playing the role of the audience, symbolic judges of submission and disgrace. The entire process was intended to degrade the offender in the eyes of official supervisors and fellow peers of the criminal.

At the site of execution, the condemned was often stripped down to his shirt and had his arms bound in front of him. The treatment of clothing was significant because it constituted one of the more important markers of social status ordering society in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. Bellamy asserts that many offenders wore their best clothing to their execution, only to have them removed by the executioner in order to facilitate disembowelment. Stripped of clothing, the offender was also stripped of his social status and any markers of honour.

The executioner arranged a noose around the man’s neck, sometimes covering the traitor’s face with a cloth, and then hanged the man using the short-drop strangulation method. Traitors typically were hanged until “nearly dead,” as required by the sentence, before being cut down and prepared for disembowelment. The “nearly dead” qualification reflected profound understandings of human death in early modern England. It suggests that death was viewed as a matter of degree. It also suggests that the connection of the individual to the body was seen as unclear during liminal stages of death. As such, violence meant to inflict near-death could be inflicted repeatedly on the body. In early modern England, the status of the dead body was unclear and, as a result, it was believed possible to kill the victim multiple times. Until the traitor’s corpse was decapitated, it continued to be somewhat alive and therefore susceptible to humiliation and degradation at even lower levels. As such, rituals of disembowelment in the hanging, drawing, and quartering process marked criminals with the stigma of receiving a thousand deaths.

The executioner then dragged the disemboweled prisoner to a board near an open fire where his hands were fastened down. By this point the executioner would have removed all of the victim’s clothing, leaving him totally exposed and stripped of status before a public audience. Once sliced open and robbed of entrails, the treasonous body came to resemble a butchered animal. Next, the executioner cut off the traitor’s genitals, sliced open the torso, and removed the entrails which were then burned before the victim’s eyes. At last, he removed and burned the heart, then decapitated the body to secure a definite death. Therefore, the process that began with a denial of self-will came to undermine the very humanity of the traitor, all in a discourse that strove to reciprocate and magnify the injury done to the king through treason.

Four interesting aspects of early modern understanding of the body in England arise here. First, the executioner must have had some skill and knowledge of anatomy in order to penetrate his victim’s body and locate the necessary organs for removal while the body remained conscious. Many executioners were also tanners accustomed to mutilating animal bodies with professional precision. Those who exercised poor skill in
dismembering the body received jeers and tossed stones from spectators, for they deviated from the intended punishment and unjustly augmented the victim’s suffering. Second, prescribed removal of the heart as part of a public spectacle implicitly assumes that popular classes possessed some notion of how the heart and entrails would look and could identify them as such. In absence of anatomy books to inform a visual understanding of organs, it seems likely many spectators would be ignorant of a heart’s appearance and so unable to participate in the celebration of its removal from the traitor’s chest. Samuel Pepys’ diary confirmed that he was capable of identifying the heart as a discernable organ, though it is uncertain whether this awareness was indicative of widespread anatomical knowledge in society. It is possible that Pepys himself was educated in anatomy, but this was rare. Perhaps the executioner announced his methods of disembowelment so that spectators could identify the organ removed from the body as a heart. Perhaps instead a social discourse around hanging, drawing, and quartering alone served as enough education for popular spectators to understand that among the pieces of flesh removed during drawing, the heart was the last and was to be celebrated. Third, the use of fire to consume the victim’s heart and entrails is significant because it employs fire as a tool to supplement the torture and retribution imposed on the traitor. In contemporary thought, human bodies were viewed a source of the individual’s behaviour, intertwined with the person and thus the origin of treasonous inclinations. Fire was an agent of catharsis and pain. Burning entrails prolonged the victim’s agony by breaking down punishment into several smaller punishments, each destroying a part of the body and person. It also dishonoured the status of the person and then expiated the treasonous threat from English society by purifying fire. Fourth, the certainty of the traitor’s death was only secured by a decisive removal of the head from his body. Until that point, the executioner and spectators could only speculate as to his death or unconsciousness, for stages of death were a hazy matter in early modern England. Decapitation, on the other hand, decisively and visibly terminated the life of the body by dramatically removing its most vital component. Only the removal of the head from the torso publicly confirmed the otherwise debatable the status of death.

Judicial torture also had clear Christian connotations. Since the early modern Englishman’s body and soul were intertwined in life, the individual could be punished via his earthly body in avenues not necessarily available in the afterlife. In this light, torturing the near-dead body of a traitor effectively delivered earthly justice in ways which the Christian afterlife was incapable of facilitating. Drawing or disemboweling, then, extended God’s punishment for sin and asserted the monarch’s supreme authority over the bodies of his subjects. As a final step, the executioner dismembered the traitor’s dead body to be displayed on various spikes at entrances to the city. This completely destroyed the body of the traitor and denied it a proper burial, thus confirming the offender’s ultimate disgrace. Relatives wishing to bury the remains of the criminal had to wait until the mutilated portions had completed their sentence and decomposed on the spikes. This reflects Richardson’s assertion that seventeenth century English people viewed the individual as partly connected to the body immediately after death. Quartering thus pursued justice beyond life and into death, degrading the individual as long as he was within earthly reach, and sustaining the sentence even when life had been decisively ended by decapitation. Furthermore, popular custom believed that the
treatment of the dead body by its relatives and community bore heavily on the well-being of the deceased individual after death. Therefore, display of the quartered body compromised the prospects of the person in the afterlife and prolonged their infamy.48

The practice of quartering transferred the traitor’s disgrace to his family. Close relatives were traditionally responsible for governing the respectable treatment of the body after death in order to ensure the individual’s well-being. Quartering, however, blocked relatives from performing the funerary duties, by preventing any rituals such as burial or cleaning from being performed to comfort the dead body.49 The Treason Act further shames the traitor’s family by requiring that the traitor’s land and possessions be forfeited to the king.50 Status being closely linked to lineage, the defamation of the traitor’s character served to stigmatize his entire family and corrupt his blood.51 In sum, the process of hanging, drawing, and quartering degraded the traitor’s body through torture, as well as shaming his body and his family’s social status, all in response to the injury that treason imposed on the king’s body.

A wide gulf existed between the punishments meted out to nobility and commoners who committed les majeste. The way the two classes were executed reveals the importance of the body in judicial torture. Nobles received different treatment for treason as well; for this category of offender the intent was to respect the degree of honour due to their station and to diminish the stigma of public punishment. As Foucault mentions, hanging and torture were regarded as more dreadful forms of punishment than decapitation.52 Occupying higher social rank granted aristocrats the privilege of maintaining integrity over their bodies. Rather than receiving the dishonour of prolonged torture, they were simply decapitated.53 Different sentences for noble traitors reduced the form of punishment out of respect for public station but achieved the same ends by killing the victim. For instance, traitors like Lady Jane Grey in 1553 and the Earl of Essex in 1606 were decapitated at the London Tower.54

Three components of decapitation for treason highlight the efforts to preserve noble honour. Bellamy asserted that most high-ranking officers privileged enough to receive immediate decapitation were not dismembered further and received full Christian burials.55 Only in a few cases were the heads of the offenders kept from their coffins to adorn the town’s gates.56 Noble individuals, therefore, were not subjected to punishment beyond death. Second, nobles were allowed to walk to the place of execution on their own volition, although escorted by soldiers. This symbolized their sustained free will and refusal to submit their very bodies to the direct authority of the monarch. Once at the site of execution, the offender knelt voluntarily and upright, in a position that symbolized honorable self-control over the personal body.57 Third, the process of decapitation required minimal removal of clothing and so did not altogether undermine the noble’s social status.58 In sum, the punishment of nobles guilty of treason was markedly unlike that of commoners.

The sentence of hanging, drawing, and quartering punished the guilty traitor via his body. Although gruesome and cruel by today’s standards, the practice was a logical legal mechanism that reflected complex conceptual understandings of the time.59 It magnified and inverted the crime perpetrated on the integrity of the king by mutilating and completely destroying the physical body of the traitor. Various steps involved in the penalty worked to stamp the authority of the monarch on the criminal and to purge the
threat by marking the dishonour of the condemned. Central to this punishment was the understanding that the physical body and individual were inextricably intertwined even immediately after death. Therefore, it followed that the penalty should operate by targeting the body. The body here can be understood as a vehicle through which social conceptions of the individual interacted with legal institutions and monarchical power structures upon which authorities projected their understanding of mechanisms of retribution.
Endnotes

2. Ibid., 104.
6. Foucault, 53-54.
7. Ibid., 8.
8. Evans, 19.
9. Ibid., 22-23.
10. Foucault, 18.
11. Ibid., 9.
12. Evans, 64.
13. Ibid., 54-55.
15. Foucault, 57.
18. Foucault, 33.
19. Ibid., 34.
20. Ibid., 34.
24. Ibid., 55.
28. Evans, 102.
30. Evans, 53.
32. Evans, 102.
33. Foucault, 50.
34. Bellamy, 202-203.
35. Ibid., 205-206.
36. Ibid., 202-203.
38. Bellamy, 204.
39. Ibid., 206.
40. Ibid., 204.
41. Ibid.
42. Richardson, 16-17.
43. Foucault, 46-47.
44. Brandon and Brooke, 3.
45. Evans, 30.
46. Bellamy, 208.
47. Richardson, 16-17.
48. Evans, 56.
49. Richardson, 16-17.
50. Bellamy, 210-216.
51. Evans, 57.
52. Foucault, 33-34.
53. Evans, 53.
54. Bellamy, 190.
55. Laurence, 189-190.
56. Bellamy, 208.
57. Evans, 55.
58. Bellamy, 205.
The Forgotten Architect of the Grassroots Right

F. Clifton White and the 1964 Goldwater Presidential Campaign

Christopher Tang

Recently, historians have begun to understand the significance of the grassroots Goldwater movement in the 1964 presidential election and its implications for the national emergence of modern American conservatism. While the Goldwater campaign’s rejuvenation of local conservatism is coming to be seen as a potential origin of the New Right, the question remains: who is responsible for the outburst of grassroots support that sprung forth in 1964? This paper proposes that the answer lies with campaign strategist, F. Clifton White. By examining White’s personal history and political vision, his efforts with the Draft Goldwater Committee and the Republican nomination, his work with the presidential campaign itself, and his later assistance to Ronald Reagan, this study’s argument is driven by two central conclusions. First, any credit given to the Goldwater campaign for its reorganization of conservatism along grassroots lines must be granted to White. Second, for White, the future of the conservative movement—namely, conservatism’s popularity and power at the grassroots level—was more important than any personal success for Goldwater in 1964. With this in mind, 1964 served as the stage upon which White became the architect of the grassroots right.

White’s emphasis on grassroots conservatism in the 1964 presidential election can be traced back to the early stages of his political career. While pursuing graduate studies in political science at Cornell in the immediate postwar years, White became active with the American Veterans Committee (AVC). Though the group was left-wing, White himself was no leftist. Instead, he saw the group as an opportunity to combat the Ithaca landlords unjustly gouging local tenants. He organized Ithaca’s local chapter and eventually rose to become the group’s state-wide organizer for New York. White’s political savvy would prove itself, however, with his bid for AVC state chairman; an effort designed to prevent the group from being taken over by the American Communist Party (ACP). After the ACP successfully ran a smear campaign that compelled White to withdraw, he soon came to realize that “the Communists had won because they were peerless organizers.” White was resolved to master the successful organizational methods of the Communists he loathed. As Rick Perlstein details, White studied how the ACP “organized as cells, small face-to-face groups.” White wasted no time in organizing his AVC chapter along similar lines. As he told his group,

"Each leader will be a personally responsible for his ten men, and he’s going to tell them that we have an AVC meeting they all have to attend. I don’t care what else is going on, short of death. When there’s a vote coming up, everyone has to attend and cast his vote against the Communist."

As White had learned in defeat, successful political campaigns were built upon both strong organization and getting out the vote.
Additionally, White examined the backroom tricks employed by his Communist adversaries. He soon realized that their continued success was built upon a simple manipulation of the parliamentary procedure. These tactics included: relocating meetings to rooms small enough to exclude opposition members, employing stalling motions to delay critical votes until times when Communist participation could be assured, imposing the unit rule whereby they would vote as a bloc to ensure the vote appeared unanimous, and calling for ‘lightning votes’ when opposition members were absent. In placing the Communist AVC strategy under the microscope, White concluded, “There was no reason…that anticommunists couldn’t use the same techniques to defeat them.” Though White had not crafted these tactics, he happily hijacked them from the ACP and began conjuring their possible application on a larger political scale. As Perlstein states, these campaign strategies fascinated White, as he would later “use them to take over the Republican Party.” Before doing so in 1964, however, White continued to assemble his tactical arsenal.

After White began teaching at Cornell and unsuccessfully ran for Congress as a Republican, he began assisting local Republican campaigns. Taking on any menial task thrown his way, White continued his shrewd observation of what made successful campaigns tick. Often, this meant dealing directly with the voters, and ensuring their loyalty actually materialized into a vote. As Perlstein writes,

Driving little old ladies to the polls election after election, he found they began asking for his advice on whom to vote for: loyalty was powerful; so was getting your people to the polls on Election Day.

White climbed the ranks of the local GOP, eventually becoming chairman of the Republican Party in Tompkins County, New York. In this position, White frequently reminded mayoral candidates in small towns of the necessity of personally introducing themselves to every registered voter in their district. White insisted on coordinating all aspects of the campaigns, even taking it upon himself to personally guide many of the volunteers. As Perlstein claims, White commonly ensured that party staff, “Never leave anything to people’s imaginations. When you go through a [sample] ballot form with voters,” White instructed them, “mark it up the way you want them to vote.” For White, the key to local success was to gain the voter’s attention, and then put in the time and effort to ensure that he or she understood why, and how, to vote for the GOP. As he mastered grassroots politics, White began inching his way to the national stage, beginning with the Young Republicans.

White commenced his work with the Young Republicans (YR) in the late 1940s, participating in the New York chapter as a hobby. As his interest in the larger political machine began to grow, however, he met William Rusher, a Wall Street lawyer, fellow conservative Republican and eventually a co-founder of the Draft Goldwater Committee alongside White. As White and Rusher began recognizing similarities in their conservative political ideals, they agreed to form a faction within the New York Young Republicans, as a means to counter the moderate supporters of New York Governor Thomas Dewey who had taken over the organization. From there, this mobilized ‘Action Faction’ would then become a national political machine. As White and Rusher felt,
“The key was manipulating regional balances of power,” thereby allowing local conservatives to unite under a national Republican organization. The first step in this scheme was to back Michigan’s John Tope in his 1949 bid for chairman of the national Young Republicans. Since Midwesterners controlled the national apparatus of the organization, White and Rusher’s backing of Tope ensured an expanded base for the ‘Action Faction’. After switching its allegiance to Herbert Warburton of Delaware in the 1951 election for national chairman, White’s faction secured the last few votes they needed to control the Young Republican organization. As Perlstine describes the efforts of White and Rusher, “In 1951 they perfected the technique of finding a nonentity willing to submit to their discipline.” For White, the movement was more important than the man, and his conservative faction secured the group’s balance of power. Consequently, another conservative leader was elected in 1957 with John Ashbrook of Ohio, who would later be the third co-founder of the Draft Goldwater Committee.

White’s Young Republican experiences also informed his regional understanding of American politics. After the ‘Action Faction’ had effectively courted Midwestern support to take control and oust the Dewey supporters, White began to consider the possibility of a Republican machine that ignored the party’s Eastern establishment. Although White’s conservatism would only truly dismiss the GOP’s Eastern wing after Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller’s 1960 ‘Compact of Fifth Avenue’, the 1959 election of Ashbrook as Young Republican chair was a testament to the united potential of the South and Midwest within the GOP. Rusher recalls,

Under White’s leadership the condition had been augmented by new alliances with the Midwest and the South…This new coalition was to prove of enormous significance for the future of the entire Republican Party.

Though seemingly simple and pragmatic in retrospect, White’s tactical circumvention of the Northeastern wing of the GOP would prove highly influential on Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential bid. In Rusher’s words, White’s new look for the GOP,

Demonstrated, for the first time in modern memory, that a convention reasonably representative of the national distribution of forces in the GOP could be controlled by a conservative coalition not including New York and its relatively liberal allies. Just what that implied would not become entirely clear until July 1964, when…Barry Goldwater [was nominated] for president at the Cow Palace in San Francisco.

By rethinking the Republican map, White paved the way for both Goldwater and the transformation of American politics that his campaign inaugurated.

The national scene was not yet prepared for this transformation, however, and White left the Young Republicans in the late 1950 and founded his own private political consulting firm. Through Public Affairs Counsellors (PAC), as it was called, White dealt primarily with corporate executives interested in getting involved in the political world. In dealing directly with the corporate world, PAC was “relentlessly local.” Determined to refashion corporate support for the GOP, a practice that had degenerated to “Fortune
500 execs…sending a few well-placed checks and making a few phone calls every fourth summer to vouchsafe an acceptable nominee at the GOP convention,” White worked like a dog to contextualize each of his speeches.\textsuperscript{16} Travelling across the country on speaking tours,

In every city where he spoke, White compiled a booklet explaining the local election codes—how Democratic and Republican convention delegates were selected, how precinct meetings were organized, how the city and state governments were arranged, and on and on.\textsuperscript{17}

In effect, White’s work at PAC continued from his earlier discovery that elections were won by ensuring a local support base, and then making sure that voting was made easy for these supporters. When White translated this message to the corporate world, the results were dramatic for his personal political network.

In Perlstein’s words, as White used PAC to tailor his local message to the corporate world, “White’s political erudition was becoming epic [and] so was his political network.”\textsuperscript{18} Not only was he spreading his message of getting out the vote to all corners of the United States, but he was also making valuable contacts with some of the nation’s wealthiest conservative donors. The results would prove highly influential on both Goldwater’s presidential campaign, and the GOP nomination that preceded it. As presidential campaign historian Theodore White astutely observed in 1965, White’s private consulting services to firms such as U.S. Steel, Standard Oil of Indiana, Richardson-Merrell Inc. (Vicks VapoRub) and General Electric had made him an expert in the instruction of aspiring junior executives...White could teach them all about county chairmen, convention rules, petitions—the finest minutiae of organizational politics which they, as citizens, must understand. Since executives and employers should at least understand the nerve system of the body politic in which they operate, White became something like a black-belt master lecturing on judo to an audience of nonparticipants.\textsuperscript{19}

Though White would have to wait a few more years before the dividends of his PAC efforts would pay off, the Draft Goldwater Committee he formed would rely heavily on White’s extensive corporate and local network.

White’s role as architect of the grassroots right would only truly be developed with his formation of the Draft Goldwater Committee in the early 1960s. After leaving PAC to serve as the organizing chairman for Volunteers for Nixon-Lodge in 1960, White became disillusioned with the ‘notorious irregularities’ of the Nixon campaign and the GOP in general.\textsuperscript{20} Above all, White felt the need to reform the GOP along conservative lines. In White’s estimation, the GOP had been hijacked by both the Democratic liberal consensus that ruled postwar America, and the GOP politicians who catered to this liberal worldview. Labelling them, ‘me-too’ Republicans, White felt,

All too many of them had drifted into this camp out of sheer
opportunism—to get themselves elected to office or to perpetuate and advance their positions once they had gotten a toehold in office…They had brought the Liberal line simply because it had proved successful for the Democratic Party and they hoped it would for them.21

For White the GOP needed a complete makeover. Though White’s extensive travels had indicated to him “that the grassroots support for a conservative candidate in 1964 was spreading rapidly,” he felt that “the incipient conservative groundswell [first] needed direction and organization.”22 As such, White decided to convene William Rusher and John Ashbrook to discuss the situation. Together, the three organized a secret meeting in Chicago, inviting twenty-six fellow conservatives in October 1961. White had met many of them previously through his work with Young Republicans and PAC. As Rusher indicates,

All of them had had long and uniformly successful experiences working with Clif White…They had developed, to a high degree, a sense of team spirit and mutual loyalty as well as a formidable expertise in the black art of winning conventions.23

When twenty-two of those invited attended the meeting, White took control and outlined the group’s goals.

White’s overarching message to the group was the necessity of taking over the GOP as a conservative means to recapture national pre-eminence. As Barry Goldwater biographer Robert Goldberg writes, “The goal, [White] told the group, was to transform the Republican Party into a force for conservatism.”24 Outlining the national context, White summoned the regional picture he had assembled as a Young Republican, emphasizing how the GOP need not concern itself with attracting the Northeast. For White, a conservative revolt was necessary to save both the GOP and American politics in general. As Rusher describes,

As [White] saw it…’the situation was ripe for revolt.’ Say, rather, ‘for revolution,’ for it was nothing less than a revolution that White and his colleagues were planning—the seizure of control of the Republican forces by brand-new forces, based in the Midwest, the South, and the West rather than in the East and dedicated to the fast-growing cause of conservatism rather than to…liberalism.25

The moment, White emphasized, was at hand since Republican losses in 1960 had created a vacuum of leadership in the party.26 As Gary Donaldson explains, “White’s committee was, in many ways, a right-wing movement looking to draft a leader.”27 Before this was to be done, however, a foundation had to be built from the grassroots up. At subsequent meetings, White’s ‘Chicago Group’ examined this task.

The key to this grassroots foundation, as White explained at the group’s next meeting in December 1962, was a two-pronged attack of delegates and organizations. By assembling an army of local conservative delegates at the precinct level, White believed
the group could silently come to dominate the Republican National Convention in 1964, thereby holding the power to nominate a conservative presidential candidate. Since White was keenly aware of the local political situation throughout the nation, a result of his extensive travels on behalf of PAC, he knew exactly how to manipulate the GOP nomination process. As White recalls in his memoirs, he instructed the group that since most of the delegates to the 1964 GOP convention would be selected by precinct caucuses (many of which were up for grabs in the early 1960s), all they had to do was ensure conservatives held the precinct positions. From there, conservative delegates to the 1964 GOP convention could be assured, thereby securing a conservative presidential nominee in that year.

In addition to these vacant precinct positions, White identified that the grassroots GOP organizations were skeleton structures waiting to be taken over by conservative forces. Commonly headed up by moderate Republicans under patronage appointments by politically-invested Democrats, White claimed these GOP leaders “had lost touch completely with their grassroots.” For the ‘Chicago Group’, therefore, it was simply a matter of replacing these individuals with diligent conservatives willing to stir up local conservative support. As White recounted for the group tales from his PAC travels,

Wherever I went I was encouraged by the enthusiasm and determination of the hundreds of conservative Republicans I met. Many were political neophytes, but they were eager and willing to learn. And I was happy to give them my primer on how to build an organization from the precinct on up and how to plan the selection of delegates from their districts and states. In many states, I was able to help bring these amateurs into closer contact with old political friends.

With this, White convinced the ‘Chicago Group’ to pursue the conservative cause at the grassroots. Though the group leaned toward Barry Goldwater as the candidate they would court, and as Goldwater increasingly sought to distance himself from any speculation of his nomination, White’s group was not built upon Goldwater as the candidate and instead focused on local organization as its foremost goal.

From the inception of the ‘Chicago Group’, White’s plan was always to build a movement which would then seek a viable candidate. Though White kept Goldwater abreast of the ‘Chicago Group’s’ activity for fear that the Senator would learn of it through another channel, White assured Goldwater, “[w]e had not formed the group to work for his candidacy” and that the group’s “primary goal” was to set up “an organizational vehicle and on finding people within the Republican Party around the country who agreed with us that the party should be forged into an effective conservative instrument.” With Goldwater’s stock continually on the rise among the nation’s conservatives, however, it became increasingly clear to White that his conservative movement had no other option except for the Senator from Arizona.

Independent of any activity conducted by the ‘Chicago Group’, Barry Goldwater had emerged as the nation’s standard-bearer of the conservative cause. As such, he effectively became “the only possible candidate for conservatives” in the early 1960s. In White’s analysis, there were simply no other conservative with "sufficient stature and
standing at that time to win any kind of broad-based support.” Since a broad-based conservative movement was precisely the group’s agenda, Goldwater had to be the candidate. Yet Goldwater vehemently opposed his candidacy, fearing it would infringe on his political freedom and risk his respected reputation in Washington. When White approached him about the ‘Chicago Group’ perhaps drafting him to seek the GOP nomination in 1964, Goldwater snapped back that he refused to be painted into a corner by the group. In response, White told him,

I’m not painting you into a corner. You painted yourself there by opening your mouth for the last eight years. You’re the leader of the conservative cause in the United States of America, and thousands—millions—of people want you to be their nominee for President. I can’t do anything about that and neither can you.

Having no definitive attraction to Goldwater himself, White understood that the only way his movement could progress in 1964, was through Goldwater’s candidacy. In this sense, White supported Goldwater and adopted his cause as a means to advance his larger goal of a grassroots conservative revolution. Though Goldwater dismissed White, the ‘Chicago Group’ did draft the Senator for the GOP nomination, and therein officially became the Draft Goldwater Committee.

After the ‘Chicago Group’ formally transitioned into the Draft Goldwater Committee in mid-1963, White’s grassroots plan of assembling conservative delegates and organizations continued with a clearer focus on Goldwater. Though the Committee had proceeded with its draft and activities despite Goldwater’s initial rebuke, it now pressed even harder to amass strength as the GOP convention neared. As White describes, he informed his nationwide Committee members that,

Each one of them would have to familiarize himself thoroughly with the statues and by-laws governing the selection of delegates in his state. I announced that we were going after delegates in every state.

Knowing that leading GOP nominee Nelson Rockefeller was heavily financed by wealthy Eastern corporate sponsors, White realized his only chance lay in grassroots delegates. Consequently, as journalist Robert Novak observed in 1965, White “exercised a degree of personal control and personal observation of the delegation-selection process not seen before in American politics.” White alone travelled over one million miles between 1961 and 1964. By consequence, not only would White’s plan for the GOP convention delegation succeed, but it would also help to establish firm conservative grassroots organizations already in place for Goldwater’s presidential bid.

While the effort to achieve conservative delegates took care of the nomination process at the top, the Draft Goldwater’s Committee’s efforts with conservative organizations ensured support at the base. Though White’s local corporate contacts aided the Draft Goldwater cause, they could not match the financial support of Rockefeller’s Eastern backers. The result was White’s all-out offensive toward grassroots
organizations. As Goldwater campaign member Lee Edwards writes,

White and his colleagues could not match Rockefeller’s money…but they had something that the New York Governor did not have: a philosophical vision for their party and the nation that transcended normal party politics. They understood that the only way they could defeat Rockefeller and his powerful liberal cohorts was to launch an all-out grassroots effort based on the new political and economic forces in the Midwest, the South, and the West.\(^{38}\)

Having mastered the intricacies of local politics in his early political career, White took it upon himself to lead the grassroots effort. White’s seemingly simple tactic was to establish local Goldwater support, and then lead these volunteers to seize the county and state organizations already in place. Since most of these organizations, as mentioned, were mere skeleton structures, all that was needed was the lifeblood of local volunteers. As Novak comments, the “mass movement, channelled and guided by Cliff White…revolutionized preconvention politics” by refusing to “waste time on winning over county and state organizations,” and instead focusing “on actually taking over the county and state organizations by an inundation of Goldwater volunteers.”\(^ {39}\) Since many such previously immobilized, local conservatives had withdrawn from national politics, White’s organizational efforts effectively “commanded forces loyal to Goldwater in those very states where the regular party organization demonstrated little enthusiasm for the national ticket.”\(^ {40}\) When, in July 1964, Goldwater succeeded in seeking the GOP nomination at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco, therefore, these local organizations were more than prepared to begin campaigning. Goldwater, however, had other plans for Cliff White. Although White assumed Goldwater would name him Republican National Committee (RNC) chairman after securing the senator the GOP nomination, Goldwater instead chose his Arizona buddy Dean Burch for the post.

Goldwater’s appointment of Burch instead of White for RNC chairman speaks to a larger divide between the Senator and White. Though Goldwater was more than forthright in crediting White with his nomination victory, he always knew that White’s dedication was foremost to the grassroots conservative movement. To be sure, White’s efforts in the Goldwater campaign represented his most earnest attempt at victory. Yet, ultimately, Goldwater knew that White backed him only insofar as he was the face of the movement White cherished. As Lee Edwards describes the relationship, “In truth, the outspoken, outdoors senator from Arizona and the cool, cerebral political operator from New York had little in common.”\(^ {41}\) Though the two men united under the same cause, they did so for different reasons. As Theodore White speculated in 1965, perhaps Goldwater was justified in keeping White from the RNC chair, since “in White he sensed an appetite and purpose different from his own.”\(^ {42}\) As Goldwater’s memoirs detail, before deciding on Burch as RNC chairman, he met with his closest advisors (dubbed the ‘Arizona Mafia’) to poll their collective thoughts on White for the position. Though White’s abilities were unanimously praised, his intentions were called into question. As Goldwater recalls, campaign field manager Dick Kleindienst,

Had the highest praise for White’s political savvy and
organizational ability. But he warned that White was not a team player but rather an independent, single-minded individual who might go his own way.43

While Kleindienst’s questioning of White’s loyalty was unwarranted, he was correct in surmising that White’s allegiance was foremost to the movement. As Perlstein describes,

The Arizonians’ conservatism was rooted in contempt for fast-talking Easterners and their wily ways; to their mind Goldwater’s choice of a bunch of hip-shooting cowboys to run his campaign was practically the message of the campaign. That couldn’t have been further from what made Clifton White and his boys tick. To them, the thrill of politics was operating in the midst of the Establishmentarians, drinking with them, joking with them—then stealing their party out from under their noses.44

This very motive, however, led White to swallow his own personal pride and stand by the Goldwater campaign, despite the obvious snub.

For White, Goldwater’s refusal to grant him the RNC position he deserved was no reason to punish the grassroots movement he had initiated. Though grassroots supporters focused on Goldwater as their figurehead, White, newly appointed as director of Citizens for Goldwater-Miller, realized that without his own efforts, these volunteers would lack the guidance necessary for their success to extend beyond 1964. As White would tell Goldwater years after the campaign,

Do you want to know why I didn’t walk out on the campaign? Because every one of those little old ladies and others out there in the hinterlands, who had been bleeding and dying for two years for you, would have lost their voices near the top of the operation. Because [campaign fund-raising coordinator] Denny Kitchel and Dick Kleindienst didn’t know them. I couldn’t leave them voiceless.45

As the Draft Goldwater Committee paved the way for the official Goldwater presidential campaign in July 1964, the dejected White knew that without him, the entire future of grassroots conservatism lay in jeopardy. Though Goldwater was not in himself enough for White to stick with the campaign, the knowledge that Goldwater’s grassroots success was critical for the future of conservatism was indeed enough to convince him. In White’s words,

I knew, deep down in my mind and heart, that I’d helped change the direction of American politics. I got a kick in the teeth for all that I had done, but we’d won. The conservatives had taken over the party and that was truly joyous.46

With this in mind, July 1964 was no time to quit. For White, any differences he shared with Goldwater had to be squashed—the movement depended on it.

Somewhat appropriately, therefore, White began the official 1964 Barry
Goldwater presidential campaign in charge of organizing the Senator’s grassroots support. Citizens for Goldwater-Miller sought to consolidate the sometimes disparate local volunteer groups that had sprung up throughout the nation. Despite White’s extensive grassroots network and his own personal efforts to ignite the fires of local support, the wave of local conservatism had spread beyond his watch. White’s mission thus became to corral these “orphaned” grassroots groups into the auspices of Citizens for Goldwater-Miller, which could then better consolidate local campaign activities. In effect, however, this task proved difficult, since many of these groups felt control from the official campaign would tarnish their distinctly local foundation. White’s more pragmatic mission, therefore, became to better organize the campaign from the bottom up.

Since, in White’s estimation, the ‘Arizona Mafia’ was poorly managing the Senator’s campaign and ignoring the grassroots he had painstakingly nurtured through the early 1960s, he used Citizens for Goldwater-Miller as a means to take matters into his own hands. Immediately, White astutely called upon his network to reorganize the campaign at the base. As Perlstein notes,

White realized that all he had to do was ring up their—his—old leaders and offer them chairmanships of Citizens for Goldwater-Miller chapters, budget them a little cash, and let them get on with doing what they had always done. Then these people could take over from below every function Burch was screwing up from above—a shadow campaign, working with the natives in the countryside like some Third World guerrilla insurgency. The Arizona Mafia, who had fought against giving White any berth whatsoever in the campaign, would be too harried to notice who was saving them from the abyss.

In touch with the grassroots to an unprecedented degree, White strengthened these local conservative ties through his work with Citizens for Goldwater-Miller. White would continue to do so in his efforts to use Citizens for Goldwater-Miller as a means of attracting grassroots fund-raising.

White’s campaign efforts to expand grassroots fund-raising served a dual function. In addition to the obvious financial support for the campaign, White saw grassroots donations as ensuring a foundation of local conservative support that would exist beyond 1964. This philosophy was translated most clearly in White’s call for local supporters to donate one dollar each, and then forward the message to five friends. As White himself detailed in his memoirs,

There was a psychological, as well as a financial benefit that accrued from such small grassroots donations. If a person was willing to donate money, even such a small sum, to the Goldwater movement, the chances were pretty good that he was not merely to accommodate a friend. More likely he was committed, at least to some degree, to the conservative cause the Senator represented... The names of our vast volunteer army came originally from more than one
In White’s mind, a wider conservative constituency at the local level was infinitely more valuable than a few, wealthy backers cutting large cheques every four years. Consequently, White’s fund-raising efforts translated into seventy-two percent of the campaign’s donations being under five hundred dollars. Though a few wealthy supporters such as the DuPont family provided considerably larger donations, the contributions of the expanding grassroots base were what mattered most to White. As the architect of modern grassroots conservatism, White’s efforts to drum up local financial support for the campaign proved highly influential long after Goldwater’s defeat to Lyndon Johnson. Though such efforts were committed for Goldwater’s presidential bid, White was also concerned for the future of the movement.

Perhaps the strongest testament to White’s privilege of the movement over the man rests with his later efforts to aid Ronald Reagan’s political career. White first became impressed by Reagan after the latter’s captivating televised speech on behalf of Goldwater late in the election. ‘A Time for Choosing’ not only brought forth a wealth of donation money and vocal support for Goldwater’s bid, but it proved to White that Reagan was the future face of conservatism. Consequently, in the wake of Goldwater’s monumental thrashing at the polls, White was relatively optimistic for the movement’s future prospects. After convening a meeting of the original ‘Chicago Group’ in January 1965, White uplifted his audience with statistical evidence of the movement’s rise. As White recounts, the numbers “proved what most of our group had sensed years before, i.e., that the conservative cause was on its way toward becoming the majority political force in America.” With this in mind, White knew the future of the GOP, and conservatism in general, lived and died with Reagan’s success. White was thus quick to press Reagan to seek election on the 1966 California gubernatorial ballot. Eventually succeeding in his lobby, White was later influential as a Reagan campaign strategist in the 1980 presidential election. Connecting Reagan to the extensive grassroots network he had crafted, White was a dominant force in attaining a conservative presence in the Oval Office. Since, for White, the grassroots conservatism was always larger than any one politician, he followed the cause as Goldwater passed the torch to Reagan. As former conservative Senator for Nevada, Paul Laxalt, states,

For it was Clif who appointed President Reagan to his first job in a Republican campaign—co-chairman of the Citizens for Goldwater-Miller in California. It was Clif who served as Ronald Reagan’s de facto presidential campaign manager in 1968...And it was Clif who as Candidate Reagan’s senior campaign advisor in 1980 gave us the benefit of his unequalled national political expertise in the strategy sessions that charted the final successful campaign for the President.

As with the Goldwater campaign, White’s dedication to the GOP leader was certainly genuine and committed in earnest. Yet his efforts were always channelled to a larger end—a vision of the GOP as a truly conservative vehicle on the national stage. For White, Reagan’s successful bid for the presidency in 1980 was the culmination of a
process that began long before.

Historians have increasingly come to acknowledge the influential effect of the grassroots on the rise to prominence of modern American conservatism. At the same time, however, most of these studies vaguely trace the origins of the modern grassroots right to the 1964 Goldwater campaign in general. The credit, however, must be placed on the shoulders of White. As White’s early political history indicates, the formation of a strong, conservative grassroots constituency was an end goal he vehemently pursued throughout his entire political career. His efforts with the ‘Chicago Group’ and the Draft Goldwater Committee testify to this, with White’s revolutionary emphasis on assembling both local conservative delegates and grassroots organizations. After being snubbed with Goldwater’s campaign appointments, White continued to place the movement before the man and used Citizens for Goldwater-Miller as a means to further consolidate the grassroots right, and secure local allegiance through various fund-raising initiatives. As the face of the conservative movement passed from Barry Goldwater to Ronald Reagan, White followed the conservative GOP his grassroots support had built, and significantly contributed to Reagan’s ascendancy to the White House. Though 1964 was a defeat for Goldwater, for F. Clifton White, the architect of the grassroots right, it was a victory that began years ago, when a political science student from Cornell began studying the grassroots political tactics that would transform a nation.
Endnotes

2. Ibid.
3. Quoted in Ibid., 174.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 175.
7. Ibid., 175.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

14. Ibid. (emphasis in text)
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 177.
22. Ibid., 33.
29. Ibid., 49.
30. Ibid., 54.
31. Ibid., 45.
34. Ibid., 117.
35. Ibid., 48. (emphasis in text)
42. White, *The Making of the President 1964*, 345.
44. Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 315. (emphasis in text)
45. Quoted in Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 165.
46. Quoted in Ibid., 189.
47. Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 480.
48. Ibid., 480.
52. Ibid.
“Within the corners of our quad lie furled, the flame and splendor of the Ginling World”¹

The Significance of the Ginling Women’s College Campus

Rei Jackler

Ginling Women’s College in Nanjing, an American missionary college opened in 1915, was the first school in China to award baccalaureate degrees to women. A pioneer of Chinese women’s education, many of its graduates went on to higher education in the United States, though today it is best known for its role as a refugee camp during the Rape of Nanjing in 1937. Under the protection of Minnie Vautrin, an American Ginling teacher, Ginling College opened its gates during the Japanese invasion to all women and children seeking refuge in the Nanking Safety Zone—a guarded, demilitarized region of the city consisting of schools and government buildings.² The campus normally accommodated between two hundred and four hundred students,³ yet over the course of the occupation, as many as ten thousand refugees came to live at Ginling.⁴ In order to gain shelter within the school, refugees crammed into buildings and under overhangs; women fought for the right to sleep on a single step at night.⁵ As time went on, many begged simply for permission to stay within the campus grounds, whether indoors or out.⁶ Minnie Vautrin, whose status as a Westerner served as the most effective deterrent to looting and kidnapping on campus, spent months patrolling the campus in an attempt to ward off Japanese soldiers.⁷ While Vautrin was unable to completely prevent abductions, looting, and rapes from occurring on campus,⁸ the mortality rate outside the Safety Zone was twice as high as that within.⁹

When juxtaposed against the image of the Ginling campus before December 1937—a famously beautiful campus full of chrysanthemums, books, and studious young women—Ginling during the Japanese invasion seems to be from a world apart. It was the school’s status as an exceptional physical space, stemming from its early days, when the school operated out of an abandoned scholar-official’s residence¹⁰ that enabled it to become such an important haven during the Rape of Nanjing. From its establishment, the Ginling campus represented a space where East and West met culturally, politically, and morally to create a unique environment.¹¹ The Ginling campus came to be not only one of the few public female spaces in China, but also one of the only spaces in China that could be both a Chinese and a foreign space simultaneously. This environment enabled Ginling students and faculty to live in relative safety from the chaos of national events while remaining connected to the Chinese people.

The Mansion of a Hundred Rooms as a Staging Ground for the New Campus

The formative years that preceded the college’s 1924 move to its permanent location were imperative to the creation of the campus. During its early years, from 1915 to 1923, Ginling operated out of a drafty Chinese-style Mansion of a Hundred Rooms in Nanjing.¹² The faculty and students considered it a transitional campus, a sub-optimal location to be abandoned as soon as possible. Despite this, the college’s development in its
founding years had a profound effect on college life at the permanent campus. Thus, the story of the first campus, the issues that arose out of its shortcomings, and the efforts of the faculty to make the campus something closer to their ideal location, are of utmost importance to understanding the second campus that eventually became Ginling’s permanent home.

Before Ginling commenced classes, the search for a location proved trying for the school’s founder and first president, Matilda Thurston. Insufficient funds and legal restrictions ruled out the possibility of building a new campus. Eventually, Thurston and the school’s benefactor, the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, decided to rent an official’s residence as a temporary solution. At the time, many of the scholar-officials had fled Nanjing as it was embroiled in the national conflict in 1913. Thurston hoped that operating out of the official residence would give the school time to grow before moving onto permanent grounds.

It quickly became clear that the residence did not properly meet Ginling’s needs. This was illustrated as early as the school’s opening chapel services, when the fourteen individuals who made up the school’s faculty and student body sat in a hall large enough to seat two hundred. A chapel, laboratories, classrooms, guestrooms, offices, recreational areas, and dormitories needed to fit within the pre-existing building. Students wondered, upon seeing the tiny library, whether a campus such as Ginling’s could serve as the location of a college at all. When first arriving at the entrance of the college, one student thought there was “not a hint of welcome” and almost decided to “call back our carriage man… drive to the station and take the next train home.”

Conditions grew worse as the student body increased every year and the school became increasingly cramped. Although additional buildings were hastily constructed during the summertime to accommodate all of the incoming students, space remained barely sufficient. By 1920, faculty member Mary Treudley felt that it had become difficult to find the privacy to pray. With an overgrown garden, leaky roofs, moldy floors, and no running water, electricity, or heat, the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms proved a difficult place to operate a school.

The faculty, despite the residence’s setbacks, appreciated the beauty of the traditional Chinese buildings, replete with detailed latticework over the windows. Reflecting the sentiments of Ginling’s founders, Matilda Thurston thought Ginling benefited from Chinese-style buildings because she hoped it instilled in the students a “taste in architecture.” Since Thurston’s aim was for the students to ultimately remain in China and serve Chinese women, she and the faculty hoped to avoid turning them into “protégés of foreigners,” as Thurston put it. To achieve this goal, Thurston mandated Chinese language classes as part of the curriculum, as well as the maintenance of a Chinese-style campus. Thurston’s initiatives would become useful in the troubled future.

For the Chinese students, living in an official Chinese residence was just as alien an experience as it was for foreigners, although decidedly less glamorous. For many students, hailing from Korea, Canton, Shanghai, and Sichuan, the architecture in Nanjing was far removed from their own. These students’ cultural isolation was amplified by their difficulty in communicating with their servants (who spoke a different dialect) and by living within the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms. High walls, combined with intense study and a concern for upholding female “propriety,” left students feeling restricted by the confines of the Mansion of a Hundred Room’s traditional architecture.
and the lifestyle it embodied. Wu Yi-fang, a member of the first class at Ginling and later Ginling’s president, reflected these student sentiments when she wrote, “Within the high walls…we seldom have contact with the outside world…How we wished that we could find more chance to be related with our fellow students [of Greater China].” Only when the students went on strike in the spring of 1915, canceling classes and focusing their energies on the city and Chinese politics, did students “awaken,” in a senior’s words, to “the crying needs of the society around us.” These disappointments, reflecting the unique needs of Ginling faculty and students, ultimately served as key factors in the plans for what later became Ginling College’s permanent campus.

In spite of general displeasure with their temporary campus among both faculty and students, one location—a rose garden grown by faculty and servants—garnered admiration from everyone. As the only place on campus where faculty and students had a say in its appearance, the garden became a space where the shortcomings of the residence were, at least in part, reconciled. By creating a Western-style garden, with a wide dirt path, benches, hedges, and trellised arches, the space balanced out the traditional Chinese aspects of the buildings. It afforded Westerners a chance to have a space that reminded them of their homes, while giving the students a respite from the cramped quarters of the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms and the ever-oppressive high walls. The order of the garden, juxtaposed against the frustrations of life in a temporary setting beyond the faculty and students’ ability to change, gave the Ginling students an increased sense of control over their personal space. Its presence, representing a more fitting compromise between East and West, foreshadowed the hybrid architecture of the future Ginling. In many ways, the garden’s importance in maintaining a harmonious environment on Ginling’s original campus demonstrates how important the physical space of the permanent campus became in creating the proper setting for Ginling.

Choosing a Location for the Permanent Campus

When Thurston began planning for a new campus, her experiences with the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms helped to cement her preferences of location, architect, building style and amenities. Thurston’s time at the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms had proven to her that it was necessary for the college’s architecture to reflect traditions of both the East and West in order to best accommodate the school’s mission. It was also necessary that the campus foster a connection with the surrounding areas and with China as a whole, while retaining the proprieties deemed appropriate for a women’s college. In 1916, Thurston began buying the land that would later form the campus. After extensive dealings with ten different owners, Thurston finally bought the land needed for Ginling’s expansion in 1919. Although Thurston expressed frustration that “very few college presidents and quite certainly no women in America, would have to carry the load that is on me in connection with the new buildings,” her direct involvement ensured that the permanent campus would become a setting that embodied the purpose and community of the school.

Thurston intentionally chose a plot close to the University of Nanking, about a half-mile away, to “allow co-operation,” but far enough away to avoid pressure from the men’s college to establish co-education. As one of three all-women’s colleges in China during the period, the school’s single sex status during a time when national student
protests called for gender equality proved trying. Ginlingers cited several reasons why they wanted to remain a single-sex institution. Thurston wanted Ginling students to “develop their intellect unhampered by the domination of masculine authority and point of view.” More importantly, the missionary teachers felt that Ginling students were “a naturally conservative group” with “much more regard for family ideals,” and were therefore afraid that the criticism over co-education would fall on their shoulders. Their fear, though not necessarily appreciated by their male counterparts at the University of Nanking, proved to be not entirely unfounded in the aftermath of the “Cumberland Incident” of 1928, when a group of Ginling students, under the chaperone of faculty, hesitantly danced with British sailors for fifteen minutes on a gun boat stationed in Nanjing. Their actions, though innocent and brief, sparked a furor at the University of Nanking, where students active in the national student movement felt the British gunboat was protecting foreign imperial privileges. Ginling faculty received letters equating the dancers to prostitutes, calling them “slaves to the foreigners”, and declaring them failed Chinese patriots. The importance of the campus’ seclusion from men and men’s judgment became clear after the intense scrutiny that followed this incident. The campus needed to be relatively secluded for the maintenance of the school’s mission and also for the students’ propriety.

The location’s seclusion also drew criticism from the community. Some feared that, despite the draw of its privacy, the isolation of the site might put students in danger. Covered in graves and rice paddies, Minnie Vautrin heard some warn that “there would be a constant menace from thieves that the students would be afraid to live in such an isolated neighborhood, or that even the rickshaw men would refuse to go out so far from the thickly populated sections of the city.” Before construction of the campus could even begin, Ginling had to construct a road on the site in order to transfer building materials. In reality, however, the school’s watchmen served well enough to discourage crime in the area; one student’s writing, playfully titled A Thief, recounts an event in which students arose from a commotion only to learn it was merely “a dog unwelcome to our Ginling dogs!” Although in later years, isolation from the city did not pose a serious security problem, the Ginling campus’ isolation proved important in the school’s future experiences, in particular during political upheaval.

Fostering a Connection to Greater China

Whereas the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms had afforded seclusion—in the form of its high walls—to the exclusion of fostering a connection to China, the new Ginling site offered spectacular views of Purple Mountain and the fields surrounding the campus. This afforded Ginlingers with a sense of inclusion in national and local affairs despite its isolation. Purple Mountain, five miles distant from Ginling, inspired faculty and students, not only with its beauty, but also as testimony to the majesty of China. Purple Mountain, later planned as the location for the Nationalists’ capital complex because of its connection with China’s antiquity, had a strong association in the Chinese imagination with dynastic history as the site of the Ming tombs. As a symbol of China across the ages, having spent eons “watching” the plain…fretted with men’s unceasing restlessness…grow brilliant with gay palaces…or lie in desolation…only to shape again by human will…a busy market street, or huddled homes,” the Ginling campus view of Purple Mountain brought the school closer to China. In Treudley’s poem “A Dialogue,”
quoted above, the mountain actually notices the newly constructed Ginling, expressing awe of the “strange magic” which welds “the olden beauty of curved line/ and joyous color in new harmony.” When “the College answers” Purple Mountain, musing whether or not its “days are numbered as a tale” like all that the mountain has seen pass before Ginling’s construction, the author connects Ginling to Purple Mountain’s history and, to China as a whole. The six new buildings, constructed to look directly towards Purple Mountain, accentuated this connection. The view of Purple Mountain, as expressed in these poems, thus played an integral role in connecting Ginling students to China in a way that the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms could not.

The history of activity on the land purchased by Thurston could be traced back one thousand five hundred years to when it served as a villa for an emperor of the Tsin dynasty, and therefore gave Ginling a Chinese identity and romanticized the school’s purpose much like the view of Purple Mountain. The location’s highly varied history, from the site of an emperor’s villa to a Ming official’s garden to the burned cinders left in the Taiping Rebellion’s wake, connected the space to a number of different perspectives of China. Occupying a space that once harbored China’s most beautiful things, but also its most horrifying, the school’s Chinese roots were further strengthened.

The New Campus and the Neighbouring Community

Ginling’s proximity to a poor rural neighborhood—some of its inhabitants so poor that they lived in “a mud hut with no window, only a door” fostered within the Ginling student body an interest in philanthropic work for the good of China. Even before Ginling moved from the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms, Minnie Vautrin urged students to join her in surveying the neighborhoods surrounding the new land, inquiring as to the standard of living, the number of children, and the education levels of its inhabitants. Vautrin’s Sunday trips quickly became a Ginling tradition, an integral element in encouraging philanthropy among Ginling students. Soon after moving to the new campus in 1924, Ginling students established a day school for the neighborhood’s children, erecting a building just off of Ginling’s campus using, for the most part, their own money. Over the years, students developed personal relationships with the families living around them and aided them as much as they could. They opened a half-day school for improving women’s literacy, taught Sunday school, and offered classes for the servants. Philanthropic projects, given greater urgency by the proximity and visibility of poverty to the new Ginling campus, greatly expanded after Ginling’s move. By 1934, students were planning a neighbourhood activity center, health clinic, and bathhouse. Ultimately, these projects helped Ginling realize its purpose as a school was to educate women to help their fellow Chinese, coaxing the students to see beyond their “ivory tower.”

The Campus’ Architectural Plan

Thurston, who strongly felt that Ginling’s connection to China and Chinese culture was imperative to “stem the tide of unthinking imitation of things Western,” decided that the campus should be constructed in Chinese style with Western adaptations. She hoped that the buildings would be not only Chinese in appearance, but “Chinese below the roof as well.” With this in mind, she and the Board chose Henry
Killam Murphy, of New York, as the architect. In past years, Murphy had designed some of the first hybrid Chinese-Western buildings while working on the Yale-in-China project, at Fukien Christian University, and at Qinghua University. His interest in adapting Chinese styles to meet the modern requirements of a college was ideally suited to Thurston’s needs. By 1919, he and Thurston were staking out the buildings planned for Ginling’s newly acquired land.

Murphy and Thurston’s decisions during planning—how to situate the campus on the land, the layout of the buildings, and the amenities they decided to construct—were made in consideration of the Ginling community. One of Murphy’s first decisions, in order to give the girls as much of their cherished privacy as the land could afford them, was to situate the college at the foot of the hill instead of higher up. In addition, he situated the student dormitories in a quadrangle, with a Chinese style courtyard and landscaping, to make it feel “very domestic,” as Murphy put it. Paying heed to the homesickness and unhappiness which was aggravated by the confined quarters of the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms, Thurston wanted the new dormitories to give the students the sense of a cheerful and familiar home. She made sure that, while students at the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms once had to bring their own furniture and dishes, their new accommodations would be fully furnished upon arrival. By combining what Thurston saw as the best of each style of architecture, she hoped to alleviate the stresses brought upon the school by the inadequate balance between East and West offered by the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms.

The Public and Ginling: Criticism and Praise

Ginling’s hybrid architecture, in addition to its importance for the proper education and comfort of Ginling students, was also of key importance in creating the public’s perception of Ginling. Those who visited Ginling had both criticism and praise for the school. In the campus’s first weeks of operation, the administration welcomed visitors to inspect the buildings at their “open house.” During this period, as two thousand people, many of them “long-gowned men from the universities,” came to inspect the school’s new campus, criticisms arose regarding Ginling’s decadent, “palace-like” architecture and its suitability for the education of young women. Visitors, especially men from the University of Nanking, such as its president A.J. Bowen, raised concern that the students, who enjoyed high living standards, would fail to sympathize with their poor neighbors once they graduated from Ginling and would instead seek out a comfortable life in the West. Ginling students and faculty protested that though the building’s exteriors were magnificent, living within them was simpler than it seemed. As Edna Wood’s poem, *Princesses?*, put it, “I went into a palace, and it wasn’t a palace/ it hasn’t got a throne room/ it hasn’t got a gold crown/ it hasn’t got a stern king/ it isn’t a palace at all.”

Some of the faculty, however, namely Dr. Cora Reeves and Minnie Vautrin, came to agree somewhat with the sentiments of Ginling’s critics. They each tried, by living simply, to instill simplicity in the lives of the students. Cora Reeves found it particularly distressing that the Western missionaries lived such decadent lives compared to the Chinese around them. Reeves’ dream of a home became a reality when a small house, with mud walls and straw thatching was built for her on campus. Minnie Vautrin also made a distinct effort at simplicity for the sake of increasing awareness of class
differences by economizing the campus, making sure the school took proper care of the campus servants, and leading many neighborhood projects. At the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms, she pinched pennies by buying oil and paper separately and teaching the servants to make oiled paper for the windows, designed to keep heat within the rooms, instead of buying pre-made oiled paper. She ate Chinese food, significantly less expensive than the Western food imported into Nanjing, to save money for the poor during famine.

Aside from its critics, however, some looked up to Ginling, and the hybrid architecture it exemplified, as an ideal embodiment of China in modernity. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government in particular expressed these sentiments while planning for the construction of their government’s capital in Nanjing. As at Ginling, the planners hoped to use Purple Mountain as a legitimizing symbol attesting to their Chinese roots, by building the centre of their capital at the mountain’s foot. Although the planners decided the capital should be “designed and built solely by Chinese,” to retain its Chinese identity, they chose Ginling’s architect, H.K. Murphy, as the project’s chief consultant. The planners admired Murphy’s use of modern techniques, combined with Chinese appearances including curved roofs, and hoped that methods such as Murphy’s could help Nanjing reach international standards of modernity. Although the Nationalists never built their capital as planned, Chiang and Soong Mei Ling visited the city on a number of occasions. Soong particularly admired the Ginling campus.

**Daily Life on the Ginling Campus**

Regardless of what outsiders thought about the buildings, the Ginling campus’ most important function for the school’s inhabitants was as one of the only venues in China designed for women to partake in public-sphere activities such as formal study, athletics, theatre, and church involvement. The importance of the Ginling space is apparent when it is compared with the space available for women growing up before the establishment of women’s public education. In traditional Chinese society, women had no opportunity to be educated at a public establishment. Although girls could study under a private tutor, this practice took place within the student’s domestic sphere. Foot-binding, a tradition that was still prevalent during Ginling students’ childhoods (many had their feet bound and later unbound), ruled out most athletic pursuits. At Ginling, however, where students were secluded enough from the judging eyes of their male counterparts to give them freedom to pursue interests without ridicule, a tradition of competitive athletics, lively theatre, and public philanthropy ensued.

Most importantly, Ginling’s library of books and its laboratories full of scientific equipment were amenities never before available for women’s education in China. Their availability enabled Ginling students to study subjects which had been previously closed to them, and in fact the natural sciences were Ginling’s most common majors in its early years. Without this space, and the resources it offered, Ginling students would not have been able to seriously pursue their degrees. Equally, Ginling’s vibrant community life, had it not been for campus amenities allowing for public performances, would have been seriously hindered by lack of proper space. As evidenced by the innumerable student-written skits, musical recitals, and holiday pageants reported in the Ginling College Magazine, theatre performances were central features of Ginling life.
In addition to academic and cultural possibilities, Ginling’s campus enabled the students to play sports. Ginling’s fields, its gymnasium (the centrepiece building of the school, donated by Smith College) and its ability to buy sports equipment led to the development of a successful physical education program at Ginling. Reflecting the importance of the space, the program began only after the Normal School of Physical Education of the YWCA – themselves unable to run their program with the limited resources offered by their original location – merged with Ginling in 1924. After the merger, volleyball, baseball, track, and tennis, among other sports, all came to Ginling campus. Athletics became a central part of the Ginling community. The campus’ amenities ultimately enabled Ginling girls to partake in a public activity that had heretofore never been considered a proper female activity.

Cultural Interactions on Campus

Ginling campus offered unique opportunities to students not only by enabling the girls to partake in the public sphere, but also by enabling the students to interact with foreigners on a personal basis, something which rarely occurred in China, especially following the anti-foreign sentiments of the May Fourth period. Although the Western faculty and Chinese students had separate living and dining arrangements, students and faculty interacted with one another during class, through the advisor program, through extracurricular activities, and in times of crisis.

Alumna letters written in memoriam of Catherine Sutherland, the school’s music teacher, illustrate the intimacy of these encounters particularly vividly. One student, having just learned that her father had died and that she would have to discontinue her studies, found herself crying in Catherine Sutherland’s office. When she told Ms. Sutherland about the tragedy, Sutherland gave her an envelope with two hundred dollars in it so she could continue her studies, and told her to take a break from school to visit her mother. Another student, also suffering from her father’s death, only later learned that Sutherland was the person who put anonymous “encouraging, inspiring, and sustaining” messages into her mailbox. While this student was ill and abandoned by nurses at the hospital during an air raid, Sutherland came to take care of her. In addition to close relations between Chinese students and foreign faculty, Chinese faculty lived closely with the foreigners. One biology teacher, Wu Ching-yi, recalled in Sutherland’s memorial booklet her experiences of living together with Sutherland and Dr. Reeves in Reeves’ faculty cottage. The three of them became a “closely knit family,” living under one roof where “love, care, and concern prevailed.” For the time, Wu was living in highly unusual circumstances.

In Chinese society at the time, the barrier imposed by language was typically high enough to make deep personal relationships between Westerners and Chinese difficult. Xenophobia—evident during the killings of foreigners in the Nanjing Incident of 1927 and in the Cumberland incident of 1928—kept Chinese and foreigners, for the most part, physically separated from each other. Had it not been for the unique properties of the Ginling campus, the faculty would have had as much difficulty forming relationships with Chinese people as elsewhere in the country. At Ginling, only six members of the foreign faculty could speak Chinese, which meant that most faculty, like Florence Kirk, knew little even about the Chinese political situation in Nanjing because of their inability to read newspapers. Thus, even for the faculty (except for Minnie...
Vautrin, who spoke Chinese fluently), forming close relationships with non-English-speaking Chinese people was nearly impossible. The Ginling campus not only enabled Chinese and foreigners to communicate through education, it also created living conditions conducive to close personal relationships between the two. Had the students been in a place any less sheltered, the relationships could not have become as meaningful as they were. The Ginling college campus ultimately provided a space where Western-Chinese relationships and cultural exchanges could take place on a magnitude rarely seen in China at this time.

**Ginling during Political Unrest**

Ginling experienced exceptionally low tension between foreigners and Chinese, as illustrated during the Nanjing Incident of 24 March 1927, when the southern armies took the city and murdered six foreign residents. At the time, with danger on its way, none of Ginling’s fifteen foreign faculty members wanted to evacuate. Fourteen members of the faculty stayed in Nanjing throughout the takeover. With the help of their students, and the natural aid that the campus’ location afforded, they were the only Westerners in Nanjing who did not have all of their possessions stolen. During the period of looting and murders that took place in the wake of the army, Ginling’s Chinese students and faculty worked frantically to protect Ginling’s Western teachers from harm. The foreigners, at their friends’ insistence, hid in an attic in the faculty residence while soldiers looted the campus. One Chinese faculty member, in her own words, “threw herself on the grass and cried to God” that the looters would not pick that building. When the faculty moved to a hiding space at the University of Nanking campus, Ginling students came to visit them to make sure they were safe. Finally, as the foreigners made their way to gunboats offshore, they were escorted by Ginling’s neighbours. This foreign-Chinese cooperation was made possible by the personal relationships developed in Ginling College’s unique environment.

When the Western faculty finally returned to Ginling six months later, experiences during the Nanjing Incident had reshaped the Ginling community’s perception of their campus. It was now seen as a safe haven from the unrest of the nationalist takeover, the pervasive anti-foreign sentiment, and the violence occurring within Greater China. The school’s seclusion made it less likely that soldiers would discover the campus at all. Once, when soldiers came to the campus and threatened to loot, their intentions were thwarted because a Nationalist military officer, the brother of a Ginling student, came to visit Ginling to see his sister and ensure the school’s safety. After discovering looting soldiers, he ordered the men at gunpoint to defend the school against incoming attackers. He also wrote a letter forbidding crime on the campus. Thus, Ginling was spared not only because of its seclusion and its seeming innocence as an all-girls school, but because a Chinese citizen, the concerned brother, identified with the space and hoped to protect it. Although the space’s foreigners attracted soldiers at first, the campus’ Chinese identity evidently saved it from the harm suffered in other parts of the city.

The shift in perception of the campus among the students, who, like the faculty, increasingly considered the school a haven, is well illustrated by their changing attitudes towards protest. Prior to the incident, and especially during the school’s years at the Mansion of a Hundred Rooms, students involved themselves in protests and
patriotic expression rather frequently, although less radically than at many other institutions. In 1919 Ginling students joined in strikes designed to pressure the government in Beijing to remain strong on the question of rule in Shandong province, claimed by the Japanese. In the early years at the new campus, students cancelled classes and marched in parades at least once, leaving early in the morning “to show grimly that they were patriots.” In contrast, when the newly-installed Nationalist government demanded that the students partake in patriotic parades in Nanjing, the latter were hesitant to leave Ginling’s safety. Two students, dispatched by the faculty, went to Nationalist headquarters to ask for an exemption for Ginling students from attending a required lantern parade, but failed. Those who went to the parade came back cold, hungry, and crying. At one point in November, Ginling was the only school in all of Nanjing that had not gone on strike. According to Minnie Vautrin, when a week once passed without any invitation to take part in a Nationalist event, students and faculty alike felt joy at the return to normal life. The resumption of “normal life”—forgetting the issues going on outside the Ginling gates—meant the resumption of a life unspoiled by politics. Whereas, before the Nanjing Incident, one of the most important aspects of the campus was its connection to Greater China through its grand views and magnificent architecture, the campus now increasingly became a haven protected from overt danger by its connection with foreign countries.

When eight foreign faculty members returned at the beginning of classes that fall, apprehensive about the dangers of living in Nanjing, they decided not to leave the Ginling campus. By 1932, Nanjing entered a five-year period of peace. During the ten years following their return, until the Japanese incursion forced Ginling College to move to Chengdu, the Ginling campus continued to house the vibrant culture of the Ginling community. Although the school, at the Nationalist government’s behest, secularized and replaced many of the Western faculty with Chinese (such as Matilda Thurston’s replacement as President by Wu Yi-fang), as long as Western faculty such as Minnie Vautrin remained, the school retained some foreign cultural influence and physical protection. The school entertained such notable visitors as Charles Lindbergh and Chiang Kai-shek; it also built a music building, a library, and a new dormitory, as well as serving as an exhibition venue for modern art and chrysanthemums. Ginling’s Western influence continued, despite the increasing ridicule Ginling students sustained for their closeness to foreigners. By 1937, the Ginling campus’ foreign status ultimately gave it the ability to serve as a sanctuary from the Japanese troops.

The Campus’ Role during the Rape of Nanjing

As the Japanese approached Nanjing from the North, Ginling administrators decided to move the school to a new location. All students left, along with the president Wu Yi-fang and the entire foreign faculty, save for a few. Minnie Vautrin, considering it her duty to stay behind and care for the grounds and the people living in Nanjing, remained in Nanjing after the last Western boat left the area. Before the air raids began, Vautrin quickly went to work marking the campus with American property in order to signify the space’s foreign, and thus untouchable, status. She commissioned a large American flag to be unfurled on the lawn to ward off Japanese fighters. According to Vautrin, in total there were “eight American flags on poles, one thirty foot flag speared
on the ground in the central quadrangle and at least ten large proclamations kindly furnished by the American Embassy which were posted in strategic and prominent places.” In addition to the American symbols, an international group of foreigners in Nanjing, chaired by the German John Rabe, included Ginling College in their plan to set up a refugee zone under foreign protection. This afforded Ginling, through the Committee for the Safety Zone, a voice in the Japanese embassy, and at least in theory ensured that the Japanese would avoid attacking the zone outright.

Minnie Vautrin decided early on that Ginling should serve as shelter for the people most in need, and started turning down special requests for shelter made by groups related to the government. Vautrin strongly disliked the foreign style houses in the city, which she saw as walled off and exclusive, and did not want Ginling to become as such. From the beginning, she was determined to let all Chinese, not just those with ties to Westerners, onto the grounds. By letting “China” in, Vautrin turned the campus into a welcoming space for the refugees. Vautrin went so far as to lead four hundred female refugees to the safe zone. Thus, the campus became an amalgamation of foreign protection and openness to China, embodied by the Chinese-speaking Vautrin, where refugees could feel as if they were on their own nation’s soil, yet protected by an outside order. Vautrin also ensured that the space remained a female one, turning most men away. Ginling thus became a safe haven for women fleeing the horrors in Nanjing. By 15 December 1937, the Ginling refugee population had already reached three thousand, primarily women and children. Over the following months, that number increased to ten thousand. Outside of a few incidents—such as when the Japanese tricked Vautrin by interrogating her at the gate while soldiers snuck into the campus to rape women—violence was relatively minimal.

The Ginling campus, established and honed to fit Ginling College’s unique needs during its years as a school, ultimately saved the lives of the ten thousand women and children harbored inside its gate during the Rape of Nanjing. Those women and children, blessed with such an exceptional physical space, ultimately have the Ginling students and faculty, and their shared dream of women’s public education and fusion of Eastern and Western cultures, to thank.
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The Politics of Place Names
The Commission de Toponymie and the Eastern Townships

Alexander Dezan

It was not difficult to notice when a sign on Route 141 in the Eastern Townships suddenly read “Riviere Nigger” in July of 2006. The river was originally named “Negro River” because a black family, the Tattons, settled on its banks in Barnston in 1804.1 Citizens of Stanstead County had long been accustomed to the more acceptable “Rivière Niger” placard that was located at the commonly traveled 141/143 intersection, just outside of my hometown, Ayer’s Cliff. The ensuing uproar soon forced the reinstatement of the former, but not without igniting my curiosity for toponymy, the study of place names.

The following essay intends to study Quebec’s Commission de toponymy during the years 1977–1982; the five years immediately following implementation of the French Language Charter that created the commission. This paper will focus on the changing of existing place names during this period, which was only one aspect of the commission’s multiple responsibilities.2 Language politics have always been a sensitive issue for Quebec and this was true for the formerly prominent, but dwindling, English-speaking minority in the Eastern Townships, who were already apprehensive due to the recently legislated Bill 101. My research suggests that the sixty-six place names changed in the Eastern Townships during the studied period appear not to have been driven by political, linguistic, or cultural motives. In the majority of instances, the commission sought to accommodate local heritage, history and language, but most Quebec Anglophones remained hostile to it. This essay will demonstrate that this reaction did not directly result from the relatively benign legislation that occurred in the Eastern Township’s in the first five years of the Commission de toponymie. This sentiment stems from a number of factors that ensued, such as a general perceived threat posed by Bill 101 to the Anglophone minority and subsequent local and provincial name creations and linguistic reform.3 Last summer’s “Rivière Nigger” incident was no exception to the latter. The notion that place names invoke historical ties to a shared past and territory was keenly felt by Anglophone residents and the Quebec government, and perceived threats to heritage as a result of the commission’s linguistic policies will also be regarded within the broader discussion of place name politics.

The creation of the Commission de toponymie was justified by Chapter 3 of Quebec’s French Language Charter in August of 1977. Broadly given responsibility over establishing the criteria for spelling, assignment and changing of all place names, articles 120 and 121 of the Charter provide the basis for more specific and expansive powers given to the commission. These included cataloguing, preserving and officiating place names, providing names to “unorganized territories” that lacked them, and advising the provincial government on the issue of toponymy.4 This represented no small task: Quebec had 35,076 official place names in 1969,5 and with the help of the commission’s authority, that number ballooned to 320,000 by 1998.6

Recording place names was not a new concept when the commission was
created. From 1912 until the creation of the Commission de toponymie, the Commission de Géographie du Québec shouldered similar responsibilities. In the early period of the Commission de Géographie du Québec, under the control of the Ministre de Terres et Forêts, a dictionary of the lakes and rivers of the province was published along with reports every five years which summarized the commission’s activities. These early publications, which led to more encompassing works, such as the first Guide Toponymique in 1968, provided a base upon which the Commission de toponymie’s authority could later expand. The French Language Charter stipulated that the commission needed to officially publish their activities in an annual Gazette Officielle—similar to the report formerly published by the Commission de Géographie du Québec—in March of 1969.

Elaborating on the general characteristics outlined in the French Language Charter, the Commission de toponymie’s early publications explained their priorities, responsibilities and general outlook on standardizing Quebec’s place names. In Methodologie des Inventaires Toponymiques, syntax and grammar were standardized to create a uniformity of language across the province regarding the use of hyphens, capital letters, apostrophes, the use of the four cardinal directions, and the like. Beyond the actual naming of towns, streets and geographic phenomena, the commission designated rules for those people who were responsible for researching each region. They were instructed to place a greater emphasis on information obtained from municipal council and historic societies. 

This general overview of the commission’s responsibilities and intentions is provided to acknowledge that employees of the regulating body were not launched haphazardly into the field when the commission began a provincial inventory and standardizing process in 1977. The commission sent employees and students to all the administrative areas of the province to collect this inventory, and each group of people (often in charge of multiple regions) reported back to the commission to publish their findings. The Dossiers Toponymiques were based upon these expeditions, often taking as many as three summers to complete and required the aid of students to obtain the thousands of names found in each area. In the previously mentioned Methodologie des Inventaires Toponymiques, researchers sought help, mainly municipal council workers or local historians, whose knowledge of common usage and historical significance of existing place names were imperative to their standardization.

The Eastern Townships provides a unique setting for toponomy researchers. Firstly, the teams of individuals who set out to record place names all over the province were commission employees. The Eastern Townships, however, was a “project conjoint [avec le] Commission de Toponymie [et le] Ministère de Transport.” It was the only constituency that saw commission employees work with the Transport Ministry. Furthermore, upon publication of the Dossier Toponymique de L’Estrie (Cantons de l’Est) in 1981, after three consecutive summers of research in the area (1978–1980), the commission noted that further studies in the area were necessary, particularly in those counties sharing a border with the United States, such as Compton and Stanstead. These counties, incidentally, had a higher percentage of English-speaking citizens than most counties and their proximity to the US border was no doubt a factor in the commission’s need to return to the area. It is clear that the higher instances of Anglophone place names and the complications that arise with them required special attention.
The Eastern Township’s Loyalist background added to its toponymic complexity, as it adopted many English place names; many places in the Eastern Townships were named after American figures, streets and regions.\textsuperscript{14} The French Settlement phase occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, half a century after the initial Loyalist phase, and mainly in the northern areas of the Townships,\textsuperscript{15} created an increasingly mixed toponymy of original Abenaki names, English first-wave settlement names and the \textit{francisation graduelle de la toponymie} resulting from the second-wave French settlers.\textsuperscript{16} A chaotic nomenclature ensued, including the alteration of place names, the unofficial changing of names, or even single places adopting numerous names, were to be sorted out by the commission in its initial studies in the region.\textsuperscript{17}

The \textit{Commission de toponymie’s} report describes sixty-six places that underwent name changes from 1977 to 1982 and therefore the possibilities of analysis are numerous. For the purposes of this study, the names were divided by linguistic changes and focused broadly on three groups of names: English to French name changes, English to English changes, as well as French to English changes.\textsuperscript{18} If the commission itself was at least partly responsible for the Anglophone dissent towards the bill that created it (Bill 101), evidence from one or a combination of any of these categories would support this assertion. I have analyzed these three classifications and each name change was subdivided into similar categories pertaining to the reason for changing it. These five categories are: 1) Name changes due to lack of use; 2) Name changes due to error; 3) Name changes for the purposes of historical accuracy; 4) Direct translations; and 5) Other.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Name Changes & Lack of Use & Error & Accuracy & Direct Translations & Other \\
\hline
English to French (20) & 13 & - & - & 3 & 4 \\
English to English (10) & 4 & 4 & 1 & - & 1 \\
French to English (5) & 2 & - & 3 & - & - \\
Total & 19 & 4 & 4 & 3 & 5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 1}
\end{table}

As can be seen from Table 1, sixty-five percent of the twenty name changes that were changed from English to French were due to the a lack of use amongst the local population. As the commission regarded this as one of the most important factors in determining the official name of a place, common local usages were held above rarely used ones and given priority during the process of standardization. Three literal translations occurred, and four place names were classified under “Other”. Reasons for names that fell within this category included a requested name change of a municipality (the only municipality in the Townships that changed its name in the period of concern), a lake that had two common usages, and two confused brook names, each of which inadvertently referred to two brooks each.\textsuperscript{20}

Table 1 also illustrates the ten English names that were replaced by other English names. Four names fit into the error category, of which there were two spelling errors and the incidence of name confusion over two brooks as mentioned in footnote twenty-one. Four were changed due to lack of use, one changed for greater historical accuracy and another (in the “Other” category) was changed for the purposes of

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geographic accuracy. Of the five names also listed in the table that were changed from French to English, three were changed for historical accuracy, the remaining two due to a lack of use.\textsuperscript{21}

This information is not a strong indication of the source of subsequent discontent and distrust of the Commission de toponymie and Bill 101 for two reasons. Firstly, although there are more cases of English names being changed to French than in either of the latter categories in question, there is no overwhelming evidence that indicates a sweeping attempt to eliminate English place names during these first five years of activity. There is no evidence that indicates an overwhelming trend toward English to French name changes. Moreover, those that did occur were often due to lack of use, and as discussed, the commission placed a priority on common usage. Secondly, the fact that English and French names, of which there were ten and five respectively, were replaced by other English names clearly shows that the commission generally accepted common usage and historical accuracy as the most important factors in their toponymy survey.\textsuperscript{22}

How then, are place names significant to the overall debate of the Anglophone minority in Quebec? Research into the first five year’s of the commission’s actions shows that the commission did little to provoke hostility of English-speakers towards Bill 101. Proving this point with the information provided, however, reveals the drawback of studying only the changed place names. The number of total place names changed in the province is a small fraction of the total number created and approved by the commission.\textsuperscript{23} If the name changes were not controversial, it was likely that the name creations that made Anglophones apprehensive.

The Guide toponymique du Québec explains with a distinctly nationalist rhetoric that the French language was to be given preponderance in place name allocation:

The Commission de toponymie recognizes that the French language gives the Quebeois people their identity…the distinctive nature of the language preserves their significant role in this unique collective heritage.\textsuperscript{24}

It was thought that a collective identity could be engendered through name allocation across Quebec’s expansive territory and thus realize the linguistic goals of the commission and the French Language. In so doing, the commission could play an active role in the creation of a perceived common culture in Quebec by using the names of geographic features and human settlements as a tool of unification.

In 1969, there were 35,076 official place names in Quebec, of which 21,957 were French; by 1983, these numbers had increased to 92,087 and 67,947 respectively.\textsuperscript{25} In the same period, the number of English place names increased only slightly: from 7,341 to 10,942.\textsuperscript{26} The threat posed by Bill 101’s creation of the Commission de toponymie, then, is not in the changing of English names, but rather it is the perceived diminution of existing place names in an onslaught of new ones, the overwhelming majority of which were French. Of the 57,011 place names created province-wide from 1969-1983 (the majority of which were done in the six year overlap of the commission’s existence and the dates in question), 80.7 percent were French.\textsuperscript{27} These new names increased the percentage of total French place names from 66.1 percent to 73 percent, and decreased
the proportion of Anglophone names from 22.1 per cent to 11.7 per cent during this period. 28

Further proof that the perceived threat lies in name creation can be found in subsequent decisions made by the Commission de toponymie. The largely Anglophone town of Lennoxville submitted sixty-seven street names for government sanction in 1991, sixty-one of which were English. Mayor Duncan Bruce recalls the commission being “most respectful of [Lennoxville’s] English heritage,” and deputy director of the commission at the time, Jean Poirier, re-iterated that the commission was “not here to wipe English off the map.” 29 None of the town’s English street names were unwillingly changed; they were simply sanctioned with the obligatory French street designations, once again depicting a scenario of government approval being devoid of attempts to rid an area of English names.

Occasionally, instances of the commission’s respect for existing place names contributes, at least in part, to the perceived threat to local Anglophone heritage. An example of this was “the summer’s hottest toponymic topic” 30 of 1992: the potential renaming of the Eastern Township’s highway to Autoroute de l’Estrie. The St. Jean Baptiste Society of Sherbrooke requested that the name be changed from Autoroute des Cantons de l’Est to Autoroute de l’Estrie, as Estrie was the official toponym for the region adopted by the government in 1981. The administrative boundaries of Estrie are not identical to those of the historical Eastern Townships, a fact readily acknowledged by the commission and outlined in their initial studies conducted in the townships in the late 1970s.

The persistence of the Eastern Townships as the attestation of an emotional belonging to, can be attributed to the presence of the collective memory within the historical region of the Eastern Townships, that being the area that is divided into townships south of the St. Lawrence right up to the border of the Beauce region. 31

After an “unprecedented consultation of local councils and residents,” once again alluding to the importance of information provided by these institutions and organizations, the name change was refuted unanimously by the Commission de toponymie. 32 Townshippers’ President Paulette Losier said of the decision: “it’s a symbolic thing, a name, but symbols are very important.” 33 The idea of symbolism being a defining characteristic in the importance of a place name runs parallel with what much of this discussion has been concerned. The Commission de toponymie understood this, and consciously employed and drew upon information obtained from historical groups and societies for that very reason. Created names hold symbolic importance: as the overall increase in numbers and percentages of French place names in the province rise, the proportion of Anglophone names, whose numbers are fewer, decreases accordingly. Even though existing names continue to be respected, the public discussion of these changes is also symbolic: it represents the possibility that history and heritage is no longer a local issue, but part of a government agenda.

Place name creation is an example of selective history. Be they created by early settlers of an area or a governing body concerned with them today, there will be
inevitable contention between groups during the process of naming Quebec. The Commission de toponymie did not threaten Quebec’s place names by changing them, but rather by changing the composition of the total number of official names by standardizing more of them; ten times as many today than in 1969. In response to the criticism of the commission, Quebecois author, Lise Bissonnette, noted that “you have to, at some point, not be too politically correct.” Perhaps this statement was taken to heart when last year’s “Rivière Nigger” signs went up at the 141/143 intersection in the Eastern Townships. As the name had been official since 1987, the signs that went up last summer were an inevitable consequence of the name’s change. As for the incredible increase in Quebec’s place names in the last few decades, their creation represents a new phase in Quebecois history whereby government legislation has entered the realm of symbolic history through place names. Last summer’s “Rivière Nigger” debacle reminds us that sometimes, in spite of the importance of history in the process of name standardization, there is sometimes such a thing as being too historically correct.
Endnotes


2. The *Commission de Toponymie* provided me with a *Liste des changements toponymes entre 1977 et 1982 pour la région de l’Estrie* and I am very grateful to have had their cooperation and enthusiasm regarding my topic.

3. The commercial sign law debate was much more pervasive in Anglophone and Francophone media in the province than were the place name politics of the *Commission de toponymie*, and was no doubt also an important factor in Anglophone sentiment toward Bill 101. This discussion does not concern itself with this matter directly, but as the *Office de la Langue Francaise* was created in Bill 101 as well, it cannot be ignored as a contributing factor to negative sentiment.


5. Commission de Toponymie, *Les noms de lieux au Quebec énoncés de politiques linguistiques*, 1984, Figure 6.


12. Ibid, 16.

13. Ibid, 17. As will inevitably occur when a border is drawn between any two nations, there will be geographic relief, and sometimes even municipalities and buildings that are split from this invisible distinction as well. The commission also had to address these cross-border commonalities, like Province Island on Lake Memphremagog, which is both in Stanstead County and in Vermont (Hubbard, 20).


16. Barabé et. al., 3.

17. Ibid, p. 3-6. Existing place names were often shaped to accommodate a change in language of a population as opposed to being changed officially. Chemin Vaillancourt in Stanstead quickly became popularly known as Vancourt Road to the largely Anglophone locals. Inversely, a road in Sherbrooke known as “Cattle and Horses” by Anglophones soon became known as “Cote des Quatorze” by the growing Francophone population, an adjustment not at all accurate with regards to actual translation but simply based on sound-based similarities.

18. As this study concerns itself primarily with Anglophone perception of the commission, only Anglophone names directly affected by name changes were looked at in detail.

19. Further, it must be understood that the *Commission de toponymie* was indeed changing all generic terms like “road” to “rue” or “pond” to “étang” under their policies of methodology briefly mentioned above. In the case of Lake Miller being changed to Lac Miller, I do not consider this an actual French place name taking the place of an English one. This formality was one the *Commission* acted upon with regards to officializing place names under the politics of the act (*Les noms de lieux au Quebec énoncés de politiques linguistiques*, 8).

that which leads from Lac McLeod to the town of Scotstown was changed to Ruisseau McLeod for historical accuracy, and was otherwise changed to Ruisseau la Loutre due to common local usage in the region.

21. Ibid.

22. There were, however, several instances in which changed English to French place names noted a common usage of one name amongst Anglophones and another amongst Francophones. The commission chose the French alternative over the English one in the four situations where multiple usages occurred.

23. René, B3.


25. Commission de Toponymie, Les noms de lieux au Québec énoncés de politiques linguistiques. 1984, Figure 6.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., Figure 3.


30. Ibid.


32. Rita Legault, “Eastern Townships Keeps Name on Route; Autoroute de l’Estrie is Rejected,” The Montreal Gazette, October 23, 1993

33. Ibid.

34. René, B3.


Unlike its more dramatic and exciting counterparts, the 1948 presidential election does not loom large in the American popular imagination. Lacking the melodrama of the turbulent 1968 campaign, or the magnitude of the landmark 1860 race, it was nevertheless an atypical election whereby two major opposition movements emerged against the entrenched and incumbent Democratic establishment represented by President Harry Truman. Former Democratic Vice-President Henry A. Wallace resurrected an old party label and launched a bid on a Progressive Party ticket, sharply criticizing Truman’s foreign policy, while conservative Democrat and South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond stormed out of the Democratic Party convention over racial policies and states-rights issues. Running on a conservative “Dixiecrat” or “States Rights Democratic Party” ticket, Thurmond captured several of the lower South states, along with thirty-nine electoral votes, and had hoped to throw the election of the House of Representatives.

Scholars have long debated the impact of these two highly visible protest parties, both of which took the form of *ad hoc* single-candidate presidential campaigns. Historian Richard Hofstadter’s famous formulation that third parties in American politics “are like bees… Once they have stung, they die”\(^1\) has become almost a truism—and indeed, the notion that third parties may not achieve electoral success, but directly influence the outcome of elections or future party platforms has received a great deal of treatment in the annals of twentieth century scholarship. John D. Hick’s 1930 work *The Populist Revolt* first posited the idea that third parties and their pet issues could have a significant impact on elections, while Walter Dean Burnham and others fit third parties into larger electoral theories on realignments in voting behaviour. Burnham calls the rise of third party movements “protorealignment phenomena,” and maintains, “Such \([\text{third}]\) parties have been associated with every stage of realignment from the 1930s to—perhaps—1968.”\(^2\)

There are two important historical issues at stake when trying to contextualize and understand the double-schism in the Democratic Party in 1948. First, historians have often wrestled over the applicability of the third-party paradigms developed by Burnham, Hicks, and Hofstadter to the 1948 campaign. New Deal economist and Wallace supporter Rexford Tugwell continued to insist into the 1970s that the Wallace campaign had forced Truman to the left, while more objective historians, like Karl Schmidt and Curtis MacDougall, concurred.\(^3\) However, one prominent challenge to that view is Alan Yarnell’s *The Democrats and the Progressives*, which argues that the Wallace movement in particular did not force Truman to the left, but rather *helped* secure Truman’s victory.\(^4\) Moreover, Ivan Ross’s journalistic chronicle, *The Loneliest Campaign*, also recognizes the traditional idea that, “many \([\text{third party}]\) causes were adopted by the old parties,” but that the Progressive Party was a “unique” movement in American political history, in that
The second issue at hand is how the Democrats were able to survive a double-split and maintain their prewar electoral dominance, staving off a three-way ideological challenge to their governing ideology that potentially split their party base. Pre-election predictions generally emphasized how third parties spelled doom and gloom for Democratic chances at victory. The Nation magazine, the liberal interest group Americans for Democratic Action, and influential liberal newspaper columnists all made the same overriding point in late 1947 and 1948: that a third party would be disastrous for the Democrats. In the aftermath of Truman’s surprise victory, much of the early Gallup polling and demographic data on the election was compiled and analyzed by Angus Campbell in his pioneering 1952 statistical survey entitled The People Elect a President. Campbell maintained that Truman faced a difficult uphill battle against three opponents for which victory was nevertheless possible because of late-breaking independent voters, who primarily voted for Truman on foreign policy grounds. A second wave of journalistic post-mortem accounts followed the data sets—all of which prominently challenged the idea that Wallace and Thurmond had hurt the Truman campaign. These ideas were first presented in a Saturday Evening Post article by Samuel Lubell, and were expanded upon in Ross’s The Loneliest Campaign, and later taken up by historians, like Zachary Karabell in The Last Campaign.

This paper will argue that the 1948 election—with its third- and fourth-party movements—represents a serious challenge to prevailing realignment and third-party political science paradigms. The election showed that traditional formulations concerning third parties and their electoral impact do not noticeably apply to the 1948 campaign in two specific ways. First, the election challenged the notion presented by Hicks, Burnham and Hofstadter that third parties can force their ideological agenda into the two-party dichotomy, despite the protestations of scholars and journalists who insist otherwise. In reality, the Wallace and Thurmond breakaway movements did not lead to significant or widespread adoption of their platforms or their ideas by either the Republicans or the Democrats; instead, they gave the Democratic Party political space to run on traditional New Deal domestic themes and mainstream foreign policy ones. Second, the election debunks the widely held conventional wisdom that intra-party schisms that involve minor party breakaways are electoral suicide and divide likely voters to the detriment of the major party—in fact, from a strategic point of view, the Wallace and Thurmond movements probably did more to help the Democrats more sharply define themselves and emerge as a victorious party in the competitive election.

The Democratic Party and its Discontent: The origins of the Democratic revolt

The two dissenting minor party movements—the Wallace Progressives, and the Thurmond Dixiecrats—did not emerge in a political vacuum. Rather, they illustrated the structural flaws and fault-lines in the big-tent Democratic coalition assembled by Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. However, the Truman Democrats were able to capitalize on the prominent Wallace and Thurmond challenges to their ideology—while Wallace and Thurmond were not able to inject their issues permanently into the national discourse, nor did their party platforms become widely adopted by either the Republicans or the Democrats. Truman and his campaign team painted Wallace as a communist dupe, while
Thurmond gave the Democrats breathing room on the issue of racial politics—allowing them to appeal to a broad constituency of northern African-Americans, which ultimately helped decide the election. Wallace and Thurmond represented dissatisfied subsections of the present state of the Democratic coalition and orthodox Democratic policy—Wallace led a coalition of traditional leftists against the increasingly bellicose anti-communist foreign policy that Truman had begun to articulate, while Thurmond reflected and epitomized the growing discontent in the South with the Democratic Party’s racial politics. Furthermore, historian Harold Gullan notes, both men were moreover convinced that “the party, as they construed it, had abandoned them, not the other way around.”

Wallace’s campaign was built around a criticism of postwar Democratic foreign policy, particularly towards the Soviet Union. Both Wallace and Truman believed they were following the course Roosevelt charted, and, as historian Robert Walton noted “Like the Holy Writ… Roosevelt could be, and was, cited to justify almost any political action.” Wallace believed that only he carried the mantle of Roosevelt’s cooperative policy towards the Soviet Union and his attempts at ensuring the postwar survival of the alliance. In this spirit, Wallace urged more collaboration and economic exchange between the two countries. “Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from experience of Allied cooperation,” he argued, “We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia. This does not mean appeasement.”

Wallace’s foreign policy stance was increasingly at odds with the Truman administration’s attempts to deal with both domestic and international communism. Standing next to Truman, in Fulton Missouri, Winston Churchill famously declared, “an Iron Curtain has descended across the [European] continent,” and later, Truman signed executive order 9835, requiring loyalty oaths from all federal employees. While many Americans supported opposition to communism at home and abroad, Wallace was dismayed by Churchill’s vocal calls for hostility, and alarmed by onerous requirements of ideological fidelity thrust upon federal employees. Britain, he articulated, was taking advantage of the President and fanning the flames of Soviet-American discord, while Truman had unnecessarily cracked down on fundamental civil liberties.

In response to growing antagonism between the Truman administration and the USSR, Wallace became vocal in his criticism of the administration (of which he was a member, serving as Secretary of Commerce). By late 1946, Truman was not prepared to entertain any more dissent from Wallace within his administration. After practically begging Wallace not to force an intra-administration confrontation by speaking further on foreign policy, Truman summarily fired him in September 1946 after Wallace defied him again. In a statement, Truman said, “I have today asked Mr. Wallace to resign from the Cabinet. It has become clear that his views on foreign policy and those of the administration—the latter being shared, I am confidence, by the great body of our citizens—there was a fundamental conflict.” In response, Wallace drafted a three-line resignation letter, writing cryptically, “As you requested, here is my resignation. I shall continue to fight for peace. I am sure that you approve and will join me in that great endeavor.”

Wallace resigned to take up a writing post with the influential liberal periodical...
The real peace treaty we need is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America.  

Across the country, it was long predicted that he would make an independent bid for Presidency. In September of 1948, Henry Wallace accepted the nomination of the Progressive party, saying that the administration had orchestrated, “the exodus of the torch bearers of the New Deal.” Rexford Tugwell, the late New Deal economist who would later do so much to advance the idea that the Wallace campaign had moved the country leftward, chaired the party’s platform committee. One New York Times news reporter declared that the party platform “went a long way towards matching the tradition Communist Party platform for this country,” and that it “went far beyond the policies of the New deal and the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Still, Wallace focused on foreign policy issues—staking his campaign on opposing the anti-communist hard line that Truman and others within his administration were taking vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

By contrast, Governor Strom Thurmond’s campaign was built on a very different foundation. Thurmond had been an enthusiastic supporter of Democratic New Deal politics, which largely brought much-needed economic reforms and development to the impoverished South—all without affecting or dismantling the Jim Crow system of racial segregation. Thurmond’s platform for governor in 1946 called for “improving the lot of all the state’s citizenry,” by eliminating the poll taxes, and improving and streamlining the South Carolina government. Thurmond even vowed that, “more attention be given to Negro education,” and that “if we provide better education for them, not only will much be accomplished in human values, but we shall raise our per capita income as well as the educational standing of the state.” Still, the growing clout of anti-segregation, pro-civil rights forces within the Democratic Party meant that the old ‘states-right” motto of the ante-bellum period wound its way back into the political discourse, and created discord within the party. Truman further provoked Southern Democrats by desegregating the military in July 1948, over the objections of generals who insisted that, “the Army is not a sociological laboratory.” These tensions within the Party reached a breaking point at the 1948 convention, when Minneapolis mayor Hubert Humphrey encouraged the party to adopt a pro-civil rights platform. Thirty-five delegates from the lower South stormed out, and two days later, held their own convention in Birmingham, Alabama and nominated Storm Thurmond as their candidate for President. Mississippi governor Fielding L. Wright stated that Truman was trying to “wreck the South and its institutions,” while Alabama governor Jim Folsom berated Truman for caving into pressure from “Monopolists, brass hats, Wall Street lawyers and the State Department.”

Thurmond called Truman’s efforts an attempt “to reduce us to the status of a mongrel inferior race,” and the party platform called for “the segregation for the races
and the racial integrity of each race.” Thurmond and his supporters harbored no illusions about winning, but hoped that they could create enough electoral logjam (in conjunction with the already-divisive Wallace campaign) that neither Truman, nor his Republican opponent would obtain an electoral college majority—and thus, they would be able to extract concessions from either the Republican or the Democratic candidate on racial issues, in exchange for a crucial block of southern support. Furthermore, the Dixiecrats tried their hardest to prevent Truman from even appearing on the ballot, convincing four states not to list Truman—though he was the sitting President—and have Thurmond replace him as the official Democratic Party nominee. Elsewhere, Thurmond appeared under the moniker “States Right Democratic Party,” but “Dixiecrat” was the name that stuck in the press.

Wallace and Thurmond’s Impact on the Campaign and the Party

Historians often note that entering 1947, Truman should have been in a remarkably strong political position, yet by late 1947 and early 1948, he was trailing generic Republican rivals in the polls. The economy had rebounded surprisingly in the aftermath of the Second World War, despite gloomy forecasts of doom. Fourteen million more people were employed than in 1938, Americans personal incomes grew fifty percent, and the domestic output of goods and services increased by sixty-six percent, all under Truman’s watch. In his 1947 State of the Union address, Truman laid out a comprehensive foreign and domestic agenda—one that did not focus on the country’s current strengths and prosperity, but one that articulated a broad liberal vision for the future. In addition to making the case for wider Social Security coverage, national health care and greater federal aid, he also addressed the issues of civil rights and foreign affairs—both of which would be crucial pivot issues for the Wallace and Thurmond campaigns. “We have recently witnessed in this country numerous attacks upon the constitutional rights of individual citizens as a result of racial and religious bigotry,” Truman noted, and “freedom to engage in lawful callings has been denied.” “The willingness to fight these crimes should be in the heart of every one of us.” On foreign affairs Truman promised, “Our policy towards the Soviet Union is guided by the same principles which determine our policy towards all nations. We seek only to uphold the principles of international justice.”

If the traditional and commonly held political science formulations concerning minor parties and their impact the major party platforms are true, then Wallace and Thurmond should have had an impact on the direction of the campaign, the Democratic Party, and the course of United States policy. Instead, both minor party movements offered stark foils to the two major party platforms—and the Democratic Party exploited their newfound ability to paint themselves as principled moderates, and defenders of the legacy of the New Deal, flanked by two ideological fringe candidates on both the left and the right. On civil rights, the Democrats continued to make overtures towards African-Americans voters—despite the emergence of a counter-movement against the party on the issues of race. On foreign policy, Truman would continue his doctrine of opposing communism globally, and reaffirm his commitment to anti-communism and containment. Despite the fractures in the Democratic façade of unity, the party was able to survive and stave off both electoral challenges; and cement a postwar governing coalition that would
last until late 1968, when the Republicans would capture the Presidency. Truman’s victory—and the combined failures of the Wallace, Thurmond and Dewey campaigns—showcased that the Democratic coalition may have been straining, but it would be ultimately strong enough to last several more electoral cycles. Furthermore, the failure of any sort of adoption of either the Dixiecrat platform, or the Progressive platform illustrates that the 1948 campaign was a unique electoral arrangement whereby either third party was able to significantly alter the tone of the campaign, either during the election itself, or in its aftermath.

The strategy of the party in dealing with both splinter movements was essentially to ignore them; and use them as a foil to defend themselves against the Republican Party. The Democrats were widely aware that a double-schism in the party’s coalition could be disastrous in the general election. Taken separately, the two protest candidacies might not have posed a serious threat to an incumbent Democratic President presiding over a healthy economy and a relatively peaceful foreign situation. However, taken together, they created the possibility of a dire electoral situation for the Democrats. As journalist Ivan Ross noted in his analysis of the campaign, “With Henry Wallace cutting into the normally Democratic bloc in the North, there was at least an outside chance that Thurmond might emerge with more electoral votes that Truman. Failing even that goal, it seemed likely that the South would at least have its revenge by ensuring Truman’s defeat.”

Further, these factors were combined with a growing Republican tide—as the usual rule about the incumbent President’s party losing seats in Congress applied, with the Republicans gaining twelve seats in the Senate, and fifty-five seats in the House; enough to secure a slim majority in both chambers.

Thus, growing anti-administration forces and an increasingly hostile political situation did concern the party leadership, and the White House political staff. In a famous 1947 memo (drafted before Wallace officially entered the race, and before there was any inkling of a Southern breakaway movement) the White House staff outlined their electoral strategy. The memo, entitled “The Politics of 1948” and originally written by James Rowe, and then re-signed and re-submitted by Special Council Clifford Clark, outlined several basic premises, notably that “the Democratic party is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives and Big City Labour.” It predicted that, “As always, the South can be considered safety Democratic.” The memo remarkably predicted that Dewey would obtain the Republican nomination, and that Wallace would contest the election as a third-party spoiler. However, it was also shortsighted in assuming unquestionably loyal Southern support, arguing that “it is inconceivable that any policies initiated by the Truman administration no matter how ‘liberal’ could so alienate the South in the next year that it would revolt.”

The most damning piece of evidence that showcased Democratic plans to undercut the Wallace movement involved a portion of the memo that detailed how Truman should deal with the Wallace movement—namely, by attracting prominent liberals into the campaign fold, and using them to criticize Wallace and link him with communist subversives. “The administration,” the memo argued, “must persuade prominent liberals and progressives—and no one else—to move publicly into the fray. They must point out that the core of Wallace backing is made up of Communists.” Furthermore, the president would have to move, “left in his appointments.”

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majority of scholarly works that argues that the Truman and the Democrats were forced leftward use the Clifford/Rowe campaign strategy memo as evidence that Truman was concerned about the leftward critique of the party, and thus moved back towards the New Deal orthodoxy that Wallace championed in order to shore up electoral support. However, this early campaign memo is far from unimpeachable evidence that the Wallace campaign forced Truman leftward. The campaign detailed a strategy for image making and branding, not governing and statecraft. It primarily offered advice and guidance on painting Truman in the best possible light to appeal to the broadest segment of the electorate. As a general strategy of image crafting, it was wise for Truman to shore up liberal support, as well as Western support. However, when it came to governing, Truman’s overriding platform hardly charged as a result of either third-party Democratic splinter group. Truman had already articulated a broad pro-New Deal activist platform prior to either campaign’s entry into the race. His foreign policy platform hardly changed at all; in fact, the Clifford memorandum spelled out that Cold War issues remained by far the most popular and least divisive issues among the general electorate—Democrats, Republicans and Independents alike were generally supportive of attempts to stop the spread of communism. “There is considerable advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin,” argued Rowe and Clifford. “The nation is already united behind the President on this issue. The worse matters get, up to a fairly certain point—real danger of eminent war—the more there is a sense of crisis. In times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his President.”

In short, Wallace’s past criticisms and themes he articulated through 1948 had no effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Rather, Truman had broad public support for policies that were ‘tough’ on the Soviets, and the brinksmanship of the early atomic age created a continual sense of crisis—one that Truman, and his campaign were willing to exploit ruthlessly for political gain. “The American people,” historian Allen Yarnell argued, “had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was their number one enemy, and no matter what Henry Wallace said, the voters were not about to believe him over President Truman.” During the election itself, Truman used his tough record on communism and the brewing trouble in Korea as a campaign issue. “The [postwar] division has been not between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the Soviet Union and the free nations of the world,” Truman stated at the Berkeley commencement. Further, he maintained that, “the situation in Korea is also disturbing. There the Soviet government has defied the clearly expressed will of an overwhelming majority of the United Nations, by boycotting.” These anti-communist stances were popular, as the Clifford memo underscored—thus, it is inconceivable to imagine that Wallace moved Truman’s position in any way on foreign issues.

Further, Truman was able to use the already widely held perception that the Wallace movement was full of communists to his political advantage. Journalists and election observers frequently referred to the Wallace campaign as being thoroughly infiltrated by communists. Journalist and author Ivan Ross, who wrote a detailed account of the campaign, stated flatly, “The Progressive Party convention was dominated by the Communist Party,” while a Washington Post commentator declared that domestic communism had lost much of its early energy, but “it was almost pitiful to observe them trying to work themselves into a dutiful lather of enthusiasm over Mr. Henry Wallace.”
Historical Discourses

This dominant narrative about Wallace and his communist supporters helped the Democrats in their campaign—allowing them to shake lingering suspicions of communist influence within their liberal ranks by painting the progressives as the true dupes of communist influence in the United States.

Indeed, the Wallace movement did contain bona fide communists (though Wallace was not), who became active and leading members.\(^4^2\) However, the majority of Wallace’s supporters—supporters who supported his entry in the race—were initially drawn from groups like urban blacks, suburban liberals, and pro-New Deal labour. The increasingly prominent role of communists in the Wallace campaign caused division within the labour movement. In 1947, most labour leaders had been willing to consider dumping Truman in favor of a staunch New Deal politician like Wallace. However, the issue of communism within the Wallace movement caused an intra-labour schism that drove many labour leaders back into the Democratic fold—showcasing their unwillingness to be involved in a political alliance with communists.\(^4^3\) In this sense, Truman and his campaign gained from playing the anti-communist card against Wallace—and Wallace himself did nothing to separate himself from the avowed communists within his party. By this refusal, the Democrats were able to convince most liberal and moderate factions within the labour movement to return to New Deal coalition. Wallace was unable to translate a good deal of personal popularity prior to his presidential bid into support for an anti-Truman movement. On foreign affairs, the traditional Democratic Party line hardly budged. In regards with domestic affairs, the communist elements within his party precipitated a defection of the labour movement to Truman, though Wallace was formerly the darling of the labour movement.

Thurmond too was unable to affect the election, or the direction of the Democratic Party. His stated goal was to push the election into a stalemate, and force concessions from the major party candidates in exchange for support; however he could not even prevail in that modest goal. Thurmond was certainly not able to create a successful or lasting counter-movement against the burgeoning liberal elements within the party, especially on racial issues, nor was he able to force his party’s platform into the two-party dichotomy. There is a broad historical consensus on importance that the African-American played in electing Truman—despite the Democratic Party’s checkered history on civil rights issues, and Dewey’s strong civil rights record. Historian Simon Topping declared, “In 1944 it could be claimed, with the aid of some creative mathematics, that the Africa-American vote decided the outcome. In 1948 there can be little doubt that it did.”\(^4^4\) Thurmond’s campaign articulated an anti-desegregation message that was increasingly losing its clout in the American political system. Both the Republican and the Democratic candidates were both willing to make at least symbolic overtures towards the African-American constituency; while Progressive party boldly promised amelioration for blacks. In his convention acceptance speech, Truman proclaimed, “Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress the civil rights program. I did that because I believed it to be my duty under the Constitution. Some members of my own party disagree with me violently on this manner.”\(^4^5\) Then, in a jab at the Republicans in Congress, Truman declared that at least anti-civil rights Southern Democrats opposed civil rights “openly,” while congressional Republicans, who controlled both chambers, “professed to be for these measures,” but “failed to act”
The Democrats were willing to risk outright confrontation within their party by advancing a civil rights platform, though they could not have foreseen the Thurmond breakaway. Meanwhile, Wallace offered an even more radical programme, with the Progressives declaring that if the South was unwilling to guarantee voting rights, then the president should follow Grant’s example, and “use federal troops if necessary to enforce the right of ten million Negroes to vote in the South.” In short, outright opposition to racial advancement and public support for segregation was becoming increasingly unacceptable in the mainstream two-party political discourse—and Thurmond’s Dixiecrat splinter movement was unable to create a lasting policy shift towards African-Americans. Republicans, Democrats and Wallace all played for a share of the Northern black vote and all had significant levels of support, with Truman ultimately prevailing.

Conclusion

The 1948 election represented an unusual situation in the annals of American political history. Most electoral realignments are indeed preceded by the emergence of a third-party movement, followed by the adoption of that movement’s platform by one of the major parties. The Populists of the 1890s foreshadowed a massive shift in voting behaviour, as did the Republicans of 1856 and 1860, and the La Follette Progressives of the 1920s. One scholar, Harold Gullan, termed 1948 as “the upset that wasn’t,” noting that Truman should have won easily, given the favorable economic and political conditions that existed in 1948. However, a better moniker would be that 1948 was the “realignment that wasn’t.” In traditional political science terms, the rise of the two splinter groups and their schism from the Democratic Party should have foreshadowed a general electoral realignment, characterized by high voter turnout and the collapse of current governing coalitions. However, in the case of the 1948 campaign, no such collapse occurred. Voter turnout was unusually low, and interest in the election was tepid. Truman maintained his traditional foreign policy themes, while re-affirming his party’s pre-existing commitment to the New Deal. On racial issues, Thurmond had no effect—as African-American gained a foothold within the Democratic Party, as well as the Republican and Progressive camps. 1948 was the realignment that wasn’t; the year where conditions were right for a spectacular Democratic implosion that simply did not occur. The Wallace and Thurmond splinter movements ended in vain, without significant adoption or dissemination of their ideas—they did not sting; they simply died.
Endnotes

4. Ibid.
6. Allen, 46.
12. Yarnell, 6.
15. Yarnell, 3.
22. Ibid.
24. Karabell, 48.
27. Gullan, 3.
29. Ibid.
30. Ross, 132.
31. Donaldson, 16.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Yarnell, 77.
40. Ibid.
42. Donaldson, 56.
43. Ibid., 57.
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'Briton and Russian differ, but in Name’

*Science, tobacco, and Anglo-Russian commerce in the early eighteenth century*

Padraic Scanlan

On 25 October 1714, Sir Isaac Newton, President of the Royal Society, wrote to Prince Menshikov, Peter the Great’s illiterate favourite, to offer him a Fellowship:

> Whereas it has long been known to the Royal Society that your Emperor [...] has furthered great advances in the arts and sciences in his Kingdom [...] we were all filled with joy when the English merchants informed us that Your Excellency (out of his high courtesy, singular regard for the sciences, and lover of our nation) designs to join the body of our Society.¹

The merchant community had strong links to the scientific community in early eighteenth century Britain. It was the merchant community who convinced Newton and the Royal Society to invite Menshikov into their ranks. That merchants had this much leverage within a scientific society, and that they thought that a scientific fellowship would produce real economic gains, speaks to these strong links. Menshikov’s election is an idiosyncratic example of how trade, particularly in tobacco, was critical in forging diplomatic and scientific links between Russia and Britain in the early eighteenth century. The relationship between Anglo-Russian trade and the progress of the Petrine reforms was an *ad hoc* process; it was directed more by the personalities of the various key players than by a broader economic strategy, on the part of either English or Russian policymakers.

John Perry, a hydraulics engineer hired by Peter while he was on the Grand Embassy, recognized the importance of impressing the Tsar with conspicuous displays of the fruits of the arts and sciences. “The Dutch,” he wrote, “being jealous of the Impressions that might be made on him by those who are their Rivals in the Russia Trade [...] [intended] to persuade him of their being Masters of all the most useful Arts and Sciences in the World.”² Perry understood that Peter considered there to be an intimate relationship between science and commerce. Fontenelle, secretary of the French Academy of Sciences, shared Peter’s essential inclination, remarking, in a eulogy for the Tsar, “Trade [Russians] knew little of, or almost totally neglected it, although all Riches, even those of the Mind, have a Dependence upon Commerce.”³ In 1699, the English press also affirmed this hand-in-glove relationship between commerce and scientific progress. One pamphleteer wrote, “The Russian Empire, which was formerly look’d upon as most barbarous [...] now bids fair for the Priority with any in Europe, by reason of the Encrease of its Commerce with most Nations of the World.”⁴ Trade, at least before the victory at Poltava moved Russia to the forefront of the concert of European powers, was the most important link between Russia and the West. Furthermore, an increase in the volume of international trade was considered to be a necessary condition for the
development of the arts and sciences in a national context. Peter’s investment in the English tobacco trade helped him to advance his reformist program; in this sense, the conventional wisdom about the link between trade and enlightenment was correct. The Orthodox Church had long forbidden tobacco smoking in Russia, and Peter’s grandfather had officially banned the use of the “ungodly herb” in 1634. When Peter sold the monopoly on the import of tobacco to a group of English merchants led by Peregrine Osborne, the Marquess of Carmarthen, he might have intended to make an anti-clerical point. John Perry thought so—he was appalled by the “great Ignorance and Stupidity” of the Orthodox priesthood. The historian Philip de Ségur, who wrote in the early nineteenth century, had a significantly more nuanced view. He remarked that Peter’s sale of the tobacco monopoly “served to defray the expenses of his travels, and to draw industrious foreigners into his country.” On the other hand, Robert Massie, in his elegant biography of the Tsar, is unequivocal. Peter needed the money, although he was no doubt more than happy to accept the skilled Englishmen and anti-clerical cheekiness of the deal. He was running low on funds, and Carmarthen’s offer of £28,000 plus duties on any tobacco imported won him over. Peter’s tobacco deal had useful practical consequences—it caused an influx of skilled foreigners, which helped him to advance his program of reforms—but it was largely a matter of necessity and convenience. It was certainly not a premeditated policy choice, typical of Anglo-Russian commerce in the period.

The tobacco trade was also linked to another key Petrine project: the development of the Russian Navy. It was the Marquess Carmarthen who designed the yacht Royal Transport that William III presented to Peter as a state gift. Carmarthen was also instrumental in organizing a mock sea-battle at Portsmouth, which deeply impressed Peter. Likewise, he recommended useful men to Peter’s service, including John Perry, the engineer, Henry Farquarson, who became the head of the St. Petersburg naval academy, and others. Carmarthen looms large in English accounts of the development of trade with Russia. John Perry suggests that it was Carmarthen who convinced Peter to sell the monopoly; the tobacco was licensed for import “upon condition of being first licens’d by the Lord Marquess of Carmarthen: which [Peter] granted him, in return of the obliging Conversation he had reciev’d from him.” Anthony Cross, in his study of the evolution of British perceptions of Peter the Great, notes that Carmarthen proved himself “indispensable as the tsar’s hard-drinking companion.” Basil Morgan concurs: in his brief biographical essay on Carmarthen, he describes how as “a reward Carmarthen was given by the tsar the sole privilege of importing tobacco into Russia.”

The prolific eighteenth century essayist and poet Aaron Hill wrote a particularly breathless paean to Peter the Great, “The northern star.” It is a florid, clumsy poem, but it hints at a curious development in what average literate Britons thought of Russia, and of Peter the Great’s reforms in particular. In one snatch of doggerel, Hill urges his readers to “Perish the Pride, in poor Distinction shewn, / That makes Man blind, to Blessings not his own! / Briton and Russian differ, but in Name: / In Nature’s Sense, All Nations are the same.” Hill, a great supporter of the Petrine project for its own sake, argued that Russia and Britain had a similar interest in enlightenment and in progress. Another poetaster, writing in 1698, described Peter as “an active Heat,
which does the World Survey, / And by its Beams, gilds Britain in the Way.” The anonymous author of the poem also recognized Peter’s vision and the importance of the Petrine reforms, even in the British context.

But not every Englishman considered the Russia trade in such moral, intellectual terms. Well before the renewal of trade with Russia after the Grand Embassy, English merchants had engaged in trade in Russia. John Milton, in his history of ‘Muscovia,’ wrote that “the discovery of Russia by the northern Ocean, made first, of any Nation that we know, by English men, might have seem’d an enterprise almost heroic; if any higher end than the excessive love of Gain and Traffick had animated the design.” The trope of the ‘discovery’ of Russia by the English resurfaced in the pamphlets and broadsheets published in support of the expansion of trade, particularly in tobacco, with Russia. One pamphleteer sullenly remarked that the Dutch were forcing the English out of trade with Russia, “though the English were the first Discoverers of the Russia Trade.”

English merchants at the time of the tobacco sale saw Russian progress as a sidebar to their own economic gain. If anything, the outcomes of the tobacco trade, like the construction of the Russian navy and of the Russian merchant marine, were setbacks to their control of the Russian trade: one of the great benefits of the Russian trade was the relative weakness of the Russian state. As another anonymous pamphleteer wrote, in 1698, “the Russes have not Shipping of their own [...] the whole Trade to and from Russia would be driven by our ships.” Needless to say, it was Carmarthen, the lynchpin of the trade deal with Russia, who provided Peter with expertise and personnel in constructing his own naval force, in a sense undermining one of the putative advantages of trade with Russia.

The commercial relationship that emerged between England and Russia after the Grand Embassy was thus largely informal. In 1698, Matthew Prior, an English advisor to William III, blended commerce and politics in his analysis of the initial conditions under which William and Peter met. He did not seem to know where one ended and the other began:

> The King has seen the Czar of Muscovy incognito at Utrecht. The immediate use we endeavour to make of him is that he would allow tobacco to be imported into his dominions, which has been forbid since the year '48. His own inclinations oblige him to carry on a war with the Turk [...] he is absolutely against the French, and that aversion may contribute a good deal towards settling the crown of Poland upon the Elector of Saxony.

Prior has an unpleasantly utilitarian attitude to the Tsar. But beyond that, he seemed to have a clear idea that there was a link between trade and diplomacy, although he did not articulate its particulars. The English had a coherent political-economic policy for Russia, but the policy was never coherently applied.

Carmarthen became the key figure in the tobacco monopoly, and thus in Anglo-Russian diplomacy, for two main reasons: Peter liked him for his boozing and his seamanship and Peter happened to need money when Carmarthen offered him the pact; neither reason was related to any overarching diplomatic goal. That is not to say that the diplomatic corps were ignorant of the value of a trade pact with Russia. Just before the
deal was cut with Carmarthen, William Blathwayt, William III’s secretary, advised William’s Secretary of State, William Trumbull, “to use the tsar’s forthcoming visit to the king ‘to obtain some Advantage in Trade or at least the Restoring of our Former Privileges from the good Nature of the Czar.’” But Peter’s stay in England grew tiresome and frustrating for the government. By February 1698, William was beginning to grow frustrated with the relentless curiosity and debauchery of the Tsar. William, in confidence, asked his courtier Burnet, who had just visited Peter, if he knew when the Tsar would be leaving. William had already lowered the Tsar’s per diem allowance and refused him the use of a state carriage. In the later years of his reign, Peter was cool toward England. One late eighteenth century historian suggests that even this coolness was personal and not political: Peter did not like George I because “he could never forget, that in his passage through Hanover, he had not been treated with the respect which he thought due to him.” The Russian and the British monarchs had clear political goals, but Anglo-Russian trade was largely left in the hands of individuals, not the government. Not all English merchants were enthusiastic about this laissez-faire attitude to trade, however. Sir Francis Brewster, in a protectionist polemic published in 1702, wrote in favour of a centralized system of trade. He praised the French system of centralized economic management, in particular the initiative taken up “to Order in every Marine and Trading Town in France a Committee of Trade, which was to represent to the Suprem Committee of Trade in Paris […] so that one part may not interfere with the other, as it does with us, to a confusion like that of Babel.”

The impromptu, personality-driven aspects of Anglo-Russian commerce, established during the Grand Embassy, had become the norm when Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov sought admission to the Royal Society. Menshikov’s Fellowship is a case study of both the vagaries of Anglo-Russian trade and of the link between science and commerce in the early eighteenth century. Menshikov himself is a wonderfully puzzling character. The comments of one anonymous ‘Foreign Minister at the Court of Russia’ are particularly resonant. The minister described a rare type of man:

They find ten thousand good Qualities in a Man which he never was Master of; and every lucky Accident, which he never dreamt of, is attributed to long laid Schemes, and his impenetrable Wisdom. An Instance of this has […] happened in Prince Menzikoff.

He came from humble beginning—in John Adams’ evocative phrase, Peter “raised him from the dirt.” By the ignominious end of his career, Menshikov had obtained a comically grandiloquent title: “Illustrious Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and Russian realm and duke of Izhoram, reichsmarshal of Her Imperial Majesty of all Russia […] vice-admiral of the fleet of all Russia, Knight of the Orders of St Andrew, the Elephant, the White and Black Eagles,” and so on. Menshikov could not read, but he managed to acquire a library of as many as thirteen thousand volumes and spoke rough Dutch and German. Yet as Lindsey Hughes remarks, “it was in recognition of Menshikov’s influence rather than his erudition […] which in 1714 secured him election to the Royal Society in London.”

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Hughes is broadly right, but his statement requires a bit more nuance. John H. Appleby has carefully traced the links between Menshikov and the British merchant community, as well as the links between the merchant community and the Royal Society. In 1704, the Tsar cancelled his agreement with the English merchants, and transferred its privileges to “Moscow burgomasters empowered to exploit it to Russia’s advantage.” Menshikov had been an important link between the English merchants and access to the market in the past. Despite the end of the tobacco monopoly, Carmarthen’s influence remained, since English merchants had the Prince’s ear through yet another of Carmarthen’s recommended personnel, “Dr. Erskine [Erskine], a most ingenious Gentleman, who is chief Physician to the Czar, and a Member of the Royal Society in England.” Erskine was also Menshikov’s physician, and his influence on his patient was first exploited for economic gain in May 1708, when the merchant William Lloyd asked Erskine to renegotiate the English import rights of lead, tin and pewter. But the key figure in the Menshikov affair was James Spilman. Spilman, a merchant from Yarmouth and a member of the Royal Society, probably went to Russia during Peter the Great’s 1697–98 recruitment drive, and worked his way up through the ranks to replace Henry Stiles as senior English merchant. Consequently, he was “responsible to the tsar for recruiting English naval and industrial personnel, and for training Russians in England. Simultaneously he partnered with Henry Hodgkin, a factor merchant, trading with several north European countries as well as with Britain.” It was these two merchants, possibly with Erskine as intermediary, who pushed for Menshikov’s admission to the Royal Society, and it was their letter to the society, written on 25 June 1714 that first intimated to the Fellows that the Prince sought election. The fact that he was elected so quickly is a testament to the influence of the merchant community over the Royal Society.

Menshikov was an extraordinarily powerful man. As Appleby notes, Menshikov was both Peter the Great’s most trusted lieutenant, and “Russia’s principal entrepreneur, owning factories, mines, fisheries and sawmills.” Despite his corruption, Menshikov was Peter’s creature, his ‘fledgling.’ One contemporary account explains that when Peter and Menshikov first met, Menshikov was a baker’s apprentice. The young Tsar asked for his pastries, and Menshikov was willing to give the Tsar all of them, since they were his to give, but he could not give the basket they were in, since the basket belonged to his master. But, he continued, “as every Thing belong’d to his Czarish Majesty he needed only lay his commands on him.” This story is probably apocryphal, but it demonstrates just how devoted Menshikov was to Peter. Feofan Prokopovich, another of Peter’s closest advisors, agreed that Menshikov was in many ways Peter’s creation, but a creation gone astray. He called him a “colossus of a pygmy, raised almost to royal status [...] an example of [...] ingratitude of spirit.” Menshikov was corrupt, but he also absorbed Peter’s ideology and worked tirelessly to advance it. Even the most jaundiced accounts of Menshikov’s service acknowledge that “he was strongly attached to his master and to the maxims of Peter I for civilizing the Russian nation.”

As Valentin Boss notes, “[Menshikov] championed Peter’s reforms with an immense and ruthless energy and imitated the Tsar by taking a fashionable interest in the new science;” for example, he welcomed mathematicians like Christian Goldbach to
his table. Peter’s interest in scientific societies was piqued when he visited the Royal Society in 1698; it is thus not surprising that Menshikov was intrigued by a Fellowship. Nor is it surprising that a possible fellowship was mooted, considering the links between the members of the Royal Society in Russia and the English merchant community in Russia. Beyond the appeal of membership in the context of Petrine scientific dilettantism, Carmarthen, the giant of the original agreement and arguably the most important figure in the export of British scientific and technical expertise into Russia, was still warmly remembered by Peter. As John Perry writes, “of which Obligation and Kindness of my Lord Marquis to have, I have many times heard [Peter] speak with great Affection; as indeed he often does of England in general, and what he observed [there].” Peter the Great was a member of the French Academy for diplomatic reasons, so Menshikov was the obvious second choice, and arguably just as powerful a figure in commercial circles.

The Royal Society had an interest in Russia for some time; while admitting Menshikov was a sop to commercial interests, it also had some scientific utility, since it increased access to Russia. Samuel Collins, a Fellow of the Society, had been Tsar Alexis’ physician, and had performed a number of experiments related to the heat and the freezing process. While abroad in Russia, Collins continued to correspond with the Royal Society. In 1713, a subcommittee had been formed to further these Russia experiments. This ‘Committee on Russia’ was chaired by Robert Balle, and included such worthies as Newton, Halley and Arbuthnot. Clearly, the Royal Society had, at the very least, some inclination toward Russia and the expansion of English knowledge about Russia. Furthermore, as Boss explores in his book on the subject, it is possible that Peter actually met Newton, and it is certain, at the very least, that his servant Jacob Daniel Bruce purchased several copies of Newton’s *Principia*, and was well-informed on Newtonian physics. These intellectual links between the Royal Society and Russia were also acknowledged when Menshikov was offered his Fellowship.

The Royal Society was also ideologically aligned with the Petrine project of the advancement of knowledge. As Margery Purver notes in her intellectual history of the Royal Society, “What [the Royal Society] stood for was the gradual evolution of new, developing sciences —not as an end, but as a means—towards a much fuller understanding of man’s physical environment, for the service of mankind.” Peter the Great had a similar goal. As the English pamphleteer J. Crull explained, “[Peter] was scarce fifteen years of Age when he applied himself to the Study of the Mathematicks [...] which he looked upon as the most Instrumental, to promote [his] Great Designs.” Peter considered the sciences to be an instrumental good, a means of extending his own goals for the reform of Russia. In the same way, the early Royal Society was inspired by Francis Bacon’s conception of science; the Society was intended to further science insofar as it could be applied to improve the general lot of mankind. Fontenelle, a very important figure in the history of science, was lavish in his praise: “We look upon the late Czar but as an Academician, tho’ he was a King and Emperor of Academicks.” Peter and the Fellows of the Royal Society had much in common ideologically, in the sense that both saw the theory and practice of science as something with a social purpose, and of a constructive benefit to mankind. So while it was primarily the merchant community who urged the Society to accept Menshikov as a Fellow, it is not absurd to imagine that many
Fellows found common cause with the Prince and his Tsar.

The appointment of Menshikov was entirely in keeping with the fundamentally ad hoc nature of the relationship between the English merchant class and their Russian partners. The Royal Society was theoretically patronized by the monarch, but it was effectively independent, the product of a class of independent virtuosi with enough financial clout to have time to experiment, and with enough curiosity to do so. And yet, as Boss slyly remarks, “It is pleasant to be able to record that Menshikov’s election to the Royal Society is unlikely to have yielded any commercial dividends.”44
Endnotes

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33. ‘A Foreign Minister at the Court of Russia,’ 4.
34. Hughes, 441.
35. From “General Manstein’s historical, political and military Memoirs of Russia,” reproduced in The Annual Register, or a view of the history, politics and literature, for the year 1770 (London: 1771), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 26.
37. Perry, 163–164.
39. Ibid.
40. Boss, 45–49 passim.
42. Crull, 9.
43. Fontenelle, 4.
44. Boss, 49.
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