Conference Program

All talks(including lightning talks, and general meeting) will be in Sarah Bernhardt Room.

Sunday, December 11th  (go to Dec. 12, Dec. 13, Dec. 14)
10:00-10:30 Coffee + Registration
10:30-12:00 Tutorial: Brendan Lucier
Posted-price Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities
12:00-1:30 Lunch Break
1:30-3:00 Tutorial: Hu Fu
The Lookahead Auction: a Simple Auction and its Several Lives
3:00-3:30 Coffee Break
3:30-4:30 Tutorial: Thomas Kesselheim
Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding: Equilibria and Dynamics
5:00-6:30 Reception
Location: Chez Plume
Monday, December 12th
8:30-9:00 Coffee
9:00-10:00 Plenary Talk: Christos Papadimitriou
Dynamics, Games, and Solution Concepts
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break
10:30-12:00 V.Conitzer
Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
A.Czumaj, A.Deligkas, M.Fasoulakis, J.Fearnley, M.Jurdzinkski and R.Savani
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria
A.Deligkas, J.Fearnley and R.Savani
Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria
H.Chan, A.X.Jiang, K.Leyton-Brown and R.Mehta
Multilinear Games
12:00-1:30 Lunch Break
1:30-3:00 X.Deng, Z.Feng and C.Papadimitriou
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net Neutrality
D.Hoy, N.Immorlica and B.Lucier
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk- averse customers
O.Ben-Porat and M.Tennenholtz
Multi-Unit Facility Location Games
A.Anagnostopoulos, R.Cavallo, S.Leonardi and M.Sviridenko
Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports Auctions
3:00-3:30 Coffee Break
3:30-4:30 R.Niazadeh and C.Wilkens
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions
M.Feldman, B.Lucier and N.Nisan
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
E.Anshelevich, K.Kar and S.Sekar
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
4:30-4:45 Break
4:45-5:30 Poster Session Lightning Talks
Location: Sarah Bernhardt Room
5:30-7:00 Poster Session + Refreshments
Location: Vieux Port/Vieux-Montreal Rooms
Tuesday, December 13th
8:30-9:00 Coffee
9:00-10:30 K.Goldner and A.R.Karlin
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
D.Thirumulanathan, R.Sundaresan and Y.Narahari
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
C.Tzamos and C.Wilkens
Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue
R.Colini-Baldeschi, S.Leonardi and Q.Zhang
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:00 Plenary Talk: Rakesh Vohra
Stable Matchings and Scarf’s Lemma
12:00-1:30 Lunch Break
1:30-3:00 D.Fotakis, L.Gourves and J.Monnot
Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences
I.Caragiannis, A.Filos-Ratsikas, S.S.Frederiksen, K.A.Hansen and Z.Tan
Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship
I.Feigenbaum, Y.Kanoria, I.Lo and J.Sethuraman
The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat Redistribution
Y.Kong, K.Ligett and G.Schoenebeck
Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-telling Focal
3:00-3:30 Coffee Break
3:30-5:00 A.Gorokh, S.Banerjee and K.Iyer
Near-Efficient Allocation using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings
E.Anshelevich and S.Sekar
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
G.Barthe, M.Gaboardi, E.J.Gallego Arias, J.Hsu, A.Roth and P-Y.Strub
Computer-aided Verification for Mechanism Design
M.Hoefer, T.Kesselheim and B.Kodric
Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
6:00-6:45 Annual Business Meeting
Location: Sarah Bernhardt Room
7:00- Conference Banquet
Location: Les Voutes
Wednesday, December 14th
8:30-9:00 Coffee
9:00-10:30 S.Albers and D.Kraft
Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach
P.Skowron
FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular Functions
T.Brunsch, M.Etscheid and H.Röglin
Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling Problems
S.Haney, D.Panigrahi and R.Freeman
On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:00 Plenary Talk: Kevin Leyton-Brown
Modeling Human Play in Games: From Behavioral Economics to Deep Learning
12:00-1:30 Lunch Break
1:30-3:00 S.Nath and T.Sandholm
Efficiency and Budget Balance
B.Fain, A.Goel and K.Munagala
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
L.Blumrosen and Y.Mizrahi
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading
G.Amanatidis, G.Birmpas and E.Markakis
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
3:00-3:30 Coffee Break
3:30-5:00 S.Goyal, S.Jabbari, M.Kearns, S.Khanna and J.Morgenstern
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization
V.Bilò, A.Fanelli and L.Moscardelli
Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social Influences
G.Schoenebeck and F-Y.Yu
Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree Distribution
W.Wang, L.Ying and J.Zhang
Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative Payments
                                    End of Conference