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Fall 2015 Schedule
Winter 2016 Schedule

2013/04/11, McConnell 437, 10:00 - 11:00

Mechanism Design: a new algorithmic framework
Yang Cai , PhD student, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Area: Mathematical Economics


In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient. Our solution proposes a novel framework for mechanism design by reducing mechanism design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "rational inputs") to algorithm design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "honest inputs"). Our reduction is generic and provides a framework for many other mechanism design problems. In the end of my talk, I will also briefly overview some of my other work, including algorithmic pricing, generalization of the Min-max theorem for multiplayer games and online matching.

Biography of Speaker:

Yang Cai is currently finishing his Ph.D. at MIT under the supervision of Constantinos Daskalakis. He received his Bachelor degree in Computer Science from Peking University. His research interests include Algorithmic Game Theory, Online Algorithms and Logic