

AdapID workshop
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KU Leuven

Model-based approaches for the design of secure e-ID card applications

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
Belgian National electronic ID cards

- Functionalities of e-ID:
 - Visual and electronic identification of the cardholder;
 - Stores a single public key certificate linked to a citizen's national number → electronic authentication of the cardholder;
 - Digital signature;
 - ...
- Used in all transactions with government services.
- RISK: breaching **privacy** of citizen.

E-Health Applications

- **Motivation:**
 - Improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare;
 - Reduce related costs;
 - Rely on the innovation of information and communication technology.
- **Technology:**
 - Associated with each patient is his/her Electronic Health Record (EHR) (patient-related information);
 - Electronic data warehouses: central information systems where EHRs are stored.
- **Concerns:**
 - Management of electronic health records;
 - Mining of electronic health data.


Existing Infrastructure for Mining of Electronic Health Records (EHR)



- Inspired by the IRIS-Quebec implementation.


(“Infrastructure de Recherche Intégrée en Santé du Québec”)

Use Case: Mining EHR



- Queries are processed sequentially by a subset of the AHCs (Associated Hospital Centers) under the coordination of the CDSS (Clinical Data Sharing System).
- The CDSS first sends the query to *AHC_{i1}*. Once *AHC_{i1}* is done, the CDSS requests *AHC_{i1}* to forward the query along with the anonymized result to the next *AHC_{i2}*.
- When the cumulative result reaches *AHC_{final}*, the CDSS notifies the researcher that the query has been processed and provides the location where the result can be fetched.

Use Case: Issuing a Credential for EHR Mining



•IAC: Information Access Commission

Concerns


- **We *only* require that communication channels between the AHCs, the CDSS, and the researcher guarantee the *integrity* of data. *Confidentiality* is not required because:**
 1. **AHCs exchange only anonymized EHRs when processing a query;**
 2. **The researcher retrieves the result of his/her query in an anonymized form (all person-identifying fields are removed);**
 3. **Authentication and query submission between the researcher and CDSS is likely to be done in Zero Knowledge thereby assuring confidentiality and preventing replay attacks.**

Modelling and Simulation Based Design of Complex Systems


•We now have:

- A definition of eID;
- A definition of e-health and related applications;
- An example e-health use case, and requirements;
- Something to check for (integrity of data).


Where do we go from here?



Overview of the Process



Use Case-Level Analysis



Model-Driven Assessment of Use Cases for Dependable Systems

- **Assessing and refining use cases to ensure that the specified functionality meets the dependability requirements of the system.**
- **Method:**
 1. **Mapping use cases to DA-Charts model;**
 2. **Perform probability analysis of the model using AToM³.**

Dependability and Fault Tolerance

- **Dependability:**

Property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers.


- **Reliability:** Measure a system's aptitude to provide service and remain operating as long as required.
- **Safety:** Determined by the lack of catastrophic failures it undergoes.

- **Fault tolerance:**

Means of achieving system dependability.

- **Error detection:** Detection of exceptional situations
- **System recovery:** Describing the interactions with the environment

Model-Driven Process for Assessment and Refinement of Use Cases




DA-Charts

- **Dependability Assessment Charts:**

Probabilistic extension of the Statecharts formalism.

- A state can transition to one of two possible target states: a *success* state with probability p and a *failure* state with probability $1-p$.

- Syntax: *event[condition]{probability}/action*




DA-Charts in AtoM³



The screenshot displays the AtoM3 v0.3 software interface. The main window is titled "AtoM3 v0.3 using: DA_Charts". The interface includes a toolbar with icons for "Basic State", "History", "Composite", "Orthogonal", "Port", "Server", "Visual Settings", and "PA". The main workspace shows a diagram of a system with three sub-diagrams: D1, System, and D2. D1 shows states s5, s6, and s7 with transitions A{0.95}yB and A{0.05}yC. System shows states s1, s2, s3, and s4 with transitions /A, C/D, B, and E. D2 shows states s8, s9, and s10 with transitions D{0.99}yE and D{0.01}. A "Probability Analysis" dialog box is open, displaying the message: "The probability of reaching (s3, *) from (s5,s1,s8) is: 0.999500".

(note: concurrency)

Verification Branch




Model Verification with TPN and Romeo



Example of TPN Model

- **ROMEIO:**
 - TPN Analyzer: translates TPN models into Timed Automata;
 - Performs state space computation and on-the-fly model checking of reachability properties expressed in RT-CTL (Real-Time Computation-Tree Logic).

TPN Model of the CDSS



• Check : $AG[0,inf](M(CDSS\ server) < 1)$


– Assumption that the “CDSS server” place could hold 2 tokens if there was some breach of privacy of data (results were stored on the server).

• Output:

false (*property does not hold*)


Trace: t1: submitQuery, t2: RMI 1, t3: ack 1, t4: processing 1

Privacy-respecting TPN Model of the CDSS



- Check : $AG[0,inf](M(CDSS\ server) < 1)$
- Output:
true

Use Case Analysis with CSP and FDR2



- **CSP** (*Communicating Sequential Processes*):


- Language for describing patterns of interaction.

- **FDR2** (*Failures/Divergence Refinement 2*):


- Model checker for systems described in CSP;

- Converts two CSP process expressions into labelled transition systems, and then determines whether one of the processes is a refinement of the other.

Simulation Branch





Approach



DEVS Formalism

- *Discrete-Event* system Specifications
- To develop a rigorous basis for the compositional modelling and simulation of discrete event systems

DEVS in AToM³



AToM3 v0.3 using: EntityRelationshipV3 + DevsV2


EntityRelationshipV3 DevsV2

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
Modelling & Simulation using PyDEVS

- **PyDEVS (aka PythonDEVS):**
 - A prototype DEVS modelling language with simulator

Simulation Results Analysis with DEVS Trace Plotter



Animation in AToM³



Conclusions

- **Gave overview of first experiments in modelling and simulation based design of e-Health applications**
- **Next phase:**
 - **Elaborate use case(s)**
 - **Down to synthesis of code ?**
 - **Use Credentica SDK**

References

[IRIS-Quebec] <http://www.iris-quebec.ca/>

[BH01-1] **Andrea Bobbio and András Horváth**, “**Model Checking Time Petri Nets Using NuSMV**”, **PMCCS 5**, 2001.

[Hoa78] **C.A.R Hoare**, “**Communicating Sequential Processes**”, **Communications of the ACM 21**, 1978.

[Ros94] **A.W. Roscoe**, “**Model-Checking CSP**”, in ***A Classical Mind: essays in Honour of C.A.R. Hoare***, Prentice Hall, 1994.

[MSKV06] **S. Mustafiz, X. Sun, J. Kienzle, and H. Vangheluwe**. “**Model-Driven Assessment of Use Cases for Dependable Systems**”, **ACM/IEEE 9th International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems**, 2006.