|
| related topics |
| {key, protocol, security} |
| {let, theorem, proof} |
| {information, entropy, channel} |
| {operator, operators, space} |
| {states, state, optimal} |
| {algorithm, log, probability} |
| {vol, operators, histories} |
|
Universally composable privacy amplification against quantum adversaries
Renato Renner, Robert Koenig
abstract: Privacy amplification is the art of shrinking a partially secret string Z to
a highly secret key S. We show that, even if an adversary holds quantum
information about the initial string Z, the key S obtained by two-universal
hashing is secure, according to a universally composable security definition.
Additionally, we give an asymptotically optimal lower bound on the length of
the extractable key S in terms of the adversary's (quantum) knowledge about Z.
Our result has applications in quantum cryptography. In particular, it implies
that many of the known quantum key distribution protocols are universally
composable.
- oai_identifier:
- oai:arXiv.org:quant-ph/0403133
- categories:
- quant-ph
- comments:
- 14 pages, LaTeX; references and detailed discussion of optimality
added
- arxiv_id:
- quant-ph/0403133
- journal_ref:
- Proc. of TCC 2005, LNCS, Springer, vol. 3378 (2005)
- created:
- 2004-03-18
- updated:
- 2004-04-15
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